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2865baf540
The Spectre-v1 mitigations made "access_ok()" much more expensive, since it has to serialize execution with the test for a valid user address. All the normal user copy routines avoid this by just masking the user address with a data-dependent mask instead, but the fast "unsafe_user_read()" kind of patterms that were supposed to be a fast case got slowed down. This introduces a notion of using src = masked_user_access_begin(src); to do the user address sanity using a data-dependent mask instead of the more traditional conditional if (user_read_access_begin(src, len)) { model. This model only works for dense accesses that start at 'src' and on architectures that have a guard region that is guaranteed to fault in between the user space and the kernel space area. With this, the user access doesn't need to be manually checked, because a bad address is guaranteed to fault (by some architecture masking trick: on x86-64 this involves just turning an invalid user address into all ones, since we don't map the top of address space). This only converts a couple of examples for now. Example x86-64 code generation for loading two words from user space: stac mov %rax,%rcx sar $0x3f,%rcx or %rax,%rcx mov (%rcx),%r13 mov 0x8(%rcx),%r14 clac where all the error handling and -EFAULT is now purely handled out of line by the exception path. Of course, if the micro-architecture does badly at 'clac' and 'stac', the above is still pitifully slow. But at least we did as well as we could. Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
156 lines
4.1 KiB
C
156 lines
4.1 KiB
C
// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
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#include <linux/compiler.h>
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#include <linux/export.h>
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#include <linux/fault-inject-usercopy.h>
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#include <linux/kasan-checks.h>
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#include <linux/thread_info.h>
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#include <linux/uaccess.h>
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#include <linux/kernel.h>
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#include <linux/errno.h>
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#include <linux/mm.h>
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#include <asm/byteorder.h>
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#include <asm/word-at-a-time.h>
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#ifdef CONFIG_HAVE_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS
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#define IS_UNALIGNED(src, dst) 0
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#else
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#define IS_UNALIGNED(src, dst) \
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(((long) dst | (long) src) & (sizeof(long) - 1))
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#endif
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/*
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* Do a strncpy, return length of string without final '\0'.
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* 'count' is the user-supplied count (return 'count' if we
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* hit it), 'max' is the address space maximum (and we return
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* -EFAULT if we hit it).
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*/
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static __always_inline long do_strncpy_from_user(char *dst, const char __user *src,
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unsigned long count, unsigned long max)
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{
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const struct word_at_a_time constants = WORD_AT_A_TIME_CONSTANTS;
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unsigned long res = 0;
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if (IS_UNALIGNED(src, dst))
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goto byte_at_a_time;
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while (max >= sizeof(unsigned long)) {
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unsigned long c, data, mask;
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/* Fall back to byte-at-a-time if we get a page fault */
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unsafe_get_user(c, (unsigned long __user *)(src+res), byte_at_a_time);
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/*
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* Note that we mask out the bytes following the NUL. This is
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* important to do because string oblivious code may read past
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* the NUL. For those routines, we don't want to give them
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* potentially random bytes after the NUL in `src`.
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*
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* One example of such code is BPF map keys. BPF treats map keys
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* as an opaque set of bytes. Without the post-NUL mask, any BPF
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* maps keyed by strings returned from strncpy_from_user() may
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* have multiple entries for semantically identical strings.
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*/
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if (has_zero(c, &data, &constants)) {
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data = prep_zero_mask(c, data, &constants);
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data = create_zero_mask(data);
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mask = zero_bytemask(data);
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*(unsigned long *)(dst+res) = c & mask;
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return res + find_zero(data);
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}
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*(unsigned long *)(dst+res) = c;
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res += sizeof(unsigned long);
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max -= sizeof(unsigned long);
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}
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byte_at_a_time:
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while (max) {
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char c;
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unsafe_get_user(c,src+res, efault);
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dst[res] = c;
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if (!c)
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return res;
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res++;
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max--;
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}
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/*
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* Uhhuh. We hit 'max'. But was that the user-specified maximum
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* too? If so, that's ok - we got as much as the user asked for.
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*/
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if (res >= count)
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return res;
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/*
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* Nope: we hit the address space limit, and we still had more
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* characters the caller would have wanted. That's an EFAULT.
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*/
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efault:
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return -EFAULT;
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}
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/**
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* strncpy_from_user: - Copy a NUL terminated string from userspace.
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* @dst: Destination address, in kernel space. This buffer must be at
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* least @count bytes long.
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* @src: Source address, in user space.
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* @count: Maximum number of bytes to copy, including the trailing NUL.
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*
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* Copies a NUL-terminated string from userspace to kernel space.
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*
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* On success, returns the length of the string (not including the trailing
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* NUL).
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*
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* If access to userspace fails, returns -EFAULT (some data may have been
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* copied).
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*
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* If @count is smaller than the length of the string, copies @count bytes
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* and returns @count.
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*/
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long strncpy_from_user(char *dst, const char __user *src, long count)
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{
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unsigned long max_addr, src_addr;
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might_fault();
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if (should_fail_usercopy())
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return -EFAULT;
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if (unlikely(count <= 0))
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return 0;
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if (can_do_masked_user_access()) {
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long retval;
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src = masked_user_access_begin(src);
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retval = do_strncpy_from_user(dst, src, count, count);
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user_read_access_end();
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return retval;
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}
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max_addr = TASK_SIZE_MAX;
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src_addr = (unsigned long)untagged_addr(src);
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if (likely(src_addr < max_addr)) {
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unsigned long max = max_addr - src_addr;
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long retval;
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/*
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* Truncate 'max' to the user-specified limit, so that
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* we only have one limit we need to check in the loop
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*/
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if (max > count)
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max = count;
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kasan_check_write(dst, count);
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check_object_size(dst, count, false);
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if (user_read_access_begin(src, max)) {
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retval = do_strncpy_from_user(dst, src, count, max);
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user_read_access_end();
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return retval;
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}
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}
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return -EFAULT;
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}
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EXPORT_SYMBOL(strncpy_from_user);
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