linux/lib/strncpy_from_user.c

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License cleanup: add SPDX GPL-2.0 license identifier to files with no license Many source files in the tree are missing licensing information, which makes it harder for compliance tools to determine the correct license. By default all files without license information are under the default license of the kernel, which is GPL version 2. Update the files which contain no license information with the 'GPL-2.0' SPDX license identifier. The SPDX identifier is a legally binding shorthand, which can be used instead of the full boiler plate text. This patch is based on work done by Thomas Gleixner and Kate Stewart and Philippe Ombredanne. How this work was done: Patches were generated and checked against linux-4.14-rc6 for a subset of the use cases: - file had no licensing information it it. - file was a */uapi/* one with no licensing information in it, - file was a */uapi/* one with existing licensing information, Further patches will be generated in subsequent months to fix up cases where non-standard license headers were used, and references to license had to be inferred by heuristics based on keywords. The analysis to determine which SPDX License Identifier to be applied to a file was done in a spreadsheet of side by side results from of the output of two independent scanners (ScanCode & Windriver) producing SPDX tag:value files created by Philippe Ombredanne. Philippe prepared the base worksheet, and did an initial spot review of a few 1000 files. The 4.13 kernel was the starting point of the analysis with 60,537 files assessed. Kate Stewart did a file by file comparison of the scanner results in the spreadsheet to determine which SPDX license identifier(s) to be applied to the file. She confirmed any determination that was not immediately clear with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation. Criteria used to select files for SPDX license identifier tagging was: - Files considered eligible had to be source code files. - Make and config files were included as candidates if they contained >5 lines of source - File already had some variant of a license header in it (even if <5 lines). All documentation files were explicitly excluded. The following heuristics were used to determine which SPDX license identifiers to apply. - when both scanners couldn't find any license traces, file was considered to have no license information in it, and the top level COPYING file license applied. For non */uapi/* files that summary was: SPDX license identifier # files ---------------------------------------------------|------- GPL-2.0 11139 and resulted in the first patch in this series. If that file was a */uapi/* path one, it was "GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note" otherwise it was "GPL-2.0". Results of that was: SPDX license identifier # files ---------------------------------------------------|------- GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 930 and resulted in the second patch in this series. - if a file had some form of licensing information in it, and was one of the */uapi/* ones, it was denoted with the Linux-syscall-note if any GPL family license was found in the file or had no licensing in it (per prior point). Results summary: SPDX license identifier # files ---------------------------------------------------|------ GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 270 GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 169 ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-2-Clause) 21 ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 17 LGPL-2.1+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 15 GPL-1.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 14 ((GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 5 LGPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 4 LGPL-2.1 WITH Linux-syscall-note 3 ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR MIT) 3 ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) AND MIT) 1 and that resulted in the third patch in this series. - when the two scanners agreed on the detected license(s), that became the concluded license(s). - when there was disagreement between the two scanners (one detected a license but the other didn't, or they both detected different licenses) a manual inspection of the file occurred. - In most cases a manual inspection of the information in the file resulted in a clear resolution of the license that should apply (and which scanner probably needed to revisit its heuristics). - When it was not immediately clear, the license identifier was confirmed with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation. - If there was any question as to the appropriate license identifier, the file was flagged for further research and to be revisited later in time. In total, over 70 hours of logged manual review was done on the spreadsheet to determine the SPDX license identifiers to apply to the source files by Kate, Philippe, Thomas and, in some cases, confirmation by lawyers working with the Linux Foundation. Kate also obtained a third independent scan of the 4.13 code base from FOSSology, and compared selected files where the other two scanners disagreed against that SPDX file, to see if there was new insights. The Windriver scanner is based on an older version of FOSSology in part, so they are related. Thomas did random spot checks in about 500 files from the spreadsheets for the uapi headers and agreed with SPDX license identifier in the files he inspected. For the non-uapi files Thomas did random spot checks in about 15000 files. In initial set of patches against 4.14-rc6, 3 files were found to have copy/paste license identifier errors, and have been fixed to reflect the correct identifier. Additionally Philippe spent 10 hours this week doing a detailed manual inspection and review of the 12,461 patched files from the initial patch version early this week with: - a full scancode scan run, collecting the matched texts, detected license ids and scores - reviewing anything where there was a license detected (about 500+ files) to ensure that the applied SPDX license was correct - reviewing anything where there was no detection but the patch license was not GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note to ensure that the applied SPDX license was correct This produced a worksheet with 20 files needing minor correction. This worksheet was then exported into 3 different .csv files for the different types of files to be modified. These .csv files were then reviewed by Greg. Thomas wrote a script to parse the csv files and add the proper SPDX tag to the file, in the format that the file expected. This script was further refined by Greg based on the output to detect more types of files automatically and to distinguish between header and source .c files (which need different comment types.) Finally Greg ran the script using the .csv files to generate the patches. Reviewed-by: Kate Stewart <kstewart@linuxfoundation.org> Reviewed-by: Philippe Ombredanne <pombredanne@nexb.com> Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2017-11-01 14:07:57 +00:00
// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
#include <linux/compiler.h>
#include <linux/export.h>
#include <linux/fault-inject-usercopy.h>
#include <linux/kasan-checks.h>
#include <linux/thread_info.h>
#include <linux/uaccess.h>
#include <linux/kernel.h>
#include <linux/errno.h>
lib: untag user pointers in strn*_user Patch series "arm64: untag user pointers passed to the kernel", v19. === Overview arm64 has a feature called Top Byte Ignore, which allows to embed pointer tags into the top byte of each pointer. Userspace programs (such as HWASan, a memory debugging tool [1]) might use this feature and pass tagged user pointers to the kernel through syscalls or other interfaces. Right now the kernel is already able to handle user faults with tagged pointers, due to these patches: 1. 81cddd65 ("arm64: traps: fix userspace cache maintenance emulation on a tagged pointer") 2. 7dcd9dd8 ("arm64: hw_breakpoint: fix watchpoint matching for tagged pointers") 3. 276e9327 ("arm64: entry: improve data abort handling of tagged pointers") This patchset extends tagged pointer support to syscall arguments. As per the proposed ABI change [3], tagged pointers are only allowed to be passed to syscalls when they point to memory ranges obtained by anonymous mmap() or sbrk() (see the patchset [3] for more details). For non-memory syscalls this is done by untaging user pointers when the kernel performs pointer checking to find out whether the pointer comes from userspace (most notably in access_ok). The untagging is done only when the pointer is being checked, the tag is preserved as the pointer makes its way through the kernel and stays tagged when the kernel dereferences the pointer when perfoming user memory accesses. The mmap and mremap (only new_addr) syscalls do not currently accept tagged addresses. Architectures may interpret the tag as a background colour for the corresponding vma. Other memory syscalls (mprotect, etc.) don't do user memory accesses but rather deal with memory ranges, and untagged pointers are better suited to describe memory ranges internally. Thus for memory syscalls we untag pointers completely when they enter the kernel. === Other approaches One of the alternative approaches to untagging that was considered is to completely strip the pointer tag as the pointer enters the kernel with some kind of a syscall wrapper, but that won't work with the countless number of different ioctl calls. With this approach we would need a custom wrapper for each ioctl variation, which doesn't seem practical. An alternative approach to untagging pointers in memory syscalls prologues is to inspead allow tagged pointers to be passed to find_vma() (and other vma related functions) and untag them there. Unfortunately, a lot of find_vma() callers then compare or subtract the returned vma start and end fields against the pointer that was being searched. Thus this approach would still require changing all find_vma() callers. === Testing The following testing approaches has been taken to find potential issues with user pointer untagging: 1. Static testing (with sparse [2] and separately with a custom static analyzer based on Clang) to track casts of __user pointers to integer types to find places where untagging needs to be done. 2. Static testing with grep to find parts of the kernel that call find_vma() (and other similar functions) or directly compare against vm_start/vm_end fields of vma. 3. Static testing with grep to find parts of the kernel that compare user pointers with TASK_SIZE or other similar consts and macros. 4. Dynamic testing: adding BUG_ON(has_tag(addr)) to find_vma() and running a modified syzkaller version that passes tagged pointers to the kernel. Based on the results of the testing the requried patches have been added to the patchset. === Notes This patchset is meant to be merged together with "arm64 relaxed ABI" [3]. This patchset is a prerequisite for ARM's memory tagging hardware feature support [4]. This patchset has been merged into the Pixel 2 & 3 kernel trees and is now being used to enable testing of Pixel phones with HWASan. Thanks! [1] http://clang.llvm.org/docs/HardwareAssistedAddressSanitizerDesign.html [2] https://github.com/lucvoo/sparse-dev/commit/5f960cb10f56ec2017c128ef9d16060e0145f292 [3] https://lkml.org/lkml/2019/6/12/745 [4] https://community.arm.com/processors/b/blog/posts/arm-a-profile-architecture-2018-developments-armv85a This patch (of 11) This patch is a part of a series that extends kernel ABI to allow to pass tagged user pointers (with the top byte set to something else other than 0x00) as syscall arguments. strncpy_from_user and strnlen_user accept user addresses as arguments, and do not go through the same path as copy_from_user and others, so here we need to handle the case of tagged user addresses separately. Untag user pointers passed to these functions. Note, that this patch only temporarily untags the pointers to perform validity checks, but then uses them as is to perform user memory accesses. [andreyknvl@google.com: fix sparc4 build] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/CAAeHK+yx4a-P0sDrXTUxMvO2H0CJZUFPffBrg_cU7oJOZyC7ew@mail.gmail.com Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/c5a78bcad3e94d6cda71fcaa60a423231ae71e4c.1563904656.git.andreyknvl@google.com Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com> Reviewed-by: Vincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino@arm.com> Reviewed-by: Khalid Aziz <khalid.aziz@oracle.com> Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com> Cc: Eric Auger <eric.auger@redhat.com> Cc: Felix Kuehling <Felix.Kuehling@amd.com> Cc: Jens Wiklander <jens.wiklander@linaro.org> Cc: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab+samsung@kernel.org> Cc: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2019-09-25 23:48:27 +00:00
#include <linux/mm.h>
#include <asm/byteorder.h>
word-at-a-time: make the interfaces truly generic This changes the interfaces in <asm/word-at-a-time.h> to be a bit more complicated, but a lot more generic. In particular, it allows us to really do the operations efficiently on both little-endian and big-endian machines, pretty much regardless of machine details. For example, if you can rely on a fast population count instruction on your architecture, this will allow you to make your optimized <asm/word-at-a-time.h> file with that. NOTE! The "generic" version in include/asm-generic/word-at-a-time.h is not truly generic, it actually only works on big-endian. Why? Because on little-endian the generic algorithms are wasteful, since you can inevitably do better. The x86 implementation is an example of that. (The only truly non-generic part of the asm-generic implementation is the "find_zero()" function, and you could make a little-endian version of it. And if the Kbuild infrastructure allowed us to pick a particular header file, that would be lovely) The <asm/word-at-a-time.h> functions are as follows: - WORD_AT_A_TIME_CONSTANTS: specific constants that the algorithm uses. - has_zero(): take a word, and determine if it has a zero byte in it. It gets the word, the pointer to the constant pool, and a pointer to an intermediate "data" field it can set. This is the "quick-and-dirty" zero tester: it's what is run inside the hot loops. - "prep_zero_mask()": take the word, the data that has_zero() produced, and the constant pool, and generate an *exact* mask of which byte had the first zero. This is run directly *outside* the loop, and allows the "has_zero()" function to answer the "is there a zero byte" question without necessarily getting exactly *which* byte is the first one to contain a zero. If you do multiple byte lookups concurrently (eg "hash_name()", which looks for both NUL and '/' bytes), after you've done the prep_zero_mask() phase, the result of those can be or'ed together to get the "either or" case. - The result from "prep_zero_mask()" can then be fed into "find_zero()" (to find the byte offset of the first byte that was zero) or into "zero_bytemask()" (to find the bytemask of the bytes preceding the zero byte). The existence of zero_bytemask() is optional, and is not necessary for the normal string routines. But dentry name hashing needs it, so if you enable DENTRY_WORD_AT_A_TIME you need to expose it. This changes the generic strncpy_from_user() function and the dentry hashing functions to use these modified word-at-a-time interfaces. This gets us back to the optimized state of the x86 strncpy that we lost in the previous commit when moving over to the generic version. Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2012-05-26 17:43:17 +00:00
#include <asm/word-at-a-time.h>
#ifdef CONFIG_HAVE_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS
#define IS_UNALIGNED(src, dst) 0
#else
#define IS_UNALIGNED(src, dst) \
(((long) dst | (long) src) & (sizeof(long) - 1))
#endif
/*
* Do a strncpy, return length of string without final '\0'.
* 'count' is the user-supplied count (return 'count' if we
* hit it), 'max' is the address space maximum (and we return
* -EFAULT if we hit it).
*/
static __always_inline long do_strncpy_from_user(char *dst, const char __user *src,
unsigned long count, unsigned long max)
{
word-at-a-time: make the interfaces truly generic This changes the interfaces in <asm/word-at-a-time.h> to be a bit more complicated, but a lot more generic. In particular, it allows us to really do the operations efficiently on both little-endian and big-endian machines, pretty much regardless of machine details. For example, if you can rely on a fast population count instruction on your architecture, this will allow you to make your optimized <asm/word-at-a-time.h> file with that. NOTE! The "generic" version in include/asm-generic/word-at-a-time.h is not truly generic, it actually only works on big-endian. Why? Because on little-endian the generic algorithms are wasteful, since you can inevitably do better. The x86 implementation is an example of that. (The only truly non-generic part of the asm-generic implementation is the "find_zero()" function, and you could make a little-endian version of it. And if the Kbuild infrastructure allowed us to pick a particular header file, that would be lovely) The <asm/word-at-a-time.h> functions are as follows: - WORD_AT_A_TIME_CONSTANTS: specific constants that the algorithm uses. - has_zero(): take a word, and determine if it has a zero byte in it. It gets the word, the pointer to the constant pool, and a pointer to an intermediate "data" field it can set. This is the "quick-and-dirty" zero tester: it's what is run inside the hot loops. - "prep_zero_mask()": take the word, the data that has_zero() produced, and the constant pool, and generate an *exact* mask of which byte had the first zero. This is run directly *outside* the loop, and allows the "has_zero()" function to answer the "is there a zero byte" question without necessarily getting exactly *which* byte is the first one to contain a zero. If you do multiple byte lookups concurrently (eg "hash_name()", which looks for both NUL and '/' bytes), after you've done the prep_zero_mask() phase, the result of those can be or'ed together to get the "either or" case. - The result from "prep_zero_mask()" can then be fed into "find_zero()" (to find the byte offset of the first byte that was zero) or into "zero_bytemask()" (to find the bytemask of the bytes preceding the zero byte). The existence of zero_bytemask() is optional, and is not necessary for the normal string routines. But dentry name hashing needs it, so if you enable DENTRY_WORD_AT_A_TIME you need to expose it. This changes the generic strncpy_from_user() function and the dentry hashing functions to use these modified word-at-a-time interfaces. This gets us back to the optimized state of the x86 strncpy that we lost in the previous commit when moving over to the generic version. Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2012-05-26 17:43:17 +00:00
const struct word_at_a_time constants = WORD_AT_A_TIME_CONSTANTS;
unsigned long res = 0;
if (IS_UNALIGNED(src, dst))
goto byte_at_a_time;
while (max >= sizeof(unsigned long)) {
unsigned long c, data, mask;
/* Fall back to byte-at-a-time if we get a page fault */
unsafe_[get|put]_user: change interface to use a error target label When I initially added the unsafe_[get|put]_user() helpers in commit 5b24a7a2aa20 ("Add 'unsafe' user access functions for batched accesses"), I made the mistake of modeling the interface on our traditional __[get|put]_user() functions, which return zero on success, or -EFAULT on failure. That interface is fairly easy to use, but it's actually fairly nasty for good code generation, since it essentially forces the caller to check the error value for each access. In particular, since the error handling is already internally implemented with an exception handler, and we already use "asm goto" for various other things, we could fairly easily make the error cases just jump directly to an error label instead, and avoid the need for explicit checking after each operation. So switch the interface to pass in an error label, rather than checking the error value in the caller. Best do it now before we start growing more users (the signal handling code in particular would be a good place to use the new interface). So rather than if (unsafe_get_user(x, ptr)) ... handle error .. the interface is now unsafe_get_user(x, ptr, label); where an error during the user mode fetch will now just cause a jump to 'label' in the caller. Right now the actual _implementation_ of this all still ends up being a "if (err) goto label", and does not take advantage of any exception label tricks, but for "unsafe_put_user()" in particular it should be fairly straightforward to convert to using the exception table model. Note that "unsafe_get_user()" is much harder to convert to a clever exception table model, because current versions of gcc do not allow the use of "asm goto" (for the exception) with output values (for the actual value to be fetched). But that is hopefully not a limitation in the long term. [ Also note that it might be a good idea to switch unsafe_get_user() to actually _return_ the value it fetches from user space, but this commit only changes the error handling semantics ] Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2016-08-08 20:02:01 +00:00
unsafe_get_user(c, (unsigned long __user *)(src+res), byte_at_a_time);
/*
* Note that we mask out the bytes following the NUL. This is
* important to do because string oblivious code may read past
* the NUL. For those routines, we don't want to give them
* potentially random bytes after the NUL in `src`.
*
* One example of such code is BPF map keys. BPF treats map keys
* as an opaque set of bytes. Without the post-NUL mask, any BPF
* maps keyed by strings returned from strncpy_from_user() may
* have multiple entries for semantically identical strings.
*/
word-at-a-time: make the interfaces truly generic This changes the interfaces in <asm/word-at-a-time.h> to be a bit more complicated, but a lot more generic. In particular, it allows us to really do the operations efficiently on both little-endian and big-endian machines, pretty much regardless of machine details. For example, if you can rely on a fast population count instruction on your architecture, this will allow you to make your optimized <asm/word-at-a-time.h> file with that. NOTE! The "generic" version in include/asm-generic/word-at-a-time.h is not truly generic, it actually only works on big-endian. Why? Because on little-endian the generic algorithms are wasteful, since you can inevitably do better. The x86 implementation is an example of that. (The only truly non-generic part of the asm-generic implementation is the "find_zero()" function, and you could make a little-endian version of it. And if the Kbuild infrastructure allowed us to pick a particular header file, that would be lovely) The <asm/word-at-a-time.h> functions are as follows: - WORD_AT_A_TIME_CONSTANTS: specific constants that the algorithm uses. - has_zero(): take a word, and determine if it has a zero byte in it. It gets the word, the pointer to the constant pool, and a pointer to an intermediate "data" field it can set. This is the "quick-and-dirty" zero tester: it's what is run inside the hot loops. - "prep_zero_mask()": take the word, the data that has_zero() produced, and the constant pool, and generate an *exact* mask of which byte had the first zero. This is run directly *outside* the loop, and allows the "has_zero()" function to answer the "is there a zero byte" question without necessarily getting exactly *which* byte is the first one to contain a zero. If you do multiple byte lookups concurrently (eg "hash_name()", which looks for both NUL and '/' bytes), after you've done the prep_zero_mask() phase, the result of those can be or'ed together to get the "either or" case. - The result from "prep_zero_mask()" can then be fed into "find_zero()" (to find the byte offset of the first byte that was zero) or into "zero_bytemask()" (to find the bytemask of the bytes preceding the zero byte). The existence of zero_bytemask() is optional, and is not necessary for the normal string routines. But dentry name hashing needs it, so if you enable DENTRY_WORD_AT_A_TIME you need to expose it. This changes the generic strncpy_from_user() function and the dentry hashing functions to use these modified word-at-a-time interfaces. This gets us back to the optimized state of the x86 strncpy that we lost in the previous commit when moving over to the generic version. Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2012-05-26 17:43:17 +00:00
if (has_zero(c, &data, &constants)) {
data = prep_zero_mask(c, data, &constants);
data = create_zero_mask(data);
mask = zero_bytemask(data);
*(unsigned long *)(dst+res) = c & mask;
word-at-a-time: make the interfaces truly generic This changes the interfaces in <asm/word-at-a-time.h> to be a bit more complicated, but a lot more generic. In particular, it allows us to really do the operations efficiently on both little-endian and big-endian machines, pretty much regardless of machine details. For example, if you can rely on a fast population count instruction on your architecture, this will allow you to make your optimized <asm/word-at-a-time.h> file with that. NOTE! The "generic" version in include/asm-generic/word-at-a-time.h is not truly generic, it actually only works on big-endian. Why? Because on little-endian the generic algorithms are wasteful, since you can inevitably do better. The x86 implementation is an example of that. (The only truly non-generic part of the asm-generic implementation is the "find_zero()" function, and you could make a little-endian version of it. And if the Kbuild infrastructure allowed us to pick a particular header file, that would be lovely) The <asm/word-at-a-time.h> functions are as follows: - WORD_AT_A_TIME_CONSTANTS: specific constants that the algorithm uses. - has_zero(): take a word, and determine if it has a zero byte in it. It gets the word, the pointer to the constant pool, and a pointer to an intermediate "data" field it can set. This is the "quick-and-dirty" zero tester: it's what is run inside the hot loops. - "prep_zero_mask()": take the word, the data that has_zero() produced, and the constant pool, and generate an *exact* mask of which byte had the first zero. This is run directly *outside* the loop, and allows the "has_zero()" function to answer the "is there a zero byte" question without necessarily getting exactly *which* byte is the first one to contain a zero. If you do multiple byte lookups concurrently (eg "hash_name()", which looks for both NUL and '/' bytes), after you've done the prep_zero_mask() phase, the result of those can be or'ed together to get the "either or" case. - The result from "prep_zero_mask()" can then be fed into "find_zero()" (to find the byte offset of the first byte that was zero) or into "zero_bytemask()" (to find the bytemask of the bytes preceding the zero byte). The existence of zero_bytemask() is optional, and is not necessary for the normal string routines. But dentry name hashing needs it, so if you enable DENTRY_WORD_AT_A_TIME you need to expose it. This changes the generic strncpy_from_user() function and the dentry hashing functions to use these modified word-at-a-time interfaces. This gets us back to the optimized state of the x86 strncpy that we lost in the previous commit when moving over to the generic version. Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2012-05-26 17:43:17 +00:00
return res + find_zero(data);
}
*(unsigned long *)(dst+res) = c;
res += sizeof(unsigned long);
max -= sizeof(unsigned long);
}
byte_at_a_time:
while (max) {
char c;
unsafe_[get|put]_user: change interface to use a error target label When I initially added the unsafe_[get|put]_user() helpers in commit 5b24a7a2aa20 ("Add 'unsafe' user access functions for batched accesses"), I made the mistake of modeling the interface on our traditional __[get|put]_user() functions, which return zero on success, or -EFAULT on failure. That interface is fairly easy to use, but it's actually fairly nasty for good code generation, since it essentially forces the caller to check the error value for each access. In particular, since the error handling is already internally implemented with an exception handler, and we already use "asm goto" for various other things, we could fairly easily make the error cases just jump directly to an error label instead, and avoid the need for explicit checking after each operation. So switch the interface to pass in an error label, rather than checking the error value in the caller. Best do it now before we start growing more users (the signal handling code in particular would be a good place to use the new interface). So rather than if (unsafe_get_user(x, ptr)) ... handle error .. the interface is now unsafe_get_user(x, ptr, label); where an error during the user mode fetch will now just cause a jump to 'label' in the caller. Right now the actual _implementation_ of this all still ends up being a "if (err) goto label", and does not take advantage of any exception label tricks, but for "unsafe_put_user()" in particular it should be fairly straightforward to convert to using the exception table model. Note that "unsafe_get_user()" is much harder to convert to a clever exception table model, because current versions of gcc do not allow the use of "asm goto" (for the exception) with output values (for the actual value to be fetched). But that is hopefully not a limitation in the long term. [ Also note that it might be a good idea to switch unsafe_get_user() to actually _return_ the value it fetches from user space, but this commit only changes the error handling semantics ] Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2016-08-08 20:02:01 +00:00
unsafe_get_user(c,src+res, efault);
dst[res] = c;
if (!c)
return res;
res++;
max--;
}
/*
* Uhhuh. We hit 'max'. But was that the user-specified maximum
* too? If so, that's ok - we got as much as the user asked for.
*/
if (res >= count)
return res;
/*
* Nope: we hit the address space limit, and we still had more
* characters the caller would have wanted. That's an EFAULT.
*/
unsafe_[get|put]_user: change interface to use a error target label When I initially added the unsafe_[get|put]_user() helpers in commit 5b24a7a2aa20 ("Add 'unsafe' user access functions for batched accesses"), I made the mistake of modeling the interface on our traditional __[get|put]_user() functions, which return zero on success, or -EFAULT on failure. That interface is fairly easy to use, but it's actually fairly nasty for good code generation, since it essentially forces the caller to check the error value for each access. In particular, since the error handling is already internally implemented with an exception handler, and we already use "asm goto" for various other things, we could fairly easily make the error cases just jump directly to an error label instead, and avoid the need for explicit checking after each operation. So switch the interface to pass in an error label, rather than checking the error value in the caller. Best do it now before we start growing more users (the signal handling code in particular would be a good place to use the new interface). So rather than if (unsafe_get_user(x, ptr)) ... handle error .. the interface is now unsafe_get_user(x, ptr, label); where an error during the user mode fetch will now just cause a jump to 'label' in the caller. Right now the actual _implementation_ of this all still ends up being a "if (err) goto label", and does not take advantage of any exception label tricks, but for "unsafe_put_user()" in particular it should be fairly straightforward to convert to using the exception table model. Note that "unsafe_get_user()" is much harder to convert to a clever exception table model, because current versions of gcc do not allow the use of "asm goto" (for the exception) with output values (for the actual value to be fetched). But that is hopefully not a limitation in the long term. [ Also note that it might be a good idea to switch unsafe_get_user() to actually _return_ the value it fetches from user space, but this commit only changes the error handling semantics ] Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2016-08-08 20:02:01 +00:00
efault:
return -EFAULT;
}
/**
* strncpy_from_user: - Copy a NUL terminated string from userspace.
* @dst: Destination address, in kernel space. This buffer must be at
* least @count bytes long.
* @src: Source address, in user space.
* @count: Maximum number of bytes to copy, including the trailing NUL.
*
* Copies a NUL-terminated string from userspace to kernel space.
*
* On success, returns the length of the string (not including the trailing
* NUL).
*
* If access to userspace fails, returns -EFAULT (some data may have been
* copied).
*
* If @count is smaller than the length of the string, copies @count bytes
* and returns @count.
*/
long strncpy_from_user(char *dst, const char __user *src, long count)
{
unsigned long max_addr, src_addr;
might_fault();
if (should_fail_usercopy())
return -EFAULT;
if (unlikely(count <= 0))
return 0;
x86: support user address masking instead of non-speculative conditional The Spectre-v1 mitigations made "access_ok()" much more expensive, since it has to serialize execution with the test for a valid user address. All the normal user copy routines avoid this by just masking the user address with a data-dependent mask instead, but the fast "unsafe_user_read()" kind of patterms that were supposed to be a fast case got slowed down. This introduces a notion of using src = masked_user_access_begin(src); to do the user address sanity using a data-dependent mask instead of the more traditional conditional if (user_read_access_begin(src, len)) { model. This model only works for dense accesses that start at 'src' and on architectures that have a guard region that is guaranteed to fault in between the user space and the kernel space area. With this, the user access doesn't need to be manually checked, because a bad address is guaranteed to fault (by some architecture masking trick: on x86-64 this involves just turning an invalid user address into all ones, since we don't map the top of address space). This only converts a couple of examples for now. Example x86-64 code generation for loading two words from user space: stac mov %rax,%rcx sar $0x3f,%rcx or %rax,%rcx mov (%rcx),%r13 mov 0x8(%rcx),%r14 clac where all the error handling and -EFAULT is now purely handled out of line by the exception path. Of course, if the micro-architecture does badly at 'clac' and 'stac', the above is still pitifully slow. But at least we did as well as we could. Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2024-04-09 03:04:58 +00:00
if (can_do_masked_user_access()) {
long retval;
src = masked_user_access_begin(src);
retval = do_strncpy_from_user(dst, src, count, count);
user_read_access_end();
return retval;
}
max_addr = TASK_SIZE_MAX;
lib: untag user pointers in strn*_user Patch series "arm64: untag user pointers passed to the kernel", v19. === Overview arm64 has a feature called Top Byte Ignore, which allows to embed pointer tags into the top byte of each pointer. Userspace programs (such as HWASan, a memory debugging tool [1]) might use this feature and pass tagged user pointers to the kernel through syscalls or other interfaces. Right now the kernel is already able to handle user faults with tagged pointers, due to these patches: 1. 81cddd65 ("arm64: traps: fix userspace cache maintenance emulation on a tagged pointer") 2. 7dcd9dd8 ("arm64: hw_breakpoint: fix watchpoint matching for tagged pointers") 3. 276e9327 ("arm64: entry: improve data abort handling of tagged pointers") This patchset extends tagged pointer support to syscall arguments. As per the proposed ABI change [3], tagged pointers are only allowed to be passed to syscalls when they point to memory ranges obtained by anonymous mmap() or sbrk() (see the patchset [3] for more details). For non-memory syscalls this is done by untaging user pointers when the kernel performs pointer checking to find out whether the pointer comes from userspace (most notably in access_ok). The untagging is done only when the pointer is being checked, the tag is preserved as the pointer makes its way through the kernel and stays tagged when the kernel dereferences the pointer when perfoming user memory accesses. The mmap and mremap (only new_addr) syscalls do not currently accept tagged addresses. Architectures may interpret the tag as a background colour for the corresponding vma. Other memory syscalls (mprotect, etc.) don't do user memory accesses but rather deal with memory ranges, and untagged pointers are better suited to describe memory ranges internally. Thus for memory syscalls we untag pointers completely when they enter the kernel. === Other approaches One of the alternative approaches to untagging that was considered is to completely strip the pointer tag as the pointer enters the kernel with some kind of a syscall wrapper, but that won't work with the countless number of different ioctl calls. With this approach we would need a custom wrapper for each ioctl variation, which doesn't seem practical. An alternative approach to untagging pointers in memory syscalls prologues is to inspead allow tagged pointers to be passed to find_vma() (and other vma related functions) and untag them there. Unfortunately, a lot of find_vma() callers then compare or subtract the returned vma start and end fields against the pointer that was being searched. Thus this approach would still require changing all find_vma() callers. === Testing The following testing approaches has been taken to find potential issues with user pointer untagging: 1. Static testing (with sparse [2] and separately with a custom static analyzer based on Clang) to track casts of __user pointers to integer types to find places where untagging needs to be done. 2. Static testing with grep to find parts of the kernel that call find_vma() (and other similar functions) or directly compare against vm_start/vm_end fields of vma. 3. Static testing with grep to find parts of the kernel that compare user pointers with TASK_SIZE or other similar consts and macros. 4. Dynamic testing: adding BUG_ON(has_tag(addr)) to find_vma() and running a modified syzkaller version that passes tagged pointers to the kernel. Based on the results of the testing the requried patches have been added to the patchset. === Notes This patchset is meant to be merged together with "arm64 relaxed ABI" [3]. This patchset is a prerequisite for ARM's memory tagging hardware feature support [4]. This patchset has been merged into the Pixel 2 & 3 kernel trees and is now being used to enable testing of Pixel phones with HWASan. Thanks! [1] http://clang.llvm.org/docs/HardwareAssistedAddressSanitizerDesign.html [2] https://github.com/lucvoo/sparse-dev/commit/5f960cb10f56ec2017c128ef9d16060e0145f292 [3] https://lkml.org/lkml/2019/6/12/745 [4] https://community.arm.com/processors/b/blog/posts/arm-a-profile-architecture-2018-developments-armv85a This patch (of 11) This patch is a part of a series that extends kernel ABI to allow to pass tagged user pointers (with the top byte set to something else other than 0x00) as syscall arguments. strncpy_from_user and strnlen_user accept user addresses as arguments, and do not go through the same path as copy_from_user and others, so here we need to handle the case of tagged user addresses separately. Untag user pointers passed to these functions. Note, that this patch only temporarily untags the pointers to perform validity checks, but then uses them as is to perform user memory accesses. [andreyknvl@google.com: fix sparc4 build] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/CAAeHK+yx4a-P0sDrXTUxMvO2H0CJZUFPffBrg_cU7oJOZyC7ew@mail.gmail.com Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/c5a78bcad3e94d6cda71fcaa60a423231ae71e4c.1563904656.git.andreyknvl@google.com Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com> Reviewed-by: Vincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino@arm.com> Reviewed-by: Khalid Aziz <khalid.aziz@oracle.com> Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com> Cc: Eric Auger <eric.auger@redhat.com> Cc: Felix Kuehling <Felix.Kuehling@amd.com> Cc: Jens Wiklander <jens.wiklander@linaro.org> Cc: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab+samsung@kernel.org> Cc: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2019-09-25 23:48:27 +00:00
src_addr = (unsigned long)untagged_addr(src);
if (likely(src_addr < max_addr)) {
unsigned long max = max_addr - src_addr;
long retval;
/*
* Truncate 'max' to the user-specified limit, so that
* we only have one limit we need to check in the loop
*/
if (max > count)
max = count;
kasan_check_write(dst, count);
check_object_size(dst, count, false);
if (user_read_access_begin(src, max)) {
retval = do_strncpy_from_user(dst, src, count, max);
user_read_access_end();
return retval;
}
}
return -EFAULT;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(strncpy_from_user);