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IPE is designed to provide system level trust guarantees, this usually implies that trust starts from bootup with a hardware root of trust, which validates the bootloader. After this, the bootloader verifies the kernel and the initramfs. As there's no currently supported integrity method for initramfs, and it's typically already verified by the bootloader. This patch introduces a new IPE property `boot_verified` which allows author of IPE policy to indicate trust for files from initramfs. The implementation of this feature utilizes the newly added `initramfs_populated` hook. This hook marks the superblock of the rootfs after the initramfs has been unpacked into it. Before mounting the real rootfs on top of the initramfs, initramfs script will recursively remove all files and directories on the initramfs. This is typically implemented by using switch_root(8) (https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man8/switch_root.8.html). Therefore the initramfs will be empty and not accessible after the real rootfs takes over. It is advised to switch to a different policy that doesn't rely on the `boot_verified` property after this point. This ensures that the trust policies remain relevant and effective throughout the system's operation. Signed-off-by: Deven Bowers <deven.desai@linux.microsoft.com> Signed-off-by: Fan Wu <wufan@linux.microsoft.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
194 lines
4.7 KiB
C
194 lines
4.7 KiB
C
// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
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/*
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* Copyright (C) 2020-2024 Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved.
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*/
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#include <linux/fs.h>
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#include <linux/fs_struct.h>
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#include <linux/types.h>
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#include <linux/binfmts.h>
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#include <linux/mman.h>
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#include "ipe.h"
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#include "hooks.h"
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#include "eval.h"
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/**
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* ipe_bprm_check_security() - ipe security hook function for bprm check.
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* @bprm: Supplies a pointer to a linux_binprm structure to source the file
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* being evaluated.
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*
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* This LSM hook is called when a binary is loaded through the exec
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* family of system calls.
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*
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* Return:
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* * %0 - Success
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* * %-EACCES - Did not pass IPE policy
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*/
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int ipe_bprm_check_security(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
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{
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struct ipe_eval_ctx ctx = IPE_EVAL_CTX_INIT;
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ipe_build_eval_ctx(&ctx, bprm->file, IPE_OP_EXEC);
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return ipe_evaluate_event(&ctx);
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}
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/**
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* ipe_mmap_file() - ipe security hook function for mmap check.
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* @f: File being mmap'd. Can be NULL in the case of anonymous memory.
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* @reqprot: The requested protection on the mmap, passed from usermode.
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* @prot: The effective protection on the mmap, resolved from reqprot and
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* system configuration.
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* @flags: Unused.
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*
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* This hook is called when a file is loaded through the mmap
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* family of system calls.
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*
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* Return:
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* * %0 - Success
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* * %-EACCES - Did not pass IPE policy
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*/
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int ipe_mmap_file(struct file *f, unsigned long reqprot __always_unused,
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unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags)
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{
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struct ipe_eval_ctx ctx = IPE_EVAL_CTX_INIT;
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if (prot & PROT_EXEC) {
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ipe_build_eval_ctx(&ctx, f, IPE_OP_EXEC);
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return ipe_evaluate_event(&ctx);
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}
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return 0;
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}
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/**
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* ipe_file_mprotect() - ipe security hook function for mprotect check.
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* @vma: Existing virtual memory area created by mmap or similar.
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* @reqprot: The requested protection on the mmap, passed from usermode.
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* @prot: The effective protection on the mmap, resolved from reqprot and
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* system configuration.
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*
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* This LSM hook is called when a mmap'd region of memory is changing
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* its protections via mprotect.
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*
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* Return:
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* * %0 - Success
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* * %-EACCES - Did not pass IPE policy
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*/
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int ipe_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
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unsigned long reqprot __always_unused,
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unsigned long prot)
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{
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struct ipe_eval_ctx ctx = IPE_EVAL_CTX_INIT;
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/* Already Executable */
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if (vma->vm_flags & VM_EXEC)
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return 0;
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if (prot & PROT_EXEC) {
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ipe_build_eval_ctx(&ctx, vma->vm_file, IPE_OP_EXEC);
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return ipe_evaluate_event(&ctx);
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}
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return 0;
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}
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/**
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* ipe_kernel_read_file() - ipe security hook function for kernel read.
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* @file: Supplies a pointer to the file structure being read in from disk.
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* @id: Supplies the enumeration identifying the purpose of the read.
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* @contents: Unused.
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*
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* This LSM hook is called when a file is read from disk in the kernel.
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*
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* Return:
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* * %0 - Success
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* * %-EACCES - Did not pass IPE policy
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*/
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int ipe_kernel_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id id,
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bool contents)
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{
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struct ipe_eval_ctx ctx = IPE_EVAL_CTX_INIT;
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enum ipe_op_type op;
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switch (id) {
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case READING_FIRMWARE:
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op = IPE_OP_FIRMWARE;
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break;
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case READING_MODULE:
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op = IPE_OP_KERNEL_MODULE;
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break;
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case READING_KEXEC_INITRAMFS:
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op = IPE_OP_KEXEC_INITRAMFS;
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break;
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case READING_KEXEC_IMAGE:
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op = IPE_OP_KEXEC_IMAGE;
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break;
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case READING_POLICY:
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op = IPE_OP_POLICY;
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break;
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case READING_X509_CERTIFICATE:
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op = IPE_OP_X509;
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break;
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default:
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op = IPE_OP_INVALID;
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WARN(1, "no rule setup for kernel_read_file enum %d", id);
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}
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ipe_build_eval_ctx(&ctx, file, op);
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return ipe_evaluate_event(&ctx);
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}
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/**
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* ipe_kernel_load_data() - ipe security hook function for kernel load data.
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* @id: Supplies the enumeration identifying the purpose of the load.
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* @contents: Unused.
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*
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* This LSM hook is called when a data buffer provided by userspace is loading
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* into the kernel.
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*
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* Return:
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* * %0 - Success
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* * %-EACCES - Did not pass IPE policy
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*/
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int ipe_kernel_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id, bool contents)
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{
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struct ipe_eval_ctx ctx = IPE_EVAL_CTX_INIT;
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enum ipe_op_type op;
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switch (id) {
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case LOADING_FIRMWARE:
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op = IPE_OP_FIRMWARE;
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break;
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case LOADING_MODULE:
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op = IPE_OP_KERNEL_MODULE;
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break;
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case LOADING_KEXEC_INITRAMFS:
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op = IPE_OP_KEXEC_INITRAMFS;
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break;
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case LOADING_KEXEC_IMAGE:
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op = IPE_OP_KEXEC_IMAGE;
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break;
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case LOADING_POLICY:
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op = IPE_OP_POLICY;
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break;
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case LOADING_X509_CERTIFICATE:
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op = IPE_OP_X509;
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break;
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default:
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op = IPE_OP_INVALID;
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WARN(1, "no rule setup for kernel_load_data enum %d", id);
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}
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ipe_build_eval_ctx(&ctx, NULL, op);
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return ipe_evaluate_event(&ctx);
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}
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/**
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* ipe_unpack_initramfs() - Mark the current rootfs as initramfs.
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*/
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void ipe_unpack_initramfs(void)
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{
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ipe_sb(current->fs->root.mnt->mnt_sb)->initramfs = true;
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}
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