mirror of
https://github.com/torvalds/linux.git
synced 2024-11-21 19:46:16 +00:00
bf9aa14fc5
- The final step to get rid of auto-rearming posix-timers posix-timers are currently auto-rearmed by the kernel when the signal of the timer is ignored so that the timer signal can be delivered once the corresponding signal is unignored. This requires to throttle the timer to prevent a DoS by small intervals and keeps the system pointlessly out of low power states for no value. This is a long standing non-trivial problem due to the lock order of posix-timer lock and the sighand lock along with life time issues as the timer and the sigqueue have different life time rules. Cure this by: * Embedding the sigqueue into the timer struct to have the same life time rules. Aside of that this also avoids the lookup of the timer in the signal delivery and rearm path as it's just a always valid container_of() now. * Queuing ignored timer signals onto a seperate ignored list. * Moving queued timer signals onto the ignored list when the signal is switched to SIG_IGN before it could be delivered. * Walking the ignored list when SIG_IGN is lifted and requeue the signals to the actual signal lists. This allows the signal delivery code to rearm the timer. This also required to consolidate the signal delivery rules so they are consistent across all situations. With that all self test scenarios finally succeed. - Core infrastructure for VFS multigrain timestamping This is required to allow the kernel to use coarse grained time stamps by default and switch to fine grained time stamps when inode attributes are actively observed via getattr(). These changes have been provided to the VFS tree as well, so that the VFS specific infrastructure could be built on top. - Cleanup and consolidation of the sleep() infrastructure * Move all sleep and timeout functions into one file * Rework udelay() and ndelay() into proper documented inline functions and replace the hardcoded magic numbers by proper defines. * Rework the fsleep() implementation to take the reality of the timer wheel granularity on different HZ values into account. Right now the boundaries are hard coded time ranges which fail to provide the requested accuracy on different HZ settings. * Update documentation for all sleep/timeout related functions and fix up stale documentation links all over the place * Fixup a few usage sites - Rework of timekeeping and adjtimex(2) to prepare for multiple PTP clocks A system can have multiple PTP clocks which are participating in seperate and independent PTP clock domains. So far the kernel only considers the PTP clock which is based on CLOCK TAI relevant as that's the clock which drives the timekeeping adjustments via the various user space daemons through adjtimex(2). The non TAI based clock domains are accessible via the file descriptor based posix clocks, but their usability is very limited. They can't be accessed fast as they always go all the way out to the hardware and they cannot be utilized in the kernel itself. As Time Sensitive Networking (TSN) gains traction it is required to provide fast user and kernel space access to these clocks. The approach taken is to utilize the timekeeping and adjtimex(2) infrastructure to provide this access in a similar way how the kernel provides access to clock MONOTONIC, REALTIME etc. Instead of creating a duplicated infrastructure this rework converts timekeeping and adjtimex(2) into generic functionality which operates on pointers to data structures instead of using static variables. This allows to provide time accessors and adjtimex(2) functionality for the independent PTP clocks in a subsequent step. - Consolidate hrtimer initialization hrtimers are set up by initializing the data structure and then seperately setting the callback function for historical reasons. That's an extra unnecessary step and makes Rust support less straight forward than it should be. Provide a new set of hrtimer_setup*() functions and convert the core code and a few usage sites of the less frequently used interfaces over. The bulk of the htimer_init() to hrtimer_setup() conversion is already prepared and scheduled for the next merge window. - Drivers: * Ensure that the global timekeeping clocksource is utilizing the cluster 0 timer on MIPS multi-cluster systems. Otherwise CPUs on different clusters use their cluster specific clocksource which is not guaranteed to be synchronized with other clusters. * Mostly boring cleanups, fixes, improvements and code movement -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iQJHBAABCgAxFiEEQp8+kY+LLUocC4bMphj1TA10mKEFAmc7kPITHHRnbHhAbGlu dXRyb25peC5kZQAKCRCmGPVMDXSYoZKkD/9OUL6fOJrDUmOYBa4QVeMyfTef4EaL tvwIMM/29XQFeiq3xxCIn+EMnHjXn2lvIhYGQ7GKsbKYwvJ7ZBDpQb+UMhZ2nKI9 6D6BP6WomZohKeH2fZbJQAdqOi3KRYdvQdIsVZUexkqiaVPphRvOH9wOr45gHtZM EyMRSotPlQTDqcrbUejDMEO94GyjDCYXRsyATLxjmTzL/N4xD4NRIiotjM2vL/a9 8MuCgIhrKUEyYlFoOxxeokBsF3kk3/ez2jlG9b/N8VLH3SYIc2zgL58FBgWxlmgG bY71nVG3nUgEjxBd2dcXAVVqvb+5widk8p6O7xxOAQKTLMcJ4H0tQDkMnzBtUzvB DGAJDHAmAr0g+ja9O35Pkhunkh4HYFIbq0Il4d1HMKObhJV0JumcKuQVxrXycdm3 UZfq3seqHsZJQbPgCAhlFU0/2WWScocbee9bNebGT33KVwSp5FoVv89C/6Vjb+vV Gusc3thqrQuMAZW5zV8g4UcBAA/xH4PB0I+vHib+9XPZ4UQ7/6xKl2jE0kd5hX7n AAUeZvFNFqIsY+B6vz+Jx/yzyM7u5cuXq87pof5EHVFzv56lyTp4ToGcOGYRgKH5 JXeYV1OxGziSDrd5vbf9CzdWMzqMvTefXrHbWrjkjhNOe8E1A8O88RZ5uRKZhmSw hZZ4hdM9+3T7cg== =2VC6 -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- Merge tag 'timers-core-2024-11-18' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip Pull timer updates from Thomas Gleixner: "A rather large update for timekeeping and timers: - The final step to get rid of auto-rearming posix-timers posix-timers are currently auto-rearmed by the kernel when the signal of the timer is ignored so that the timer signal can be delivered once the corresponding signal is unignored. This requires to throttle the timer to prevent a DoS by small intervals and keeps the system pointlessly out of low power states for no value. This is a long standing non-trivial problem due to the lock order of posix-timer lock and the sighand lock along with life time issues as the timer and the sigqueue have different life time rules. Cure this by: - Embedding the sigqueue into the timer struct to have the same life time rules. Aside of that this also avoids the lookup of the timer in the signal delivery and rearm path as it's just a always valid container_of() now. - Queuing ignored timer signals onto a seperate ignored list. - Moving queued timer signals onto the ignored list when the signal is switched to SIG_IGN before it could be delivered. - Walking the ignored list when SIG_IGN is lifted and requeue the signals to the actual signal lists. This allows the signal delivery code to rearm the timer. This also required to consolidate the signal delivery rules so they are consistent across all situations. With that all self test scenarios finally succeed. - Core infrastructure for VFS multigrain timestamping This is required to allow the kernel to use coarse grained time stamps by default and switch to fine grained time stamps when inode attributes are actively observed via getattr(). These changes have been provided to the VFS tree as well, so that the VFS specific infrastructure could be built on top. - Cleanup and consolidation of the sleep() infrastructure - Move all sleep and timeout functions into one file - Rework udelay() and ndelay() into proper documented inline functions and replace the hardcoded magic numbers by proper defines. - Rework the fsleep() implementation to take the reality of the timer wheel granularity on different HZ values into account. Right now the boundaries are hard coded time ranges which fail to provide the requested accuracy on different HZ settings. - Update documentation for all sleep/timeout related functions and fix up stale documentation links all over the place - Fixup a few usage sites - Rework of timekeeping and adjtimex(2) to prepare for multiple PTP clocks A system can have multiple PTP clocks which are participating in seperate and independent PTP clock domains. So far the kernel only considers the PTP clock which is based on CLOCK TAI relevant as that's the clock which drives the timekeeping adjustments via the various user space daemons through adjtimex(2). The non TAI based clock domains are accessible via the file descriptor based posix clocks, but their usability is very limited. They can't be accessed fast as they always go all the way out to the hardware and they cannot be utilized in the kernel itself. As Time Sensitive Networking (TSN) gains traction it is required to provide fast user and kernel space access to these clocks. The approach taken is to utilize the timekeeping and adjtimex(2) infrastructure to provide this access in a similar way how the kernel provides access to clock MONOTONIC, REALTIME etc. Instead of creating a duplicated infrastructure this rework converts timekeeping and adjtimex(2) into generic functionality which operates on pointers to data structures instead of using static variables. This allows to provide time accessors and adjtimex(2) functionality for the independent PTP clocks in a subsequent step. - Consolidate hrtimer initialization hrtimers are set up by initializing the data structure and then seperately setting the callback function for historical reasons. That's an extra unnecessary step and makes Rust support less straight forward than it should be. Provide a new set of hrtimer_setup*() functions and convert the core code and a few usage sites of the less frequently used interfaces over. The bulk of the htimer_init() to hrtimer_setup() conversion is already prepared and scheduled for the next merge window. - Drivers: - Ensure that the global timekeeping clocksource is utilizing the cluster 0 timer on MIPS multi-cluster systems. Otherwise CPUs on different clusters use their cluster specific clocksource which is not guaranteed to be synchronized with other clusters. - Mostly boring cleanups, fixes, improvements and code movement" * tag 'timers-core-2024-11-18' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (140 commits) posix-timers: Fix spurious warning on double enqueue versus do_exit() clocksource/drivers/arm_arch_timer: Use of_property_present() for non-boolean properties clocksource/drivers/gpx: Remove redundant casts clocksource/drivers/timer-ti-dm: Fix child node refcount handling dt-bindings: timer: actions,owl-timer: convert to YAML clocksource/drivers/ralink: Add Ralink System Tick Counter driver clocksource/drivers/mips-gic-timer: Always use cluster 0 counter as clocksource clocksource/drivers/timer-ti-dm: Don't fail probe if int not found clocksource/drivers:sp804: Make user selectable clocksource/drivers/dw_apb: Remove unused dw_apb_clockevent functions hrtimers: Delete hrtimer_init_on_stack() alarmtimer: Switch to use hrtimer_setup() and hrtimer_setup_on_stack() io_uring: Switch to use hrtimer_setup_on_stack() sched/idle: Switch to use hrtimer_setup_on_stack() hrtimers: Delete hrtimer_init_sleeper_on_stack() wait: Switch to use hrtimer_setup_sleeper_on_stack() timers: Switch to use hrtimer_setup_sleeper_on_stack() net: pktgen: Switch to use hrtimer_setup_sleeper_on_stack() futex: Switch to use hrtimer_setup_sleeper_on_stack() fs/aio: Switch to use hrtimer_setup_sleeper_on_stack() ...
1175 lines
32 KiB
C
1175 lines
32 KiB
C
// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later
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/*
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* Fast Userspace Mutexes (which I call "Futexes!").
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* (C) Rusty Russell, IBM 2002
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*
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* Generalized futexes, futex requeueing, misc fixes by Ingo Molnar
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* (C) Copyright 2003 Red Hat Inc, All Rights Reserved
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*
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* Removed page pinning, fix privately mapped COW pages and other cleanups
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* (C) Copyright 2003, 2004 Jamie Lokier
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*
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* Robust futex support started by Ingo Molnar
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* (C) Copyright 2006 Red Hat Inc, All Rights Reserved
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* Thanks to Thomas Gleixner for suggestions, analysis and fixes.
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*
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* PI-futex support started by Ingo Molnar and Thomas Gleixner
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* Copyright (C) 2006 Red Hat, Inc., Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
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* Copyright (C) 2006 Timesys Corp., Thomas Gleixner <tglx@timesys.com>
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*
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* PRIVATE futexes by Eric Dumazet
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* Copyright (C) 2007 Eric Dumazet <dada1@cosmosbay.com>
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*
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* Requeue-PI support by Darren Hart <dvhltc@us.ibm.com>
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* Copyright (C) IBM Corporation, 2009
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* Thanks to Thomas Gleixner for conceptual design and careful reviews.
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*
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* Thanks to Ben LaHaise for yelling "hashed waitqueues" loudly
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* enough at me, Linus for the original (flawed) idea, Matthew
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* Kirkwood for proof-of-concept implementation.
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*
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* "The futexes are also cursed."
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* "But they come in a choice of three flavours!"
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*/
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#include <linux/compat.h>
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#include <linux/jhash.h>
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#include <linux/pagemap.h>
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#include <linux/debugfs.h>
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#include <linux/plist.h>
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#include <linux/memblock.h>
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#include <linux/fault-inject.h>
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#include <linux/slab.h>
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#include "futex.h"
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#include "../locking/rtmutex_common.h"
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/*
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* The base of the bucket array and its size are always used together
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* (after initialization only in futex_hash()), so ensure that they
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* reside in the same cacheline.
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*/
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static struct {
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struct futex_hash_bucket *queues;
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unsigned long hashsize;
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} __futex_data __read_mostly __aligned(2*sizeof(long));
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#define futex_queues (__futex_data.queues)
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#define futex_hashsize (__futex_data.hashsize)
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/*
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* Fault injections for futexes.
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*/
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#ifdef CONFIG_FAIL_FUTEX
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static struct {
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struct fault_attr attr;
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bool ignore_private;
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} fail_futex = {
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.attr = FAULT_ATTR_INITIALIZER,
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.ignore_private = false,
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};
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static int __init setup_fail_futex(char *str)
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{
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return setup_fault_attr(&fail_futex.attr, str);
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}
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__setup("fail_futex=", setup_fail_futex);
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bool should_fail_futex(bool fshared)
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{
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if (fail_futex.ignore_private && !fshared)
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return false;
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return should_fail(&fail_futex.attr, 1);
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}
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#ifdef CONFIG_FAULT_INJECTION_DEBUG_FS
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static int __init fail_futex_debugfs(void)
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{
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umode_t mode = S_IFREG | S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR;
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struct dentry *dir;
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dir = fault_create_debugfs_attr("fail_futex", NULL,
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&fail_futex.attr);
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if (IS_ERR(dir))
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return PTR_ERR(dir);
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debugfs_create_bool("ignore-private", mode, dir,
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&fail_futex.ignore_private);
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return 0;
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}
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late_initcall(fail_futex_debugfs);
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#endif /* CONFIG_FAULT_INJECTION_DEBUG_FS */
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#endif /* CONFIG_FAIL_FUTEX */
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/**
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* futex_hash - Return the hash bucket in the global hash
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* @key: Pointer to the futex key for which the hash is calculated
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*
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* We hash on the keys returned from get_futex_key (see below) and return the
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* corresponding hash bucket in the global hash.
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*/
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struct futex_hash_bucket *futex_hash(union futex_key *key)
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{
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u32 hash = jhash2((u32 *)key, offsetof(typeof(*key), both.offset) / 4,
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key->both.offset);
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return &futex_queues[hash & (futex_hashsize - 1)];
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}
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/**
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* futex_setup_timer - set up the sleeping hrtimer.
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* @time: ptr to the given timeout value
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* @timeout: the hrtimer_sleeper structure to be set up
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* @flags: futex flags
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* @range_ns: optional range in ns
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*
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* Return: Initialized hrtimer_sleeper structure or NULL if no timeout
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* value given
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*/
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struct hrtimer_sleeper *
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futex_setup_timer(ktime_t *time, struct hrtimer_sleeper *timeout,
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int flags, u64 range_ns)
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{
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if (!time)
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return NULL;
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hrtimer_setup_sleeper_on_stack(timeout,
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(flags & FLAGS_CLOCKRT) ? CLOCK_REALTIME : CLOCK_MONOTONIC,
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HRTIMER_MODE_ABS);
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/*
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* If range_ns is 0, calling hrtimer_set_expires_range_ns() is
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* effectively the same as calling hrtimer_set_expires().
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*/
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hrtimer_set_expires_range_ns(&timeout->timer, *time, range_ns);
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return timeout;
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}
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/*
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* Generate a machine wide unique identifier for this inode.
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*
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* This relies on u64 not wrapping in the life-time of the machine; which with
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* 1ns resolution means almost 585 years.
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*
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* This further relies on the fact that a well formed program will not unmap
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* the file while it has a (shared) futex waiting on it. This mapping will have
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* a file reference which pins the mount and inode.
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*
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* If for some reason an inode gets evicted and read back in again, it will get
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* a new sequence number and will _NOT_ match, even though it is the exact same
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* file.
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*
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* It is important that futex_match() will never have a false-positive, esp.
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* for PI futexes that can mess up the state. The above argues that false-negatives
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* are only possible for malformed programs.
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*/
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static u64 get_inode_sequence_number(struct inode *inode)
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{
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static atomic64_t i_seq;
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u64 old;
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/* Does the inode already have a sequence number? */
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old = atomic64_read(&inode->i_sequence);
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if (likely(old))
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return old;
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for (;;) {
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u64 new = atomic64_inc_return(&i_seq);
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if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!new))
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continue;
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old = 0;
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if (!atomic64_try_cmpxchg_relaxed(&inode->i_sequence, &old, new))
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return old;
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return new;
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}
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}
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/**
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* get_futex_key() - Get parameters which are the keys for a futex
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* @uaddr: virtual address of the futex
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* @flags: FLAGS_*
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* @key: address where result is stored.
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* @rw: mapping needs to be read/write (values: FUTEX_READ,
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* FUTEX_WRITE)
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*
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* Return: a negative error code or 0
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*
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* The key words are stored in @key on success.
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*
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* For shared mappings (when @fshared), the key is:
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*
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* ( inode->i_sequence, page->index, offset_within_page )
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*
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* [ also see get_inode_sequence_number() ]
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*
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* For private mappings (or when !@fshared), the key is:
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*
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* ( current->mm, address, 0 )
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*
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* This allows (cross process, where applicable) identification of the futex
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* without keeping the page pinned for the duration of the FUTEX_WAIT.
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*
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* lock_page() might sleep, the caller should not hold a spinlock.
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*/
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int get_futex_key(u32 __user *uaddr, unsigned int flags, union futex_key *key,
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enum futex_access rw)
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{
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unsigned long address = (unsigned long)uaddr;
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struct mm_struct *mm = current->mm;
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struct page *page;
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struct folio *folio;
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struct address_space *mapping;
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int err, ro = 0;
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bool fshared;
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fshared = flags & FLAGS_SHARED;
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/*
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* The futex address must be "naturally" aligned.
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*/
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key->both.offset = address % PAGE_SIZE;
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if (unlikely((address % sizeof(u32)) != 0))
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return -EINVAL;
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address -= key->both.offset;
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if (unlikely(!access_ok(uaddr, sizeof(u32))))
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return -EFAULT;
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if (unlikely(should_fail_futex(fshared)))
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return -EFAULT;
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/*
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* PROCESS_PRIVATE futexes are fast.
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* As the mm cannot disappear under us and the 'key' only needs
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* virtual address, we dont even have to find the underlying vma.
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* Note : We do have to check 'uaddr' is a valid user address,
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* but access_ok() should be faster than find_vma()
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*/
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if (!fshared) {
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/*
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* On no-MMU, shared futexes are treated as private, therefore
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* we must not include the current process in the key. Since
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* there is only one address space, the address is a unique key
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* on its own.
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*/
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if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MMU))
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key->private.mm = mm;
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else
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key->private.mm = NULL;
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key->private.address = address;
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return 0;
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}
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again:
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/* Ignore any VERIFY_READ mapping (futex common case) */
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if (unlikely(should_fail_futex(true)))
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return -EFAULT;
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err = get_user_pages_fast(address, 1, FOLL_WRITE, &page);
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/*
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* If write access is not required (eg. FUTEX_WAIT), try
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* and get read-only access.
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*/
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if (err == -EFAULT && rw == FUTEX_READ) {
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err = get_user_pages_fast(address, 1, 0, &page);
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ro = 1;
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}
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if (err < 0)
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return err;
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else
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err = 0;
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/*
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* The treatment of mapping from this point on is critical. The folio
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* lock protects many things but in this context the folio lock
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* stabilizes mapping, prevents inode freeing in the shared
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* file-backed region case and guards against movement to swap cache.
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*
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* Strictly speaking the folio lock is not needed in all cases being
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* considered here and folio lock forces unnecessarily serialization.
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* From this point on, mapping will be re-verified if necessary and
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* folio lock will be acquired only if it is unavoidable
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*
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* Mapping checks require the folio so it is looked up now. For
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* anonymous pages, it does not matter if the folio is split
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* in the future as the key is based on the address. For
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* filesystem-backed pages, the precise page is required as the
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* index of the page determines the key.
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*/
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folio = page_folio(page);
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mapping = READ_ONCE(folio->mapping);
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/*
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* If folio->mapping is NULL, then it cannot be an anonymous
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* page; but it might be the ZERO_PAGE or in the gate area or
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* in a special mapping (all cases which we are happy to fail);
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* or it may have been a good file page when get_user_pages_fast
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* found it, but truncated or holepunched or subjected to
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* invalidate_complete_page2 before we got the folio lock (also
|
|
* cases which we are happy to fail). And we hold a reference,
|
|
* so refcount care in invalidate_inode_page's remove_mapping
|
|
* prevents drop_caches from setting mapping to NULL beneath us.
|
|
*
|
|
* The case we do have to guard against is when memory pressure made
|
|
* shmem_writepage move it from filecache to swapcache beneath us:
|
|
* an unlikely race, but we do need to retry for folio->mapping.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (unlikely(!mapping)) {
|
|
int shmem_swizzled;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Folio lock is required to identify which special case above
|
|
* applies. If this is really a shmem page then the folio lock
|
|
* will prevent unexpected transitions.
|
|
*/
|
|
folio_lock(folio);
|
|
shmem_swizzled = folio_test_swapcache(folio) || folio->mapping;
|
|
folio_unlock(folio);
|
|
folio_put(folio);
|
|
|
|
if (shmem_swizzled)
|
|
goto again;
|
|
|
|
return -EFAULT;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Private mappings are handled in a simple way.
|
|
*
|
|
* If the futex key is stored in anonymous memory, then the associated
|
|
* object is the mm which is implicitly pinned by the calling process.
|
|
*
|
|
* NOTE: When userspace waits on a MAP_SHARED mapping, even if
|
|
* it's a read-only handle, it's expected that futexes attach to
|
|
* the object not the particular process.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (folio_test_anon(folio)) {
|
|
/*
|
|
* A RO anonymous page will never change and thus doesn't make
|
|
* sense for futex operations.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (unlikely(should_fail_futex(true)) || ro) {
|
|
err = -EFAULT;
|
|
goto out;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
key->both.offset |= FUT_OFF_MMSHARED; /* ref taken on mm */
|
|
key->private.mm = mm;
|
|
key->private.address = address;
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
struct inode *inode;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* The associated futex object in this case is the inode and
|
|
* the folio->mapping must be traversed. Ordinarily this should
|
|
* be stabilised under folio lock but it's not strictly
|
|
* necessary in this case as we just want to pin the inode, not
|
|
* update i_pages or anything like that.
|
|
*
|
|
* The RCU read lock is taken as the inode is finally freed
|
|
* under RCU. If the mapping still matches expectations then the
|
|
* mapping->host can be safely accessed as being a valid inode.
|
|
*/
|
|
rcu_read_lock();
|
|
|
|
if (READ_ONCE(folio->mapping) != mapping) {
|
|
rcu_read_unlock();
|
|
folio_put(folio);
|
|
|
|
goto again;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
inode = READ_ONCE(mapping->host);
|
|
if (!inode) {
|
|
rcu_read_unlock();
|
|
folio_put(folio);
|
|
|
|
goto again;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
key->both.offset |= FUT_OFF_INODE; /* inode-based key */
|
|
key->shared.i_seq = get_inode_sequence_number(inode);
|
|
key->shared.pgoff = folio->index + folio_page_idx(folio, page);
|
|
rcu_read_unlock();
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
out:
|
|
folio_put(folio);
|
|
return err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* fault_in_user_writeable() - Fault in user address and verify RW access
|
|
* @uaddr: pointer to faulting user space address
|
|
*
|
|
* Slow path to fixup the fault we just took in the atomic write
|
|
* access to @uaddr.
|
|
*
|
|
* We have no generic implementation of a non-destructive write to the
|
|
* user address. We know that we faulted in the atomic pagefault
|
|
* disabled section so we can as well avoid the #PF overhead by
|
|
* calling get_user_pages() right away.
|
|
*/
|
|
int fault_in_user_writeable(u32 __user *uaddr)
|
|
{
|
|
struct mm_struct *mm = current->mm;
|
|
int ret;
|
|
|
|
mmap_read_lock(mm);
|
|
ret = fixup_user_fault(mm, (unsigned long)uaddr,
|
|
FAULT_FLAG_WRITE, NULL);
|
|
mmap_read_unlock(mm);
|
|
|
|
return ret < 0 ? ret : 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* futex_top_waiter() - Return the highest priority waiter on a futex
|
|
* @hb: the hash bucket the futex_q's reside in
|
|
* @key: the futex key (to distinguish it from other futex futex_q's)
|
|
*
|
|
* Must be called with the hb lock held.
|
|
*/
|
|
struct futex_q *futex_top_waiter(struct futex_hash_bucket *hb, union futex_key *key)
|
|
{
|
|
struct futex_q *this;
|
|
|
|
plist_for_each_entry(this, &hb->chain, list) {
|
|
if (futex_match(&this->key, key))
|
|
return this;
|
|
}
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int futex_cmpxchg_value_locked(u32 *curval, u32 __user *uaddr, u32 uval, u32 newval)
|
|
{
|
|
int ret;
|
|
|
|
pagefault_disable();
|
|
ret = futex_atomic_cmpxchg_inatomic(curval, uaddr, uval, newval);
|
|
pagefault_enable();
|
|
|
|
return ret;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int futex_get_value_locked(u32 *dest, u32 __user *from)
|
|
{
|
|
int ret;
|
|
|
|
pagefault_disable();
|
|
ret = __get_user(*dest, from);
|
|
pagefault_enable();
|
|
|
|
return ret ? -EFAULT : 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* wait_for_owner_exiting - Block until the owner has exited
|
|
* @ret: owner's current futex lock status
|
|
* @exiting: Pointer to the exiting task
|
|
*
|
|
* Caller must hold a refcount on @exiting.
|
|
*/
|
|
void wait_for_owner_exiting(int ret, struct task_struct *exiting)
|
|
{
|
|
if (ret != -EBUSY) {
|
|
WARN_ON_ONCE(exiting);
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (WARN_ON_ONCE(ret == -EBUSY && !exiting))
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
mutex_lock(&exiting->futex_exit_mutex);
|
|
/*
|
|
* No point in doing state checking here. If the waiter got here
|
|
* while the task was in exec()->exec_futex_release() then it can
|
|
* have any FUTEX_STATE_* value when the waiter has acquired the
|
|
* mutex. OK, if running, EXITING or DEAD if it reached exit()
|
|
* already. Highly unlikely and not a problem. Just one more round
|
|
* through the futex maze.
|
|
*/
|
|
mutex_unlock(&exiting->futex_exit_mutex);
|
|
|
|
put_task_struct(exiting);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* __futex_unqueue() - Remove the futex_q from its futex_hash_bucket
|
|
* @q: The futex_q to unqueue
|
|
*
|
|
* The q->lock_ptr must not be NULL and must be held by the caller.
|
|
*/
|
|
void __futex_unqueue(struct futex_q *q)
|
|
{
|
|
struct futex_hash_bucket *hb;
|
|
|
|
if (WARN_ON_SMP(!q->lock_ptr) || WARN_ON(plist_node_empty(&q->list)))
|
|
return;
|
|
lockdep_assert_held(q->lock_ptr);
|
|
|
|
hb = container_of(q->lock_ptr, struct futex_hash_bucket, lock);
|
|
plist_del(&q->list, &hb->chain);
|
|
futex_hb_waiters_dec(hb);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* The key must be already stored in q->key. */
|
|
struct futex_hash_bucket *futex_q_lock(struct futex_q *q)
|
|
__acquires(&hb->lock)
|
|
{
|
|
struct futex_hash_bucket *hb;
|
|
|
|
hb = futex_hash(&q->key);
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Increment the counter before taking the lock so that
|
|
* a potential waker won't miss a to-be-slept task that is
|
|
* waiting for the spinlock. This is safe as all futex_q_lock()
|
|
* users end up calling futex_queue(). Similarly, for housekeeping,
|
|
* decrement the counter at futex_q_unlock() when some error has
|
|
* occurred and we don't end up adding the task to the list.
|
|
*/
|
|
futex_hb_waiters_inc(hb); /* implies smp_mb(); (A) */
|
|
|
|
q->lock_ptr = &hb->lock;
|
|
|
|
spin_lock(&hb->lock);
|
|
return hb;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void futex_q_unlock(struct futex_hash_bucket *hb)
|
|
__releases(&hb->lock)
|
|
{
|
|
spin_unlock(&hb->lock);
|
|
futex_hb_waiters_dec(hb);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void __futex_queue(struct futex_q *q, struct futex_hash_bucket *hb)
|
|
{
|
|
int prio;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* The priority used to register this element is
|
|
* - either the real thread-priority for the real-time threads
|
|
* (i.e. threads with a priority lower than MAX_RT_PRIO)
|
|
* - or MAX_RT_PRIO for non-RT threads.
|
|
* Thus, all RT-threads are woken first in priority order, and
|
|
* the others are woken last, in FIFO order.
|
|
*/
|
|
prio = min(current->normal_prio, MAX_RT_PRIO);
|
|
|
|
plist_node_init(&q->list, prio);
|
|
plist_add(&q->list, &hb->chain);
|
|
q->task = current;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* futex_unqueue() - Remove the futex_q from its futex_hash_bucket
|
|
* @q: The futex_q to unqueue
|
|
*
|
|
* The q->lock_ptr must not be held by the caller. A call to futex_unqueue() must
|
|
* be paired with exactly one earlier call to futex_queue().
|
|
*
|
|
* Return:
|
|
* - 1 - if the futex_q was still queued (and we removed unqueued it);
|
|
* - 0 - if the futex_q was already removed by the waking thread
|
|
*/
|
|
int futex_unqueue(struct futex_q *q)
|
|
{
|
|
spinlock_t *lock_ptr;
|
|
int ret = 0;
|
|
|
|
/* In the common case we don't take the spinlock, which is nice. */
|
|
retry:
|
|
/*
|
|
* q->lock_ptr can change between this read and the following spin_lock.
|
|
* Use READ_ONCE to forbid the compiler from reloading q->lock_ptr and
|
|
* optimizing lock_ptr out of the logic below.
|
|
*/
|
|
lock_ptr = READ_ONCE(q->lock_ptr);
|
|
if (lock_ptr != NULL) {
|
|
spin_lock(lock_ptr);
|
|
/*
|
|
* q->lock_ptr can change between reading it and
|
|
* spin_lock(), causing us to take the wrong lock. This
|
|
* corrects the race condition.
|
|
*
|
|
* Reasoning goes like this: if we have the wrong lock,
|
|
* q->lock_ptr must have changed (maybe several times)
|
|
* between reading it and the spin_lock(). It can
|
|
* change again after the spin_lock() but only if it was
|
|
* already changed before the spin_lock(). It cannot,
|
|
* however, change back to the original value. Therefore
|
|
* we can detect whether we acquired the correct lock.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (unlikely(lock_ptr != q->lock_ptr)) {
|
|
spin_unlock(lock_ptr);
|
|
goto retry;
|
|
}
|
|
__futex_unqueue(q);
|
|
|
|
BUG_ON(q->pi_state);
|
|
|
|
spin_unlock(lock_ptr);
|
|
ret = 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return ret;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* PI futexes can not be requeued and must remove themselves from the hash
|
|
* bucket. The hash bucket lock (i.e. lock_ptr) is held.
|
|
*/
|
|
void futex_unqueue_pi(struct futex_q *q)
|
|
{
|
|
/*
|
|
* If the lock was not acquired (due to timeout or signal) then the
|
|
* rt_waiter is removed before futex_q is. If this is observed by
|
|
* an unlocker after dropping the rtmutex wait lock and before
|
|
* acquiring the hash bucket lock, then the unlocker dequeues the
|
|
* futex_q from the hash bucket list to guarantee consistent state
|
|
* vs. userspace. Therefore the dequeue here must be conditional.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (!plist_node_empty(&q->list))
|
|
__futex_unqueue(q);
|
|
|
|
BUG_ON(!q->pi_state);
|
|
put_pi_state(q->pi_state);
|
|
q->pi_state = NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Constants for the pending_op argument of handle_futex_death */
|
|
#define HANDLE_DEATH_PENDING true
|
|
#define HANDLE_DEATH_LIST false
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Process a futex-list entry, check whether it's owned by the
|
|
* dying task, and do notification if so:
|
|
*/
|
|
static int handle_futex_death(u32 __user *uaddr, struct task_struct *curr,
|
|
bool pi, bool pending_op)
|
|
{
|
|
u32 uval, nval, mval;
|
|
pid_t owner;
|
|
int err;
|
|
|
|
/* Futex address must be 32bit aligned */
|
|
if ((((unsigned long)uaddr) % sizeof(*uaddr)) != 0)
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
retry:
|
|
if (get_user(uval, uaddr))
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Special case for regular (non PI) futexes. The unlock path in
|
|
* user space has two race scenarios:
|
|
*
|
|
* 1. The unlock path releases the user space futex value and
|
|
* before it can execute the futex() syscall to wake up
|
|
* waiters it is killed.
|
|
*
|
|
* 2. A woken up waiter is killed before it can acquire the
|
|
* futex in user space.
|
|
*
|
|
* In the second case, the wake up notification could be generated
|
|
* by the unlock path in user space after setting the futex value
|
|
* to zero or by the kernel after setting the OWNER_DIED bit below.
|
|
*
|
|
* In both cases the TID validation below prevents a wakeup of
|
|
* potential waiters which can cause these waiters to block
|
|
* forever.
|
|
*
|
|
* In both cases the following conditions are met:
|
|
*
|
|
* 1) task->robust_list->list_op_pending != NULL
|
|
* @pending_op == true
|
|
* 2) The owner part of user space futex value == 0
|
|
* 3) Regular futex: @pi == false
|
|
*
|
|
* If these conditions are met, it is safe to attempt waking up a
|
|
* potential waiter without touching the user space futex value and
|
|
* trying to set the OWNER_DIED bit. If the futex value is zero,
|
|
* the rest of the user space mutex state is consistent, so a woken
|
|
* waiter will just take over the uncontended futex. Setting the
|
|
* OWNER_DIED bit would create inconsistent state and malfunction
|
|
* of the user space owner died handling. Otherwise, the OWNER_DIED
|
|
* bit is already set, and the woken waiter is expected to deal with
|
|
* this.
|
|
*/
|
|
owner = uval & FUTEX_TID_MASK;
|
|
|
|
if (pending_op && !pi && !owner) {
|
|
futex_wake(uaddr, FLAGS_SIZE_32 | FLAGS_SHARED, 1,
|
|
FUTEX_BITSET_MATCH_ANY);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (owner != task_pid_vnr(curr))
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Ok, this dying thread is truly holding a futex
|
|
* of interest. Set the OWNER_DIED bit atomically
|
|
* via cmpxchg, and if the value had FUTEX_WAITERS
|
|
* set, wake up a waiter (if any). (We have to do a
|
|
* futex_wake() even if OWNER_DIED is already set -
|
|
* to handle the rare but possible case of recursive
|
|
* thread-death.) The rest of the cleanup is done in
|
|
* userspace.
|
|
*/
|
|
mval = (uval & FUTEX_WAITERS) | FUTEX_OWNER_DIED;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* We are not holding a lock here, but we want to have
|
|
* the pagefault_disable/enable() protection because
|
|
* we want to handle the fault gracefully. If the
|
|
* access fails we try to fault in the futex with R/W
|
|
* verification via get_user_pages. get_user() above
|
|
* does not guarantee R/W access. If that fails we
|
|
* give up and leave the futex locked.
|
|
*/
|
|
if ((err = futex_cmpxchg_value_locked(&nval, uaddr, uval, mval))) {
|
|
switch (err) {
|
|
case -EFAULT:
|
|
if (fault_in_user_writeable(uaddr))
|
|
return -1;
|
|
goto retry;
|
|
|
|
case -EAGAIN:
|
|
cond_resched();
|
|
goto retry;
|
|
|
|
default:
|
|
WARN_ON_ONCE(1);
|
|
return err;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (nval != uval)
|
|
goto retry;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Wake robust non-PI futexes here. The wakeup of
|
|
* PI futexes happens in exit_pi_state():
|
|
*/
|
|
if (!pi && (uval & FUTEX_WAITERS)) {
|
|
futex_wake(uaddr, FLAGS_SIZE_32 | FLAGS_SHARED, 1,
|
|
FUTEX_BITSET_MATCH_ANY);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Fetch a robust-list pointer. Bit 0 signals PI futexes:
|
|
*/
|
|
static inline int fetch_robust_entry(struct robust_list __user **entry,
|
|
struct robust_list __user * __user *head,
|
|
unsigned int *pi)
|
|
{
|
|
unsigned long uentry;
|
|
|
|
if (get_user(uentry, (unsigned long __user *)head))
|
|
return -EFAULT;
|
|
|
|
*entry = (void __user *)(uentry & ~1UL);
|
|
*pi = uentry & 1;
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Walk curr->robust_list (very carefully, it's a userspace list!)
|
|
* and mark any locks found there dead, and notify any waiters.
|
|
*
|
|
* We silently return on any sign of list-walking problem.
|
|
*/
|
|
static void exit_robust_list(struct task_struct *curr)
|
|
{
|
|
struct robust_list_head __user *head = curr->robust_list;
|
|
struct robust_list __user *entry, *next_entry, *pending;
|
|
unsigned int limit = ROBUST_LIST_LIMIT, pi, pip;
|
|
unsigned int next_pi;
|
|
unsigned long futex_offset;
|
|
int rc;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Fetch the list head (which was registered earlier, via
|
|
* sys_set_robust_list()):
|
|
*/
|
|
if (fetch_robust_entry(&entry, &head->list.next, &pi))
|
|
return;
|
|
/*
|
|
* Fetch the relative futex offset:
|
|
*/
|
|
if (get_user(futex_offset, &head->futex_offset))
|
|
return;
|
|
/*
|
|
* Fetch any possibly pending lock-add first, and handle it
|
|
* if it exists:
|
|
*/
|
|
if (fetch_robust_entry(&pending, &head->list_op_pending, &pip))
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
next_entry = NULL; /* avoid warning with gcc */
|
|
while (entry != &head->list) {
|
|
/*
|
|
* Fetch the next entry in the list before calling
|
|
* handle_futex_death:
|
|
*/
|
|
rc = fetch_robust_entry(&next_entry, &entry->next, &next_pi);
|
|
/*
|
|
* A pending lock might already be on the list, so
|
|
* don't process it twice:
|
|
*/
|
|
if (entry != pending) {
|
|
if (handle_futex_death((void __user *)entry + futex_offset,
|
|
curr, pi, HANDLE_DEATH_LIST))
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
if (rc)
|
|
return;
|
|
entry = next_entry;
|
|
pi = next_pi;
|
|
/*
|
|
* Avoid excessively long or circular lists:
|
|
*/
|
|
if (!--limit)
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
cond_resched();
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (pending) {
|
|
handle_futex_death((void __user *)pending + futex_offset,
|
|
curr, pip, HANDLE_DEATH_PENDING);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT
|
|
static void __user *futex_uaddr(struct robust_list __user *entry,
|
|
compat_long_t futex_offset)
|
|
{
|
|
compat_uptr_t base = ptr_to_compat(entry);
|
|
void __user *uaddr = compat_ptr(base + futex_offset);
|
|
|
|
return uaddr;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Fetch a robust-list pointer. Bit 0 signals PI futexes:
|
|
*/
|
|
static inline int
|
|
compat_fetch_robust_entry(compat_uptr_t *uentry, struct robust_list __user **entry,
|
|
compat_uptr_t __user *head, unsigned int *pi)
|
|
{
|
|
if (get_user(*uentry, head))
|
|
return -EFAULT;
|
|
|
|
*entry = compat_ptr((*uentry) & ~1);
|
|
*pi = (unsigned int)(*uentry) & 1;
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Walk curr->robust_list (very carefully, it's a userspace list!)
|
|
* and mark any locks found there dead, and notify any waiters.
|
|
*
|
|
* We silently return on any sign of list-walking problem.
|
|
*/
|
|
static void compat_exit_robust_list(struct task_struct *curr)
|
|
{
|
|
struct compat_robust_list_head __user *head = curr->compat_robust_list;
|
|
struct robust_list __user *entry, *next_entry, *pending;
|
|
unsigned int limit = ROBUST_LIST_LIMIT, pi, pip;
|
|
unsigned int next_pi;
|
|
compat_uptr_t uentry, next_uentry, upending;
|
|
compat_long_t futex_offset;
|
|
int rc;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Fetch the list head (which was registered earlier, via
|
|
* sys_set_robust_list()):
|
|
*/
|
|
if (compat_fetch_robust_entry(&uentry, &entry, &head->list.next, &pi))
|
|
return;
|
|
/*
|
|
* Fetch the relative futex offset:
|
|
*/
|
|
if (get_user(futex_offset, &head->futex_offset))
|
|
return;
|
|
/*
|
|
* Fetch any possibly pending lock-add first, and handle it
|
|
* if it exists:
|
|
*/
|
|
if (compat_fetch_robust_entry(&upending, &pending,
|
|
&head->list_op_pending, &pip))
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
next_entry = NULL; /* avoid warning with gcc */
|
|
while (entry != (struct robust_list __user *) &head->list) {
|
|
/*
|
|
* Fetch the next entry in the list before calling
|
|
* handle_futex_death:
|
|
*/
|
|
rc = compat_fetch_robust_entry(&next_uentry, &next_entry,
|
|
(compat_uptr_t __user *)&entry->next, &next_pi);
|
|
/*
|
|
* A pending lock might already be on the list, so
|
|
* dont process it twice:
|
|
*/
|
|
if (entry != pending) {
|
|
void __user *uaddr = futex_uaddr(entry, futex_offset);
|
|
|
|
if (handle_futex_death(uaddr, curr, pi,
|
|
HANDLE_DEATH_LIST))
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
if (rc)
|
|
return;
|
|
uentry = next_uentry;
|
|
entry = next_entry;
|
|
pi = next_pi;
|
|
/*
|
|
* Avoid excessively long or circular lists:
|
|
*/
|
|
if (!--limit)
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
cond_resched();
|
|
}
|
|
if (pending) {
|
|
void __user *uaddr = futex_uaddr(pending, futex_offset);
|
|
|
|
handle_futex_death(uaddr, curr, pip, HANDLE_DEATH_PENDING);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_FUTEX_PI
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* This task is holding PI mutexes at exit time => bad.
|
|
* Kernel cleans up PI-state, but userspace is likely hosed.
|
|
* (Robust-futex cleanup is separate and might save the day for userspace.)
|
|
*/
|
|
static void exit_pi_state_list(struct task_struct *curr)
|
|
{
|
|
struct list_head *next, *head = &curr->pi_state_list;
|
|
struct futex_pi_state *pi_state;
|
|
struct futex_hash_bucket *hb;
|
|
union futex_key key = FUTEX_KEY_INIT;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* We are a ZOMBIE and nobody can enqueue itself on
|
|
* pi_state_list anymore, but we have to be careful
|
|
* versus waiters unqueueing themselves:
|
|
*/
|
|
raw_spin_lock_irq(&curr->pi_lock);
|
|
while (!list_empty(head)) {
|
|
next = head->next;
|
|
pi_state = list_entry(next, struct futex_pi_state, list);
|
|
key = pi_state->key;
|
|
hb = futex_hash(&key);
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* We can race against put_pi_state() removing itself from the
|
|
* list (a waiter going away). put_pi_state() will first
|
|
* decrement the reference count and then modify the list, so
|
|
* its possible to see the list entry but fail this reference
|
|
* acquire.
|
|
*
|
|
* In that case; drop the locks to let put_pi_state() make
|
|
* progress and retry the loop.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (!refcount_inc_not_zero(&pi_state->refcount)) {
|
|
raw_spin_unlock_irq(&curr->pi_lock);
|
|
cpu_relax();
|
|
raw_spin_lock_irq(&curr->pi_lock);
|
|
continue;
|
|
}
|
|
raw_spin_unlock_irq(&curr->pi_lock);
|
|
|
|
spin_lock(&hb->lock);
|
|
raw_spin_lock_irq(&pi_state->pi_mutex.wait_lock);
|
|
raw_spin_lock(&curr->pi_lock);
|
|
/*
|
|
* We dropped the pi-lock, so re-check whether this
|
|
* task still owns the PI-state:
|
|
*/
|
|
if (head->next != next) {
|
|
/* retain curr->pi_lock for the loop invariant */
|
|
raw_spin_unlock(&pi_state->pi_mutex.wait_lock);
|
|
spin_unlock(&hb->lock);
|
|
put_pi_state(pi_state);
|
|
continue;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
WARN_ON(pi_state->owner != curr);
|
|
WARN_ON(list_empty(&pi_state->list));
|
|
list_del_init(&pi_state->list);
|
|
pi_state->owner = NULL;
|
|
|
|
raw_spin_unlock(&curr->pi_lock);
|
|
raw_spin_unlock_irq(&pi_state->pi_mutex.wait_lock);
|
|
spin_unlock(&hb->lock);
|
|
|
|
rt_mutex_futex_unlock(&pi_state->pi_mutex);
|
|
put_pi_state(pi_state);
|
|
|
|
raw_spin_lock_irq(&curr->pi_lock);
|
|
}
|
|
raw_spin_unlock_irq(&curr->pi_lock);
|
|
}
|
|
#else
|
|
static inline void exit_pi_state_list(struct task_struct *curr) { }
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
static void futex_cleanup(struct task_struct *tsk)
|
|
{
|
|
if (unlikely(tsk->robust_list)) {
|
|
exit_robust_list(tsk);
|
|
tsk->robust_list = NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT
|
|
if (unlikely(tsk->compat_robust_list)) {
|
|
compat_exit_robust_list(tsk);
|
|
tsk->compat_robust_list = NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
if (unlikely(!list_empty(&tsk->pi_state_list)))
|
|
exit_pi_state_list(tsk);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* futex_exit_recursive - Set the tasks futex state to FUTEX_STATE_DEAD
|
|
* @tsk: task to set the state on
|
|
*
|
|
* Set the futex exit state of the task lockless. The futex waiter code
|
|
* observes that state when a task is exiting and loops until the task has
|
|
* actually finished the futex cleanup. The worst case for this is that the
|
|
* waiter runs through the wait loop until the state becomes visible.
|
|
*
|
|
* This is called from the recursive fault handling path in make_task_dead().
|
|
*
|
|
* This is best effort. Either the futex exit code has run already or
|
|
* not. If the OWNER_DIED bit has been set on the futex then the waiter can
|
|
* take it over. If not, the problem is pushed back to user space. If the
|
|
* futex exit code did not run yet, then an already queued waiter might
|
|
* block forever, but there is nothing which can be done about that.
|
|
*/
|
|
void futex_exit_recursive(struct task_struct *tsk)
|
|
{
|
|
/* If the state is FUTEX_STATE_EXITING then futex_exit_mutex is held */
|
|
if (tsk->futex_state == FUTEX_STATE_EXITING)
|
|
mutex_unlock(&tsk->futex_exit_mutex);
|
|
tsk->futex_state = FUTEX_STATE_DEAD;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static void futex_cleanup_begin(struct task_struct *tsk)
|
|
{
|
|
/*
|
|
* Prevent various race issues against a concurrent incoming waiter
|
|
* including live locks by forcing the waiter to block on
|
|
* tsk->futex_exit_mutex when it observes FUTEX_STATE_EXITING in
|
|
* attach_to_pi_owner().
|
|
*/
|
|
mutex_lock(&tsk->futex_exit_mutex);
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Switch the state to FUTEX_STATE_EXITING under tsk->pi_lock.
|
|
*
|
|
* This ensures that all subsequent checks of tsk->futex_state in
|
|
* attach_to_pi_owner() must observe FUTEX_STATE_EXITING with
|
|
* tsk->pi_lock held.
|
|
*
|
|
* It guarantees also that a pi_state which was queued right before
|
|
* the state change under tsk->pi_lock by a concurrent waiter must
|
|
* be observed in exit_pi_state_list().
|
|
*/
|
|
raw_spin_lock_irq(&tsk->pi_lock);
|
|
tsk->futex_state = FUTEX_STATE_EXITING;
|
|
raw_spin_unlock_irq(&tsk->pi_lock);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static void futex_cleanup_end(struct task_struct *tsk, int state)
|
|
{
|
|
/*
|
|
* Lockless store. The only side effect is that an observer might
|
|
* take another loop until it becomes visible.
|
|
*/
|
|
tsk->futex_state = state;
|
|
/*
|
|
* Drop the exit protection. This unblocks waiters which observed
|
|
* FUTEX_STATE_EXITING to reevaluate the state.
|
|
*/
|
|
mutex_unlock(&tsk->futex_exit_mutex);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void futex_exec_release(struct task_struct *tsk)
|
|
{
|
|
/*
|
|
* The state handling is done for consistency, but in the case of
|
|
* exec() there is no way to prevent further damage as the PID stays
|
|
* the same. But for the unlikely and arguably buggy case that a
|
|
* futex is held on exec(), this provides at least as much state
|
|
* consistency protection which is possible.
|
|
*/
|
|
futex_cleanup_begin(tsk);
|
|
futex_cleanup(tsk);
|
|
/*
|
|
* Reset the state to FUTEX_STATE_OK. The task is alive and about
|
|
* exec a new binary.
|
|
*/
|
|
futex_cleanup_end(tsk, FUTEX_STATE_OK);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void futex_exit_release(struct task_struct *tsk)
|
|
{
|
|
futex_cleanup_begin(tsk);
|
|
futex_cleanup(tsk);
|
|
futex_cleanup_end(tsk, FUTEX_STATE_DEAD);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int __init futex_init(void)
|
|
{
|
|
unsigned int futex_shift;
|
|
unsigned long i;
|
|
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_BASE_SMALL
|
|
futex_hashsize = 16;
|
|
#else
|
|
futex_hashsize = roundup_pow_of_two(256 * num_possible_cpus());
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
futex_queues = alloc_large_system_hash("futex", sizeof(*futex_queues),
|
|
futex_hashsize, 0, 0,
|
|
&futex_shift, NULL,
|
|
futex_hashsize, futex_hashsize);
|
|
futex_hashsize = 1UL << futex_shift;
|
|
|
|
for (i = 0; i < futex_hashsize; i++) {
|
|
atomic_set(&futex_queues[i].waiters, 0);
|
|
plist_head_init(&futex_queues[i].chain);
|
|
spin_lock_init(&futex_queues[i].lock);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
core_initcall(futex_init);
|