diff --git a/MAINTAINERS b/MAINTAINERS
index 0e110c9dc4a0..fa5e4f3ba76d 100644
--- a/MAINTAINERS
+++ b/MAINTAINERS
@@ -20804,6 +20804,7 @@ Q:	https://patchwork.kernel.org/project/linux-security-module/list
 B:	mailto:linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
 P:	https://github.com/LinuxSecurityModule/kernel/blob/main/README.md
 T:	git https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/lsm.git
+F:	include/linux/lsm/
 F:	include/linux/lsm_audit.h
 F:	include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h
 F:	include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
diff --git a/include/linux/lsm/apparmor.h b/include/linux/lsm/apparmor.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..612cbfacb072
--- /dev/null
+++ b/include/linux/lsm/apparmor.h
@@ -0,0 +1,17 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
+/*
+ * Linux Security Module interface to other subsystems.
+ * AppArmor presents single pointer to an aa_label structure.
+ */
+#ifndef __LINUX_LSM_APPARMOR_H
+#define __LINUX_LSM_APPARMOR_H
+
+struct aa_label;
+
+struct lsm_prop_apparmor {
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR
+	struct aa_label *label;
+#endif
+};
+
+#endif /* ! __LINUX_LSM_APPARMOR_H */
diff --git a/include/linux/lsm/bpf.h b/include/linux/lsm/bpf.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..8106e206fcef
--- /dev/null
+++ b/include/linux/lsm/bpf.h
@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
+/*
+ * Linux Security Module interface to other subsystems.
+ * BPF may present a single u32 value.
+ */
+#ifndef __LINUX_LSM_BPF_H
+#define __LINUX_LSM_BPF_H
+#include <linux/types.h>
+
+struct lsm_prop_bpf {
+#ifdef CONFIG_BPF_LSM
+	u32 secid;
+#endif
+};
+
+#endif /* ! __LINUX_LSM_BPF_H */
diff --git a/include/linux/lsm/selinux.h b/include/linux/lsm/selinux.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..9455a6b5b910
--- /dev/null
+++ b/include/linux/lsm/selinux.h
@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
+/*
+ * Linux Security Module interface to other subsystems.
+ * SELinux presents a single u32 value which is known as a secid.
+ */
+#ifndef __LINUX_LSM_SELINUX_H
+#define __LINUX_LSM_SELINUX_H
+#include <linux/types.h>
+
+struct lsm_prop_selinux {
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX
+	u32 secid;
+#endif
+};
+
+#endif /* ! __LINUX_LSM_SELINUX_H */
diff --git a/include/linux/lsm/smack.h b/include/linux/lsm/smack.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..ff730dd7a734
--- /dev/null
+++ b/include/linux/lsm/smack.h
@@ -0,0 +1,17 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
+/*
+ * Linux Security Module interface to other subsystems.
+ * Smack presents a pointer into the global Smack label list.
+ */
+#ifndef __LINUX_LSM_SMACK_H
+#define __LINUX_LSM_SMACK_H
+
+struct smack_known;
+
+struct lsm_prop_smack {
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK
+	struct smack_known *skp;
+#endif
+};
+
+#endif /* ! __LINUX_LSM_SMACK_H */
diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h b/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h
index 9eca013aa5e1..eb2937599cb0 100644
--- a/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h
+++ b/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h
@@ -176,7 +176,8 @@ LSM_HOOK(int, -EOPNOTSUPP, inode_setsecurity, struct inode *inode,
 	 const char *name, const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
 LSM_HOOK(int, 0, inode_listsecurity, struct inode *inode, char *buffer,
 	 size_t buffer_size)
-LSM_HOOK(void, LSM_RET_VOID, inode_getsecid, struct inode *inode, u32 *secid)
+LSM_HOOK(void, LSM_RET_VOID, inode_getlsmprop, struct inode *inode,
+	 struct lsm_prop *prop)
 LSM_HOOK(int, 0, inode_copy_up, struct dentry *src, struct cred **new)
 LSM_HOOK(int, -EOPNOTSUPP, inode_copy_up_xattr, struct dentry *src,
 	 const char *name)
@@ -217,6 +218,8 @@ LSM_HOOK(int, 0, cred_prepare, struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
 LSM_HOOK(void, LSM_RET_VOID, cred_transfer, struct cred *new,
 	 const struct cred *old)
 LSM_HOOK(void, LSM_RET_VOID, cred_getsecid, const struct cred *c, u32 *secid)
+LSM_HOOK(void, LSM_RET_VOID, cred_getlsmprop, const struct cred *c,
+	 struct lsm_prop *prop)
 LSM_HOOK(int, 0, kernel_act_as, struct cred *new, u32 secid)
 LSM_HOOK(int, 0, kernel_create_files_as, struct cred *new, struct inode *inode)
 LSM_HOOK(int, 0, kernel_module_request, char *kmod_name)
@@ -235,9 +238,9 @@ LSM_HOOK(int, 0, task_fix_setgroups, struct cred *new, const struct cred * old)
 LSM_HOOK(int, 0, task_setpgid, struct task_struct *p, pid_t pgid)
 LSM_HOOK(int, 0, task_getpgid, struct task_struct *p)
 LSM_HOOK(int, 0, task_getsid, struct task_struct *p)
-LSM_HOOK(void, LSM_RET_VOID, current_getsecid_subj, u32 *secid)
-LSM_HOOK(void, LSM_RET_VOID, task_getsecid_obj,
-	 struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid)
+LSM_HOOK(void, LSM_RET_VOID, current_getlsmprop_subj, struct lsm_prop *prop)
+LSM_HOOK(void, LSM_RET_VOID, task_getlsmprop_obj,
+	 struct task_struct *p, struct lsm_prop *prop)
 LSM_HOOK(int, 0, task_setnice, struct task_struct *p, int nice)
 LSM_HOOK(int, 0, task_setioprio, struct task_struct *p, int ioprio)
 LSM_HOOK(int, 0, task_getioprio, struct task_struct *p)
@@ -256,8 +259,8 @@ LSM_HOOK(void, LSM_RET_VOID, task_to_inode, struct task_struct *p,
 	 struct inode *inode)
 LSM_HOOK(int, 0, userns_create, const struct cred *cred)
 LSM_HOOK(int, 0, ipc_permission, struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, short flag)
-LSM_HOOK(void, LSM_RET_VOID, ipc_getsecid, struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp,
-	 u32 *secid)
+LSM_HOOK(void, LSM_RET_VOID, ipc_getlsmprop, struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp,
+	 struct lsm_prop *prop)
 LSM_HOOK(int, 0, msg_msg_alloc_security, struct msg_msg *msg)
 LSM_HOOK(void, LSM_RET_VOID, msg_msg_free_security, struct msg_msg *msg)
 LSM_HOOK(int, 0, msg_queue_alloc_security, struct kern_ipc_perm *perm)
@@ -294,6 +297,8 @@ LSM_HOOK(int, -EINVAL, setprocattr, const char *name, void *value, size_t size)
 LSM_HOOK(int, 0, ismaclabel, const char *name)
 LSM_HOOK(int, -EOPNOTSUPP, secid_to_secctx, u32 secid, char **secdata,
 	 u32 *seclen)
+LSM_HOOK(int, -EOPNOTSUPP, lsmprop_to_secctx, struct lsm_prop *prop,
+	 char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
 LSM_HOOK(int, 0, secctx_to_secid, const char *secdata, u32 seclen, u32 *secid)
 LSM_HOOK(void, LSM_RET_VOID, release_secctx, char *secdata, u32 seclen)
 LSM_HOOK(void, LSM_RET_VOID, inode_invalidate_secctx, struct inode *inode)
@@ -416,7 +421,8 @@ LSM_HOOK(void, LSM_RET_VOID, key_post_create_or_update, struct key *keyring,
 LSM_HOOK(int, 0, audit_rule_init, u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr,
 	 void **lsmrule, gfp_t gfp)
 LSM_HOOK(int, 0, audit_rule_known, struct audit_krule *krule)
-LSM_HOOK(int, 0, audit_rule_match, u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, void *lsmrule)
+LSM_HOOK(int, 0, audit_rule_match, struct lsm_prop *prop, u32 field, u32 op,
+	 void *lsmrule)
 LSM_HOOK(void, LSM_RET_VOID, audit_rule_free, void *lsmrule)
 #endif /* CONFIG_AUDIT */
 
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index 2ec8f3014757..cbdba435b798 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -34,6 +34,10 @@
 #include <linux/sockptr.h>
 #include <linux/bpf.h>
 #include <uapi/linux/lsm.h>
+#include <linux/lsm/selinux.h>
+#include <linux/lsm/smack.h>
+#include <linux/lsm/apparmor.h>
+#include <linux/lsm/bpf.h>
 
 struct linux_binprm;
 struct cred;
@@ -152,6 +156,16 @@ enum lockdown_reason {
 	LOCKDOWN_CONFIDENTIALITY_MAX,
 };
 
+/*
+ * Data exported by the security modules
+ */
+struct lsm_prop {
+	struct lsm_prop_selinux selinux;
+	struct lsm_prop_smack smack;
+	struct lsm_prop_apparmor apparmor;
+	struct lsm_prop_bpf bpf;
+};
+
 extern const char *const lockdown_reasons[LOCKDOWN_CONFIDENTIALITY_MAX+1];
 extern u32 lsm_active_cnt;
 extern const struct lsm_id *lsm_idlist[];
@@ -269,8 +283,32 @@ static inline const char *kernel_load_data_id_str(enum kernel_load_data_id id)
 	return kernel_load_data_str[id];
 }
 
+/**
+ * lsmprop_init - initialize a lsm_prop structure
+ * @prop: Pointer to the data to initialize
+ *
+ * Set all secid for all modules to the specified value.
+ */
+static inline void lsmprop_init(struct lsm_prop *prop)
+{
+	memset(prop, 0, sizeof(*prop));
+}
+
 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY
 
+/**
+ * lsmprop_is_set - report if there is a value in the lsm_prop
+ * @prop: Pointer to the exported LSM data
+ *
+ * Returns true if there is a value set, false otherwise
+ */
+static inline bool lsmprop_is_set(struct lsm_prop *prop)
+{
+	const struct lsm_prop empty = {};
+
+	return !!memcmp(prop, &empty, sizeof(*prop));
+}
+
 int call_blocking_lsm_notifier(enum lsm_event event, void *data);
 int register_blocking_lsm_notifier(struct notifier_block *nb);
 int unregister_blocking_lsm_notifier(struct notifier_block *nb);
@@ -408,7 +446,7 @@ int security_inode_getsecurity(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
 			       void **buffer, bool alloc);
 int security_inode_setsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name, const void *value, size_t size, int flags);
 int security_inode_listsecurity(struct inode *inode, char *buffer, size_t buffer_size);
-void security_inode_getsecid(struct inode *inode, u32 *secid);
+void security_inode_getlsmprop(struct inode *inode, struct lsm_prop *prop);
 int security_inode_copy_up(struct dentry *src, struct cred **new);
 int security_inode_copy_up_xattr(struct dentry *src, const char *name);
 int security_inode_setintegrity(const struct inode *inode,
@@ -444,6 +482,7 @@ void security_cred_free(struct cred *cred);
 int security_prepare_creds(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old, gfp_t gfp);
 void security_transfer_creds(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old);
 void security_cred_getsecid(const struct cred *c, u32 *secid);
+void security_cred_getlsmprop(const struct cred *c, struct lsm_prop *prop);
 int security_kernel_act_as(struct cred *new, u32 secid);
 int security_kernel_create_files_as(struct cred *new, struct inode *inode);
 int security_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name);
@@ -463,8 +502,8 @@ int security_task_fix_setgroups(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old);
 int security_task_setpgid(struct task_struct *p, pid_t pgid);
 int security_task_getpgid(struct task_struct *p);
 int security_task_getsid(struct task_struct *p);
-void security_current_getsecid_subj(u32 *secid);
-void security_task_getsecid_obj(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid);
+void security_current_getlsmprop_subj(struct lsm_prop *prop);
+void security_task_getlsmprop_obj(struct task_struct *p, struct lsm_prop *prop);
 int security_task_setnice(struct task_struct *p, int nice);
 int security_task_setioprio(struct task_struct *p, int ioprio);
 int security_task_getioprio(struct task_struct *p);
@@ -482,7 +521,7 @@ int security_task_prctl(int option, unsigned long arg2, unsigned long arg3,
 void security_task_to_inode(struct task_struct *p, struct inode *inode);
 int security_create_user_ns(const struct cred *cred);
 int security_ipc_permission(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, short flag);
-void security_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, u32 *secid);
+void security_ipc_getlsmprop(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, struct lsm_prop *prop);
 int security_msg_msg_alloc(struct msg_msg *msg);
 void security_msg_msg_free(struct msg_msg *msg);
 int security_msg_queue_alloc(struct kern_ipc_perm *msq);
@@ -515,6 +554,7 @@ int security_setprocattr(int lsmid, const char *name, void *value, size_t size);
 int security_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb);
 int security_ismaclabel(const char *name);
 int security_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen);
+int security_lsmprop_to_secctx(struct lsm_prop *prop, char **secdata, u32 *seclen);
 int security_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen, u32 *secid);
 void security_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen);
 void security_inode_invalidate_secctx(struct inode *inode);
@@ -531,6 +571,17 @@ int security_bdev_setintegrity(struct block_device *bdev,
 			       size_t size);
 #else /* CONFIG_SECURITY */
 
+/**
+ * lsmprop_is_set - report if there is a value in the lsm_prop
+ * @prop: Pointer to the exported LSM data
+ *
+ * Returns true if there is a value set, false otherwise
+ */
+static inline bool lsmprop_is_set(struct lsm_prop *prop)
+{
+	return false;
+}
+
 static inline int call_blocking_lsm_notifier(enum lsm_event event, void *data)
 {
 	return 0;
@@ -1020,9 +1071,10 @@ static inline int security_inode_listsecurity(struct inode *inode, char *buffer,
 	return 0;
 }
 
-static inline void security_inode_getsecid(struct inode *inode, u32 *secid)
+static inline void security_inode_getlsmprop(struct inode *inode,
+					     struct lsm_prop *prop)
 {
-	*secid = 0;
+	lsmprop_init(prop);
 }
 
 static inline int security_inode_copy_up(struct dentry *src, struct cred **new)
@@ -1172,6 +1224,10 @@ static inline void security_cred_getsecid(const struct cred *c, u32 *secid)
 	*secid = 0;
 }
 
+static inline void security_cred_getlsmprop(const struct cred *c,
+					    struct lsm_prop *prop)
+{ }
+
 static inline int security_kernel_act_as(struct cred *cred, u32 secid)
 {
 	return 0;
@@ -1249,14 +1305,15 @@ static inline int security_task_getsid(struct task_struct *p)
 	return 0;
 }
 
-static inline void security_current_getsecid_subj(u32 *secid)
+static inline void security_current_getlsmprop_subj(struct lsm_prop *prop)
 {
-	*secid = 0;
+	lsmprop_init(prop);
 }
 
-static inline void security_task_getsecid_obj(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid)
+static inline void security_task_getlsmprop_obj(struct task_struct *p,
+						struct lsm_prop *prop)
 {
-	*secid = 0;
+	lsmprop_init(prop);
 }
 
 static inline int security_task_setnice(struct task_struct *p, int nice)
@@ -1332,9 +1389,10 @@ static inline int security_ipc_permission(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp,
 	return 0;
 }
 
-static inline void security_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, u32 *secid)
+static inline void security_ipc_getlsmprop(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp,
+					   struct lsm_prop *prop)
 {
-	*secid = 0;
+	lsmprop_init(prop);
 }
 
 static inline int security_msg_msg_alloc(struct msg_msg *msg)
@@ -1468,7 +1526,14 @@ static inline int security_ismaclabel(const char *name)
 	return 0;
 }
 
-static inline int security_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
+static inline int security_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata,
+					   u32 *seclen)
+{
+	return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+}
+
+static inline int security_lsmprop_to_secctx(struct lsm_prop *prop,
+					     char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
 {
 	return -EOPNOTSUPP;
 }
@@ -2095,7 +2160,8 @@ static inline void security_key_post_create_or_update(struct key *keyring,
 int security_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **lsmrule,
 			     gfp_t gfp);
 int security_audit_rule_known(struct audit_krule *krule);
-int security_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, void *lsmrule);
+int security_audit_rule_match(struct lsm_prop *prop, u32 field, u32 op,
+			      void *lsmrule);
 void security_audit_rule_free(void *lsmrule);
 
 #else
@@ -2111,8 +2177,8 @@ static inline int security_audit_rule_known(struct audit_krule *krule)
 	return 0;
 }
 
-static inline int security_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op,
-					    void *lsmrule)
+static inline int security_audit_rule_match(struct lsm_prop *prop, u32 field,
+					    u32 op, void *lsmrule)
 {
 	return 0;
 }
diff --git a/include/net/netlabel.h b/include/net/netlabel.h
index 529160f76cac..8de8344ee93c 100644
--- a/include/net/netlabel.h
+++ b/include/net/netlabel.h
@@ -97,7 +97,7 @@ struct calipso_doi;
 
 /* NetLabel audit information */
 struct netlbl_audit {
-	u32 secid;
+	struct lsm_prop prop;
 	kuid_t loginuid;
 	unsigned int sessionid;
 };
diff --git a/kernel/audit.c b/kernel/audit.c
index 53e3bddcc327..6a95a6077953 100644
--- a/kernel/audit.c
+++ b/kernel/audit.c
@@ -123,7 +123,7 @@ static u32	audit_backlog_wait_time = AUDIT_BACKLOG_WAIT_TIME;
 /* The identity of the user shutting down the audit system. */
 static kuid_t		audit_sig_uid = INVALID_UID;
 static pid_t		audit_sig_pid = -1;
-static u32		audit_sig_sid;
+static struct lsm_prop	audit_sig_lsm;
 
 /* Records can be lost in several ways:
    0) [suppressed in audit_alloc]
@@ -1473,20 +1473,21 @@ static int audit_receive_msg(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh,
 	}
 	case AUDIT_SIGNAL_INFO:
 		len = 0;
-		if (audit_sig_sid) {
-			err = security_secid_to_secctx(audit_sig_sid, &ctx, &len);
+		if (lsmprop_is_set(&audit_sig_lsm)) {
+			err = security_lsmprop_to_secctx(&audit_sig_lsm, &ctx,
+							 &len);
 			if (err)
 				return err;
 		}
 		sig_data = kmalloc(struct_size(sig_data, ctx, len), GFP_KERNEL);
 		if (!sig_data) {
-			if (audit_sig_sid)
+			if (lsmprop_is_set(&audit_sig_lsm))
 				security_release_secctx(ctx, len);
 			return -ENOMEM;
 		}
 		sig_data->uid = from_kuid(&init_user_ns, audit_sig_uid);
 		sig_data->pid = audit_sig_pid;
-		if (audit_sig_sid) {
+		if (lsmprop_is_set(&audit_sig_lsm)) {
 			memcpy(sig_data->ctx, ctx, len);
 			security_release_secctx(ctx, len);
 		}
@@ -2178,16 +2179,16 @@ void audit_log_key(struct audit_buffer *ab, char *key)
 
 int audit_log_task_context(struct audit_buffer *ab)
 {
+	struct lsm_prop prop;
 	char *ctx = NULL;
 	unsigned len;
 	int error;
-	u32 sid;
 
-	security_current_getsecid_subj(&sid);
-	if (!sid)
+	security_current_getlsmprop_subj(&prop);
+	if (!lsmprop_is_set(&prop))
 		return 0;
 
-	error = security_secid_to_secctx(sid, &ctx, &len);
+	error = security_lsmprop_to_secctx(&prop, &ctx, &len);
 	if (error) {
 		if (error != -EINVAL)
 			goto error_path;
@@ -2404,7 +2405,7 @@ int audit_signal_info(int sig, struct task_struct *t)
 			audit_sig_uid = auid;
 		else
 			audit_sig_uid = uid;
-		security_current_getsecid_subj(&audit_sig_sid);
+		security_current_getlsmprop_subj(&audit_sig_lsm);
 	}
 
 	return audit_signal_info_syscall(t);
diff --git a/kernel/audit.h b/kernel/audit.h
index a60d2840559e..0211cb307d30 100644
--- a/kernel/audit.h
+++ b/kernel/audit.h
@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@
 
 #include <linux/fs.h>
 #include <linux/audit.h>
+#include <linux/security.h>
 #include <linux/skbuff.h>
 #include <uapi/linux/mqueue.h>
 #include <linux/tty.h>
@@ -81,7 +82,7 @@ struct audit_names {
 	kuid_t			uid;
 	kgid_t			gid;
 	dev_t			rdev;
-	u32			osid;
+	struct lsm_prop		oprop;
 	struct audit_cap_data	fcap;
 	unsigned int		fcap_ver;
 	unsigned char		type;		/* record type */
@@ -143,7 +144,7 @@ struct audit_context {
 	kuid_t		    target_auid;
 	kuid_t		    target_uid;
 	unsigned int	    target_sessionid;
-	u32		    target_sid;
+	struct lsm_prop	    target_ref;
 	char		    target_comm[TASK_COMM_LEN];
 
 	struct audit_tree_refs *trees, *first_trees;
@@ -160,7 +161,7 @@ struct audit_context {
 			kuid_t			uid;
 			kgid_t			gid;
 			umode_t			mode;
-			u32			osid;
+			struct lsm_prop		oprop;
 			int			has_perm;
 			uid_t			perm_uid;
 			gid_t			perm_gid;
diff --git a/kernel/auditfilter.c b/kernel/auditfilter.c
index 470041c49a44..bceb9f58a09e 100644
--- a/kernel/auditfilter.c
+++ b/kernel/auditfilter.c
@@ -1339,8 +1339,8 @@ int audit_filter(int msgtype, unsigned int listtype)
 
 		for (i = 0; i < e->rule.field_count; i++) {
 			struct audit_field *f = &e->rule.fields[i];
+			struct lsm_prop prop = { };
 			pid_t pid;
-			u32 sid;
 
 			switch (f->type) {
 			case AUDIT_PID:
@@ -1370,9 +1370,10 @@ int audit_filter(int msgtype, unsigned int listtype)
 			case AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN:
 			case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR:
 				if (f->lsm_rule) {
-					security_current_getsecid_subj(&sid);
-					result = security_audit_rule_match(sid,
-						   f->type, f->op, f->lsm_rule);
+					security_current_getlsmprop_subj(&prop);
+					result = security_audit_rule_match(
+						   &prop, f->type, f->op,
+						   f->lsm_rule);
 				}
 				break;
 			case AUDIT_EXE:
diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c
index 0627e74585ce..91afdd0d036e 100644
--- a/kernel/auditsc.c
+++ b/kernel/auditsc.c
@@ -100,7 +100,7 @@ struct audit_aux_data_pids {
 	kuid_t			target_auid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS];
 	kuid_t			target_uid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS];
 	unsigned int		target_sessionid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS];
-	u32			target_sid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS];
+	struct lsm_prop		target_ref[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS];
 	char 			target_comm[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS][TASK_COMM_LEN];
 	int			pid_count;
 };
@@ -470,7 +470,7 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
 {
 	const struct cred *cred;
 	int i, need_sid = 1;
-	u32 sid;
+	struct lsm_prop prop = { };
 	unsigned int sessionid;
 
 	if (ctx && rule->prio <= ctx->prio)
@@ -674,14 +674,16 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
 					 * fork()/copy_process() in which case
 					 * the new @tsk creds are still a dup
 					 * of @current's creds so we can still
-					 * use security_current_getsecid_subj()
+					 * use
+					 * security_current_getlsmprop_subj()
 					 * here even though it always refs
 					 * @current's creds
 					 */
-					security_current_getsecid_subj(&sid);
+					security_current_getlsmprop_subj(&prop);
 					need_sid = 0;
 				}
-				result = security_audit_rule_match(sid, f->type,
+				result = security_audit_rule_match(&prop,
+								   f->type,
 								   f->op,
 								   f->lsm_rule);
 			}
@@ -697,14 +699,14 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
 				/* Find files that match */
 				if (name) {
 					result = security_audit_rule_match(
-								name->osid,
+								&name->oprop,
 								f->type,
 								f->op,
 								f->lsm_rule);
 				} else if (ctx) {
 					list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) {
 						if (security_audit_rule_match(
-								n->osid,
+								&n->oprop,
 								f->type,
 								f->op,
 								f->lsm_rule)) {
@@ -716,7 +718,7 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
 				/* Find ipc objects that match */
 				if (!ctx || ctx->type != AUDIT_IPC)
 					break;
-				if (security_audit_rule_match(ctx->ipc.osid,
+				if (security_audit_rule_match(&ctx->ipc.oprop,
 							      f->type, f->op,
 							      f->lsm_rule))
 					++result;
@@ -1017,7 +1019,7 @@ static void audit_reset_context(struct audit_context *ctx)
 	ctx->target_pid = 0;
 	ctx->target_auid = ctx->target_uid = KUIDT_INIT(0);
 	ctx->target_sessionid = 0;
-	ctx->target_sid = 0;
+	lsmprop_init(&ctx->target_ref);
 	ctx->target_comm[0] = '\0';
 	unroll_tree_refs(ctx, NULL, 0);
 	WARN_ON(!list_empty(&ctx->killed_trees));
@@ -1091,8 +1093,9 @@ static inline void audit_free_context(struct audit_context *context)
 }
 
 static int audit_log_pid_context(struct audit_context *context, pid_t pid,
-				 kuid_t auid, kuid_t uid, unsigned int sessionid,
-				 u32 sid, char *comm)
+				 kuid_t auid, kuid_t uid,
+				 unsigned int sessionid, struct lsm_prop *prop,
+				 char *comm)
 {
 	struct audit_buffer *ab;
 	char *ctx = NULL;
@@ -1106,8 +1109,8 @@ static int audit_log_pid_context(struct audit_context *context, pid_t pid,
 	audit_log_format(ab, "opid=%d oauid=%d ouid=%d oses=%d", pid,
 			 from_kuid(&init_user_ns, auid),
 			 from_kuid(&init_user_ns, uid), sessionid);
-	if (sid) {
-		if (security_secid_to_secctx(sid, &ctx, &len)) {
+	if (lsmprop_is_set(prop)) {
+		if (security_lsmprop_to_secctx(prop, &ctx, &len)) {
 			audit_log_format(ab, " obj=(none)");
 			rc = 1;
 		} else {
@@ -1384,19 +1387,17 @@ static void show_special(struct audit_context *context, int *call_panic)
 			audit_log_format(ab, " a%d=%lx", i,
 				context->socketcall.args[i]);
 		break; }
-	case AUDIT_IPC: {
-		u32 osid = context->ipc.osid;
-
+	case AUDIT_IPC:
 		audit_log_format(ab, "ouid=%u ogid=%u mode=%#ho",
 				 from_kuid(&init_user_ns, context->ipc.uid),
 				 from_kgid(&init_user_ns, context->ipc.gid),
 				 context->ipc.mode);
-		if (osid) {
+		if (lsmprop_is_set(&context->ipc.oprop)) {
 			char *ctx = NULL;
 			u32 len;
 
-			if (security_secid_to_secctx(osid, &ctx, &len)) {
-				audit_log_format(ab, " osid=%u", osid);
+			if (security_lsmprop_to_secctx(&context->ipc.oprop,
+						       &ctx, &len)) {
 				*call_panic = 1;
 			} else {
 				audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", ctx);
@@ -1416,7 +1417,7 @@ static void show_special(struct audit_context *context, int *call_panic)
 				context->ipc.perm_gid,
 				context->ipc.perm_mode);
 		}
-		break; }
+		break;
 	case AUDIT_MQ_OPEN:
 		audit_log_format(ab,
 			"oflag=0x%x mode=%#ho mq_flags=0x%lx mq_maxmsg=%ld "
@@ -1558,13 +1559,11 @@ static void audit_log_name(struct audit_context *context, struct audit_names *n,
 				 from_kgid(&init_user_ns, n->gid),
 				 MAJOR(n->rdev),
 				 MINOR(n->rdev));
-	if (n->osid != 0) {
+	if (lsmprop_is_set(&n->oprop)) {
 		char *ctx = NULL;
 		u32 len;
 
-		if (security_secid_to_secctx(
-			n->osid, &ctx, &len)) {
-			audit_log_format(ab, " osid=%u", n->osid);
+		if (security_lsmprop_to_secctx(&n->oprop, &ctx, &len)) {
 			if (call_panic)
 				*call_panic = 2;
 		} else {
@@ -1780,7 +1779,7 @@ static void audit_log_exit(void)
 						  axs->target_auid[i],
 						  axs->target_uid[i],
 						  axs->target_sessionid[i],
-						  axs->target_sid[i],
+						  &axs->target_ref[i],
 						  axs->target_comm[i]))
 				call_panic = 1;
 	}
@@ -1789,7 +1788,7 @@ static void audit_log_exit(void)
 	    audit_log_pid_context(context, context->target_pid,
 				  context->target_auid, context->target_uid,
 				  context->target_sessionid,
-				  context->target_sid, context->target_comm))
+				  &context->target_ref, context->target_comm))
 			call_panic = 1;
 
 	if (context->pwd.dentry && context->pwd.mnt) {
@@ -2278,7 +2277,7 @@ static void audit_copy_inode(struct audit_names *name,
 	name->uid   = inode->i_uid;
 	name->gid   = inode->i_gid;
 	name->rdev  = inode->i_rdev;
-	security_inode_getsecid(inode, &name->osid);
+	security_inode_getlsmprop(inode, &name->oprop);
 	if (flags & AUDIT_INODE_NOEVAL) {
 		name->fcap_ver = -1;
 		return;
@@ -2632,7 +2631,7 @@ void __audit_ipc_obj(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp)
 	context->ipc.gid = ipcp->gid;
 	context->ipc.mode = ipcp->mode;
 	context->ipc.has_perm = 0;
-	security_ipc_getsecid(ipcp, &context->ipc.osid);
+	security_ipc_getlsmprop(ipcp, &context->ipc.oprop);
 	context->type = AUDIT_IPC;
 }
 
@@ -2729,7 +2728,7 @@ void __audit_ptrace(struct task_struct *t)
 	context->target_auid = audit_get_loginuid(t);
 	context->target_uid = task_uid(t);
 	context->target_sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(t);
-	security_task_getsecid_obj(t, &context->target_sid);
+	security_task_getlsmprop_obj(t, &context->target_ref);
 	memcpy(context->target_comm, t->comm, TASK_COMM_LEN);
 }
 
@@ -2756,7 +2755,7 @@ int audit_signal_info_syscall(struct task_struct *t)
 		ctx->target_auid = audit_get_loginuid(t);
 		ctx->target_uid = t_uid;
 		ctx->target_sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(t);
-		security_task_getsecid_obj(t, &ctx->target_sid);
+		security_task_getlsmprop_obj(t, &ctx->target_ref);
 		memcpy(ctx->target_comm, t->comm, TASK_COMM_LEN);
 		return 0;
 	}
@@ -2777,7 +2776,7 @@ int audit_signal_info_syscall(struct task_struct *t)
 	axp->target_auid[axp->pid_count] = audit_get_loginuid(t);
 	axp->target_uid[axp->pid_count] = t_uid;
 	axp->target_sessionid[axp->pid_count] = audit_get_sessionid(t);
-	security_task_getsecid_obj(t, &axp->target_sid[axp->pid_count]);
+	security_task_getlsmprop_obj(t, &axp->target_ref[axp->pid_count]);
 	memcpy(axp->target_comm[axp->pid_count], t->comm, TASK_COMM_LEN);
 	axp->pid_count++;
 
diff --git a/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c b/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c
index 9996883bf2b7..1bc2d0890a9f 100644
--- a/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c
+++ b/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c
@@ -1538,7 +1538,7 @@ int __init netlbl_unlabel_defconf(void)
 	/* Only the kernel is allowed to call this function and the only time
 	 * it is called is at bootup before the audit subsystem is reporting
 	 * messages so don't worry to much about these values. */
-	security_current_getsecid_subj(&audit_info.secid);
+	security_current_getlsmprop_subj(&audit_info.prop);
 	audit_info.loginuid = GLOBAL_ROOT_UID;
 	audit_info.sessionid = 0;
 
diff --git a/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c b/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c
index 3ed4fea2a2de..81635a13987b 100644
--- a/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c
+++ b/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c
@@ -98,10 +98,9 @@ struct audit_buffer *netlbl_audit_start_common(int type,
 			 from_kuid(&init_user_ns, audit_info->loginuid),
 			 audit_info->sessionid);
 
-	if (audit_info->secid != 0 &&
-	    security_secid_to_secctx(audit_info->secid,
-				     &secctx,
-				     &secctx_len) == 0) {
+	if (lsmprop_is_set(&audit_info->prop) &&
+	    security_lsmprop_to_secctx(&audit_info->prop, &secctx,
+				       &secctx_len) == 0) {
 		audit_log_format(audit_buf, " subj=%s", secctx);
 		security_release_secctx(secctx, secctx_len);
 	}
diff --git a/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.h b/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.h
index d6c5b31eb4eb..d4c434956212 100644
--- a/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.h
+++ b/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.h
@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@
  */
 static inline void netlbl_netlink_auditinfo(struct netlbl_audit *audit_info)
 {
-	security_current_getsecid_subj(&audit_info->secid);
+	security_current_getlsmprop_subj(&audit_info->prop);
 	audit_info->loginuid = audit_get_loginuid(current);
 	audit_info->sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(current);
 }
diff --git a/security/apparmor/audit.c b/security/apparmor/audit.c
index 6b5181c668b5..73087d76f649 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/audit.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/audit.c
@@ -264,13 +264,13 @@ int aa_audit_rule_known(struct audit_krule *rule)
 	return 0;
 }
 
-int aa_audit_rule_match(u32 sid, u32 field, u32 op, void *vrule)
+int aa_audit_rule_match(struct lsm_prop *prop, u32 field, u32 op, void *vrule)
 {
 	struct aa_audit_rule *rule = vrule;
 	struct aa_label *label;
 	int found = 0;
 
-	label = aa_secid_to_label(sid);
+	label = prop->apparmor.label;
 
 	if (!label)
 		return -ENOENT;
diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/audit.h b/security/apparmor/include/audit.h
index 0c8cc86b417b..e27229349abb 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/include/audit.h
+++ b/security/apparmor/include/audit.h
@@ -202,6 +202,6 @@ static inline int complain_error(int error)
 void aa_audit_rule_free(void *vrule);
 int aa_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **vrule, gfp_t gfp);
 int aa_audit_rule_known(struct audit_krule *rule);
-int aa_audit_rule_match(u32 sid, u32 field, u32 op, void *vrule);
+int aa_audit_rule_match(struct lsm_prop *prop, u32 field, u32 op, void *vrule);
 
 #endif /* __AA_AUDIT_H */
diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/secid.h b/security/apparmor/include/secid.h
index a912a5d5d04f..cc6d1c9f4a47 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/include/secid.h
+++ b/security/apparmor/include/secid.h
@@ -26,6 +26,8 @@ extern int apparmor_display_secid_mode;
 
 struct aa_label *aa_secid_to_label(u32 secid);
 int apparmor_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen);
+int apparmor_lsmprop_to_secctx(struct lsm_prop *prop, char **secdata,
+			       u32 *seclen);
 int apparmor_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen, u32 *secid);
 void apparmor_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen);
 
diff --git a/security/apparmor/lsm.c b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
index f5d05297d59e..1edc12862a7d 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/lsm.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
@@ -982,17 +982,20 @@ static void apparmor_bprm_committed_creds(const struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 	return;
 }
 
-static void apparmor_current_getsecid_subj(u32 *secid)
+static void apparmor_current_getlsmprop_subj(struct lsm_prop *prop)
 {
 	struct aa_label *label = __begin_current_label_crit_section();
-	*secid = label->secid;
+
+	prop->apparmor.label = label;
 	__end_current_label_crit_section(label);
 }
 
-static void apparmor_task_getsecid_obj(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid)
+static void apparmor_task_getlsmprop_obj(struct task_struct *p,
+					  struct lsm_prop *prop)
 {
 	struct aa_label *label = aa_get_task_label(p);
-	*secid = label->secid;
+
+	prop->apparmor.label = label;
 	aa_put_label(label);
 }
 
@@ -1503,8 +1506,9 @@ static struct security_hook_list apparmor_hooks[] __ro_after_init = {
 
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_free, apparmor_task_free),
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_alloc, apparmor_task_alloc),
-	LSM_HOOK_INIT(current_getsecid_subj, apparmor_current_getsecid_subj),
-	LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getsecid_obj, apparmor_task_getsecid_obj),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(current_getlsmprop_subj,
+		      apparmor_current_getlsmprop_subj),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getlsmprop_obj, apparmor_task_getlsmprop_obj),
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setrlimit, apparmor_task_setrlimit),
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_kill, apparmor_task_kill),
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(userns_create, apparmor_userns_create),
@@ -1517,6 +1521,7 @@ static struct security_hook_list apparmor_hooks[] __ro_after_init = {
 #endif
 
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(secid_to_secctx, apparmor_secid_to_secctx),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(lsmprop_to_secctx, apparmor_lsmprop_to_secctx),
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(secctx_to_secid, apparmor_secctx_to_secid),
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(release_secctx, apparmor_release_secctx),
 
diff --git a/security/apparmor/secid.c b/security/apparmor/secid.c
index 83d3d1e6d9dc..6350d107013a 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/secid.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/secid.c
@@ -61,10 +61,10 @@ struct aa_label *aa_secid_to_label(u32 secid)
 	return xa_load(&aa_secids, secid);
 }
 
-int apparmor_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
+static int apparmor_label_to_secctx(struct aa_label *label, char **secdata,
+				    u32 *seclen)
 {
 	/* TODO: cache secctx and ref count so we don't have to recreate */
-	struct aa_label *label = aa_secid_to_label(secid);
 	int flags = FLAG_VIEW_SUBNS | FLAG_HIDDEN_UNCONFINED | FLAG_ABS_ROOT;
 	int len;
 
@@ -90,6 +90,23 @@ int apparmor_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
 	return 0;
 }
 
+int apparmor_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
+{
+	struct aa_label *label = aa_secid_to_label(secid);
+
+	return apparmor_label_to_secctx(label, secdata, seclen);
+}
+
+int apparmor_lsmprop_to_secctx(struct lsm_prop *prop, char **secdata,
+			       u32 *seclen)
+{
+	struct aa_label *label;
+
+	label = prop->apparmor.label;
+
+	return apparmor_label_to_secctx(label, secdata, seclen);
+}
+
 int apparmor_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen, u32 *secid)
 {
 	struct aa_label *label;
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
index 3c323ca213d4..c0d3b716d11f 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
@@ -369,7 +369,7 @@ static inline void ima_process_queued_keys(void) {}
 
 /* LIM API function definitions */
 int ima_get_action(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct inode *inode,
-		   const struct cred *cred, u32 secid, int mask,
+		   const struct cred *cred, struct lsm_prop *prop, int mask,
 		   enum ima_hooks func, int *pcr,
 		   struct ima_template_desc **template_desc,
 		   const char *func_data, unsigned int *allowed_algos);
@@ -400,8 +400,8 @@ const char *ima_d_path(const struct path *path, char **pathbuf, char *filename);
 
 /* IMA policy related functions */
 int ima_match_policy(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct inode *inode,
-		     const struct cred *cred, u32 secid, enum ima_hooks func,
-		     int mask, int flags, int *pcr,
+		     const struct cred *cred, struct lsm_prop *prop,
+		     enum ima_hooks func, int mask, int flags, int *pcr,
 		     struct ima_template_desc **template_desc,
 		     const char *func_data, unsigned int *allowed_algos);
 void ima_init_policy(void);
@@ -555,7 +555,7 @@ static inline void ima_filter_rule_free(void *lsmrule)
 {
 }
 
-static inline int ima_filter_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op,
+static inline int ima_filter_rule_match(struct lsm_prop *prop, u32 field, u32 op,
 					void *lsmrule)
 {
 	return -EINVAL;
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
index 984e861f6e33..c35ea613c9f8 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
@@ -165,7 +165,7 @@ void ima_add_violation(struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename,
  * @idmap: idmap of the mount the inode was found from
  * @inode: pointer to the inode associated with the object being validated
  * @cred: pointer to credentials structure to validate
- * @secid: secid of the task being validated
+ * @prop: properties of the task being validated
  * @mask: contains the permission mask (MAY_READ, MAY_WRITE, MAY_EXEC,
  *        MAY_APPEND)
  * @func: caller identifier
@@ -187,7 +187,7 @@ void ima_add_violation(struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename,
  *
  */
 int ima_get_action(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct inode *inode,
-		   const struct cred *cred, u32 secid, int mask,
+		   const struct cred *cred, struct lsm_prop *prop, int mask,
 		   enum ima_hooks func, int *pcr,
 		   struct ima_template_desc **template_desc,
 		   const char *func_data, unsigned int *allowed_algos)
@@ -196,7 +196,7 @@ int ima_get_action(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct inode *inode,
 
 	flags &= ima_policy_flag;
 
-	return ima_match_policy(idmap, inode, cred, secid, func, mask,
+	return ima_match_policy(idmap, inode, cred, prop, func, mask,
 				flags, pcr, template_desc, func_data,
 				allowed_algos);
 }
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
index 656c709b974f..884a3533f7af 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
@@ -73,13 +73,13 @@ bool is_ima_appraise_enabled(void)
 int ima_must_appraise(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct inode *inode,
 		      int mask, enum ima_hooks func)
 {
-	u32 secid;
+	struct lsm_prop prop;
 
 	if (!ima_appraise)
 		return 0;
 
-	security_current_getsecid_subj(&secid);
-	return ima_match_policy(idmap, inode, current_cred(), secid,
+	security_current_getlsmprop_subj(&prop);
+	return ima_match_policy(idmap, inode, current_cred(), &prop,
 				func, mask, IMA_APPRAISE | IMA_HASH, NULL,
 				NULL, NULL, NULL);
 }
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
index db5e2dd7cec9..eb153a1855c4 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
@@ -206,8 +206,8 @@ static void ima_file_free(struct file *file)
 }
 
 static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred,
-			       u32 secid, char *buf, loff_t size, int mask,
-			       enum ima_hooks func)
+			       struct lsm_prop *prop, char *buf, loff_t size,
+			       int mask, enum ima_hooks func)
 {
 	struct inode *real_inode, *inode = file_inode(file);
 	struct ima_iint_cache *iint = NULL;
@@ -232,7 +232,7 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred,
 	 * bitmask based on the appraise/audit/measurement policy.
 	 * Included is the appraise submask.
 	 */
-	action = ima_get_action(file_mnt_idmap(file), inode, cred, secid,
+	action = ima_get_action(file_mnt_idmap(file), inode, cred, prop,
 				mask, func, &pcr, &template_desc, NULL,
 				&allowed_algos);
 	violation_check = ((func == FILE_CHECK || func == MMAP_CHECK ||
@@ -443,23 +443,23 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred,
 static int ima_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,
 			 unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags)
 {
-	u32 secid;
+	struct lsm_prop prop;
 	int ret;
 
 	if (!file)
 		return 0;
 
-	security_current_getsecid_subj(&secid);
+	security_current_getlsmprop_subj(&prop);
 
 	if (reqprot & PROT_EXEC) {
-		ret = process_measurement(file, current_cred(), secid, NULL,
+		ret = process_measurement(file, current_cred(), &prop, NULL,
 					  0, MAY_EXEC, MMAP_CHECK_REQPROT);
 		if (ret)
 			return ret;
 	}
 
 	if (prot & PROT_EXEC)
-		return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), secid, NULL,
+		return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), &prop, NULL,
 					   0, MAY_EXEC, MMAP_CHECK);
 
 	return 0;
@@ -488,9 +488,9 @@ static int ima_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long reqprot,
 	char *pathbuf = NULL;
 	const char *pathname = NULL;
 	struct inode *inode;
+	struct lsm_prop prop;
 	int result = 0;
 	int action;
-	u32 secid;
 	int pcr;
 
 	/* Is mprotect making an mmap'ed file executable? */
@@ -498,13 +498,13 @@ static int ima_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long reqprot,
 	    !(prot & PROT_EXEC) || (vma->vm_flags & VM_EXEC))
 		return 0;
 
-	security_current_getsecid_subj(&secid);
+	security_current_getlsmprop_subj(&prop);
 	inode = file_inode(vma->vm_file);
 	action = ima_get_action(file_mnt_idmap(vma->vm_file), inode,
-				current_cred(), secid, MAY_EXEC, MMAP_CHECK,
+				current_cred(), &prop, MAY_EXEC, MMAP_CHECK,
 				&pcr, &template, NULL, NULL);
 	action |= ima_get_action(file_mnt_idmap(vma->vm_file), inode,
-				 current_cred(), secid, MAY_EXEC,
+				 current_cred(), &prop, MAY_EXEC,
 				 MMAP_CHECK_REQPROT, &pcr, &template, NULL,
 				 NULL);
 
@@ -541,16 +541,16 @@ static int ima_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long reqprot,
 static int ima_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 {
 	int ret;
-	u32 secid;
+	struct lsm_prop prop;
 
-	security_current_getsecid_subj(&secid);
-	ret = process_measurement(bprm->file, current_cred(), secid, NULL, 0,
-				  MAY_EXEC, BPRM_CHECK);
+	security_current_getlsmprop_subj(&prop);
+	ret = process_measurement(bprm->file, current_cred(),
+				  &prop, NULL, 0, MAY_EXEC, BPRM_CHECK);
 	if (ret)
 		return ret;
 
-	security_cred_getsecid(bprm->cred, &secid);
-	return process_measurement(bprm->file, bprm->cred, secid, NULL, 0,
+	security_cred_getlsmprop(bprm->cred, &prop);
+	return process_measurement(bprm->file, bprm->cred, &prop, NULL, 0,
 				   MAY_EXEC, CREDS_CHECK);
 }
 
@@ -566,10 +566,10 @@ static int ima_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
  */
 static int ima_file_check(struct file *file, int mask)
 {
-	u32 secid;
+	struct lsm_prop prop;
 
-	security_current_getsecid_subj(&secid);
-	return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), secid, NULL, 0,
+	security_current_getlsmprop_subj(&prop);
+	return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), &prop, NULL, 0,
 				   mask & (MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE | MAY_EXEC |
 					   MAY_APPEND), FILE_CHECK);
 }
@@ -768,7 +768,7 @@ static int ima_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id read_id,
 			 bool contents)
 {
 	enum ima_hooks func;
-	u32 secid;
+	struct lsm_prop prop;
 
 	/*
 	 * Do devices using pre-allocated memory run the risk of the
@@ -788,9 +788,9 @@ static int ima_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id read_id,
 
 	/* Read entire file for all partial reads. */
 	func = read_idmap[read_id] ?: FILE_CHECK;
-	security_current_getsecid_subj(&secid);
-	return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), secid, NULL,
-				   0, MAY_READ, func);
+	security_current_getlsmprop_subj(&prop);
+	return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), &prop, NULL, 0,
+				   MAY_READ, func);
 }
 
 const int read_idmap[READING_MAX_ID] = {
@@ -818,7 +818,7 @@ static int ima_post_read_file(struct file *file, char *buf, loff_t size,
 			      enum kernel_read_file_id read_id)
 {
 	enum ima_hooks func;
-	u32 secid;
+	struct lsm_prop prop;
 
 	/* permit signed certs */
 	if (!file && read_id == READING_X509_CERTIFICATE)
@@ -831,8 +831,8 @@ static int ima_post_read_file(struct file *file, char *buf, loff_t size,
 	}
 
 	func = read_idmap[read_id] ?: FILE_CHECK;
-	security_current_getsecid_subj(&secid);
-	return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), secid, buf, size,
+	security_current_getlsmprop_subj(&prop);
+	return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), &prop, buf, size,
 				   MAY_READ, func);
 }
 
@@ -967,7 +967,7 @@ int process_buffer_measurement(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
 	int digest_hash_len = hash_digest_size[ima_hash_algo];
 	int violation = 0;
 	int action = 0;
-	u32 secid;
+	struct lsm_prop prop;
 
 	if (digest && digest_len < digest_hash_len)
 		return -EINVAL;
@@ -990,9 +990,9 @@ int process_buffer_measurement(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
 	 * buffer measurements.
 	 */
 	if (func) {
-		security_current_getsecid_subj(&secid);
+		security_current_getlsmprop_subj(&prop);
 		action = ima_get_action(idmap, inode, current_cred(),
-					secid, 0, func, &pcr, &template,
+					&prop, 0, func, &pcr, &template,
 					func_data, NULL);
 		if (!(action & IMA_MEASURE) && !digest)
 			return -ENOENT;
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
index 09da8e639239..dbfd554b4624 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
@@ -557,7 +557,7 @@ static bool ima_match_rule_data(struct ima_rule_entry *rule,
  * @idmap: idmap of the mount the inode was found from
  * @inode: a pointer to an inode
  * @cred: a pointer to a credentials structure for user validation
- * @secid: the secid of the task to be validated
+ * @prop: LSM properties of the task to be validated
  * @func: LIM hook identifier
  * @mask: requested action (MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE | MAY_APPEND | MAY_EXEC)
  * @func_data: func specific data, may be NULL
@@ -567,7 +567,7 @@ static bool ima_match_rule_data(struct ima_rule_entry *rule,
 static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *rule,
 			    struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
 			    struct inode *inode, const struct cred *cred,
-			    u32 secid, enum ima_hooks func, int mask,
+			    struct lsm_prop *prop, enum ima_hooks func, int mask,
 			    const char *func_data)
 {
 	int i;
@@ -635,7 +635,7 @@ static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *rule,
 		return false;
 	for (i = 0; i < MAX_LSM_RULES; i++) {
 		int rc = 0;
-		u32 osid;
+		struct lsm_prop prop = { };
 
 		if (!lsm_rule->lsm[i].rule) {
 			if (!lsm_rule->lsm[i].args_p)
@@ -649,15 +649,15 @@ static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *rule,
 		case LSM_OBJ_USER:
 		case LSM_OBJ_ROLE:
 		case LSM_OBJ_TYPE:
-			security_inode_getsecid(inode, &osid);
-			rc = ima_filter_rule_match(osid, lsm_rule->lsm[i].type,
+			security_inode_getlsmprop(inode, &prop);
+			rc = ima_filter_rule_match(&prop, lsm_rule->lsm[i].type,
 						   Audit_equal,
 						   lsm_rule->lsm[i].rule);
 			break;
 		case LSM_SUBJ_USER:
 		case LSM_SUBJ_ROLE:
 		case LSM_SUBJ_TYPE:
-			rc = ima_filter_rule_match(secid, lsm_rule->lsm[i].type,
+			rc = ima_filter_rule_match(&prop, lsm_rule->lsm[i].type,
 						   Audit_equal,
 						   lsm_rule->lsm[i].rule);
 			break;
@@ -720,7 +720,7 @@ static int get_subaction(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, enum ima_hooks func)
  * @inode: pointer to an inode for which the policy decision is being made
  * @cred: pointer to a credentials structure for which the policy decision is
  *        being made
- * @secid: LSM secid of the task to be validated
+ * @prop: LSM properties of the task to be validated
  * @func: IMA hook identifier
  * @mask: requested action (MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE | MAY_APPEND | MAY_EXEC)
  * @flags: IMA actions to consider (e.g. IMA_MEASURE | IMA_APPRAISE)
@@ -737,8 +737,8 @@ static int get_subaction(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, enum ima_hooks func)
  * than writes so ima_match_policy() is classical RCU candidate.
  */
 int ima_match_policy(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct inode *inode,
-		     const struct cred *cred, u32 secid, enum ima_hooks func,
-		     int mask, int flags, int *pcr,
+		     const struct cred *cred, struct lsm_prop *prop,
+		     enum ima_hooks func, int mask, int flags, int *pcr,
 		     struct ima_template_desc **template_desc,
 		     const char *func_data, unsigned int *allowed_algos)
 {
@@ -756,7 +756,7 @@ int ima_match_policy(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct inode *inode,
 		if (!(entry->action & actmask))
 			continue;
 
-		if (!ima_match_rules(entry, idmap, inode, cred, secid,
+		if (!ima_match_rules(entry, idmap, inode, cred, prop,
 				     func, mask, func_data))
 			continue;
 
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index c5981e558bc2..e2d47dd4087a 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -2726,16 +2726,15 @@ int security_inode_listsecurity(struct inode *inode,
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inode_listsecurity);
 
 /**
- * security_inode_getsecid() - Get an inode's secid
+ * security_inode_getlsmprop() - Get an inode's LSM data
  * @inode: inode
- * @secid: secid to return
+ * @prop: lsm specific information to return
  *
- * Get the secid associated with the node.  In case of failure, @secid will be
- * set to zero.
+ * Get the lsm specific information associated with the node.
  */
-void security_inode_getsecid(struct inode *inode, u32 *secid)
+void security_inode_getlsmprop(struct inode *inode, struct lsm_prop *prop)
 {
-	call_void_hook(inode_getsecid, inode, secid);
+	call_void_hook(inode_getlsmprop, inode, prop);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -3275,6 +3274,21 @@ void security_cred_getsecid(const struct cred *c, u32 *secid)
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_cred_getsecid);
 
+/**
+ * security_cred_getlsmprop() - Get the LSM data from a set of credentials
+ * @c: credentials
+ * @prop: destination for the LSM data
+ *
+ * Retrieve the security data of the cred structure @c.  In case of
+ * failure, @prop will be cleared.
+ */
+void security_cred_getlsmprop(const struct cred *c, struct lsm_prop *prop)
+{
+	lsmprop_init(prop);
+	call_void_hook(cred_getlsmprop, c, prop);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_cred_getlsmprop);
+
 /**
  * security_kernel_act_as() - Set the kernel credentials to act as secid
  * @new: credentials
@@ -3494,33 +3508,33 @@ int security_task_getsid(struct task_struct *p)
 }
 
 /**
- * security_current_getsecid_subj() - Get the current task's subjective secid
- * @secid: secid value
+ * security_current_getlsmprop_subj() - Current task's subjective LSM data
+ * @prop: lsm specific information
  *
  * Retrieve the subjective security identifier of the current task and return
- * it in @secid.  In case of failure, @secid will be set to zero.
+ * it in @prop.
  */
-void security_current_getsecid_subj(u32 *secid)
+void security_current_getlsmprop_subj(struct lsm_prop *prop)
 {
-	*secid = 0;
-	call_void_hook(current_getsecid_subj, secid);
+	lsmprop_init(prop);
+	call_void_hook(current_getlsmprop_subj, prop);
 }
-EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_current_getsecid_subj);
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_current_getlsmprop_subj);
 
 /**
- * security_task_getsecid_obj() - Get a task's objective secid
+ * security_task_getlsmprop_obj() - Get a task's objective LSM data
  * @p: target task
- * @secid: secid value
+ * @prop: lsm specific information
  *
  * Retrieve the objective security identifier of the task_struct in @p and
- * return it in @secid. In case of failure, @secid will be set to zero.
+ * return it in @prop.
  */
-void security_task_getsecid_obj(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid)
+void security_task_getlsmprop_obj(struct task_struct *p, struct lsm_prop *prop)
 {
-	*secid = 0;
-	call_void_hook(task_getsecid_obj, p, secid);
+	lsmprop_init(prop);
+	call_void_hook(task_getlsmprop_obj, p, prop);
 }
-EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_task_getsecid_obj);
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_task_getlsmprop_obj);
 
 /**
  * security_task_setnice() - Check if setting a task's nice value is allowed
@@ -3732,17 +3746,17 @@ int security_ipc_permission(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, short flag)
 }
 
 /**
- * security_ipc_getsecid() - Get the sysv ipc object's secid
+ * security_ipc_getlsmprop() - Get the sysv ipc object LSM data
  * @ipcp: ipc permission structure
- * @secid: secid pointer
+ * @prop: pointer to lsm information
  *
- * Get the secid associated with the ipc object.  In case of failure, @secid
- * will be set to zero.
+ * Get the lsm information associated with the ipc object.
  */
-void security_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, u32 *secid)
+
+void security_ipc_getlsmprop(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, struct lsm_prop *prop)
 {
-	*secid = 0;
-	call_void_hook(ipc_getsecid, ipcp, secid);
+	lsmprop_init(prop);
+	call_void_hook(ipc_getlsmprop, ipcp, prop);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -4313,6 +4327,27 @@ int security_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_secid_to_secctx);
 
+/**
+ * security_lsmprop_to_secctx() - Convert a lsm_prop to a secctx
+ * @prop: lsm specific information
+ * @secdata: secctx
+ * @seclen: secctx length
+ *
+ * Convert a @prop entry to security context.  If @secdata is NULL the
+ * length of the result will be returned in @seclen, but no @secdata
+ * will be returned.  This does mean that the length could change between
+ * calls to check the length and the next call which actually allocates
+ * and returns the @secdata.
+ *
+ * Return: Return 0 on success, error on failure.
+ */
+int security_lsmprop_to_secctx(struct lsm_prop *prop, char **secdata,
+			       u32 *seclen)
+{
+	return call_int_hook(lsmprop_to_secctx, prop, secdata, seclen);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_lsmprop_to_secctx);
+
 /**
  * security_secctx_to_secid() - Convert a secctx to a secid
  * @secdata: secctx
@@ -5572,7 +5607,7 @@ void security_audit_rule_free(void *lsmrule)
 
 /**
  * security_audit_rule_match() - Check if a label matches an audit rule
- * @secid: security label
+ * @prop: security label
  * @field: LSM audit field
  * @op: matching operator
  * @lsmrule: audit rule
@@ -5583,9 +5618,10 @@ void security_audit_rule_free(void *lsmrule)
  * Return: Returns 1 if secid matches the rule, 0 if it does not, -ERRNO on
  *         failure.
  */
-int security_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, void *lsmrule)
+int security_audit_rule_match(struct lsm_prop *prop, u32 field, u32 op,
+			      void *lsmrule)
 {
-	return call_int_hook(audit_rule_match, secid, field, op, lsmrule);
+	return call_int_hook(audit_rule_match, prop, field, op, lsmrule);
 }
 #endif /* CONFIG_AUDIT */
 
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index ad3abd48eed1..f5a08f94e094 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -3503,15 +3503,16 @@ static int selinux_inode_listsecurity(struct inode *inode, char *buffer, size_t
 	return len;
 }
 
-static void selinux_inode_getsecid(struct inode *inode, u32 *secid)
+static void selinux_inode_getlsmprop(struct inode *inode, struct lsm_prop *prop)
 {
 	struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode_security_novalidate(inode);
-	*secid = isec->sid;
+
+	prop->selinux.secid = isec->sid;
 }
 
 static int selinux_inode_copy_up(struct dentry *src, struct cred **new)
 {
-	u32 sid;
+	struct lsm_prop prop;
 	struct task_security_struct *tsec;
 	struct cred *new_creds = *new;
 
@@ -3523,8 +3524,8 @@ static int selinux_inode_copy_up(struct dentry *src, struct cred **new)
 
 	tsec = selinux_cred(new_creds);
 	/* Get label from overlay inode and set it in create_sid */
-	selinux_inode_getsecid(d_inode(src), &sid);
-	tsec->create_sid = sid;
+	selinux_inode_getlsmprop(d_inode(src), &prop);
+	tsec->create_sid = prop.selinux.secid;
 	*new = new_creds;
 	return 0;
 }
@@ -4034,6 +4035,11 @@ static void selinux_cred_getsecid(const struct cred *c, u32 *secid)
 	*secid = cred_sid(c);
 }
 
+static void selinux_cred_getlsmprop(const struct cred *c, struct lsm_prop *prop)
+{
+	prop->selinux.secid = cred_sid(c);
+}
+
 /*
  * set the security data for a kernel service
  * - all the creation contexts are set to unlabelled
@@ -4169,14 +4175,15 @@ static int selinux_task_getsid(struct task_struct *p)
 			    PROCESS__GETSESSION, NULL);
 }
 
-static void selinux_current_getsecid_subj(u32 *secid)
+static void selinux_current_getlsmprop_subj(struct lsm_prop *prop)
 {
-	*secid = current_sid();
+	prop->selinux.secid = current_sid();
 }
 
-static void selinux_task_getsecid_obj(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid)
+static void selinux_task_getlsmprop_obj(struct task_struct *p,
+					struct lsm_prop *prop)
 {
-	*secid = task_sid_obj(p);
+	prop->selinux.secid = task_sid_obj(p);
 }
 
 static int selinux_task_setnice(struct task_struct *p, int nice)
@@ -6352,10 +6359,11 @@ static int selinux_ipc_permission(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, short flag)
 	return ipc_has_perm(ipcp, av);
 }
 
-static void selinux_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, u32 *secid)
+static void selinux_ipc_getlsmprop(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp,
+				   struct lsm_prop *prop)
 {
 	struct ipc_security_struct *isec = selinux_ipc(ipcp);
-	*secid = isec->sid;
+	prop->selinux.secid = isec->sid;
 }
 
 static void selinux_d_instantiate(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode)
@@ -6634,8 +6642,13 @@ static int selinux_ismaclabel(const char *name)
 
 static int selinux_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
 {
-	return security_sid_to_context(secid,
-				       secdata, seclen);
+	return security_sid_to_context(secid, secdata, seclen);
+}
+
+static int selinux_lsmprop_to_secctx(struct lsm_prop *prop, char **secdata,
+				     u32 *seclen)
+{
+	return selinux_secid_to_secctx(prop->selinux.secid, secdata, seclen);
 }
 
 static int selinux_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen, u32 *secid)
@@ -7188,7 +7201,7 @@ static struct security_hook_list selinux_hooks[] __ro_after_init = {
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getsecurity, selinux_inode_getsecurity),
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_setsecurity, selinux_inode_setsecurity),
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_listsecurity, selinux_inode_listsecurity),
-	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getsecid, selinux_inode_getsecid),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getlsmprop, selinux_inode_getlsmprop),
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_copy_up, selinux_inode_copy_up),
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_copy_up_xattr, selinux_inode_copy_up_xattr),
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_notify, selinux_path_notify),
@@ -7214,6 +7227,7 @@ static struct security_hook_list selinux_hooks[] __ro_after_init = {
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_prepare, selinux_cred_prepare),
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_transfer, selinux_cred_transfer),
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_getsecid, selinux_cred_getsecid),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_getlsmprop, selinux_cred_getlsmprop),
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_act_as, selinux_kernel_act_as),
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_create_files_as, selinux_kernel_create_files_as),
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_module_request, selinux_kernel_module_request),
@@ -7222,8 +7236,8 @@ static struct security_hook_list selinux_hooks[] __ro_after_init = {
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setpgid, selinux_task_setpgid),
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getpgid, selinux_task_getpgid),
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getsid, selinux_task_getsid),
-	LSM_HOOK_INIT(current_getsecid_subj, selinux_current_getsecid_subj),
-	LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getsecid_obj, selinux_task_getsecid_obj),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(current_getlsmprop_subj, selinux_current_getlsmprop_subj),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getlsmprop_obj, selinux_task_getlsmprop_obj),
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setnice, selinux_task_setnice),
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setioprio, selinux_task_setioprio),
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getioprio, selinux_task_getioprio),
@@ -7237,7 +7251,7 @@ static struct security_hook_list selinux_hooks[] __ro_after_init = {
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(userns_create, selinux_userns_create),
 
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(ipc_permission, selinux_ipc_permission),
-	LSM_HOOK_INIT(ipc_getsecid, selinux_ipc_getsecid),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(ipc_getlsmprop, selinux_ipc_getlsmprop),
 
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_queue_associate, selinux_msg_queue_associate),
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_queue_msgctl, selinux_msg_queue_msgctl),
@@ -7380,6 +7394,7 @@ static struct security_hook_list selinux_hooks[] __ro_after_init = {
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_alloc_security, selinux_inode_alloc_security),
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(sem_alloc_security, selinux_sem_alloc_security),
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(secid_to_secctx, selinux_secid_to_secctx),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(lsmprop_to_secctx, selinux_lsmprop_to_secctx),
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getsecctx, selinux_inode_getsecctx),
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_alloc_security, selinux_sk_alloc_security),
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(tun_dev_alloc_security, selinux_tun_dev_alloc_security),
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/audit.h b/security/selinux/include/audit.h
index 168d17be7df3..d5b0425055e4 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/audit.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/audit.h
@@ -41,7 +41,7 @@ void selinux_audit_rule_free(void *rule);
 
 /**
  * selinux_audit_rule_match - determine if a context ID matches a rule.
- * @sid: the context ID to check
+ * @prop: includes the context ID to check
  * @field: the field this rule refers to
  * @op: the operator the rule uses
  * @rule: pointer to the audit rule to check against
@@ -49,7 +49,8 @@ void selinux_audit_rule_free(void *rule);
  * Returns 1 if the context id matches the rule, 0 if it does not, and
  * -errno on failure.
  */
-int selinux_audit_rule_match(u32 sid, u32 field, u32 op, void *rule);
+int selinux_audit_rule_match(struct lsm_prop *prop, u32 field, u32 op,
+			     void *rule);
 
 /**
  * selinux_audit_rule_known - check to see if rule contains selinux fields.
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/services.c b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
index 9652aec400cb..971c45d576ba 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/services.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
@@ -3641,7 +3641,7 @@ int selinux_audit_rule_known(struct audit_krule *rule)
 	return 0;
 }
 
-int selinux_audit_rule_match(u32 sid, u32 field, u32 op, void *vrule)
+int selinux_audit_rule_match(struct lsm_prop *prop, u32 field, u32 op, void *vrule)
 {
 	struct selinux_state *state = &selinux_state;
 	struct selinux_policy *policy;
@@ -3667,10 +3667,10 @@ int selinux_audit_rule_match(u32 sid, u32 field, u32 op, void *vrule)
 		goto out;
 	}
 
-	ctxt = sidtab_search(policy->sidtab, sid);
+	ctxt = sidtab_search(policy->sidtab, prop->selinux.secid);
 	if (unlikely(!ctxt)) {
 		WARN_ONCE(1, "selinux_audit_rule_match: unrecognized SID %d\n",
-			  sid);
+			  prop->selinux.secid);
 		match = -ENOENT;
 		goto out;
 	}
diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
index 370fd594da12..0c476282e279 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
+++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
@@ -1649,15 +1649,13 @@ static int smack_inode_listsecurity(struct inode *inode, char *buffer,
 }
 
 /**
- * smack_inode_getsecid - Extract inode's security id
+ * smack_inode_getlsmprop - Extract inode's security id
  * @inode: inode to extract the info from
- * @secid: where result will be saved
+ * @prop: where result will be saved
  */
-static void smack_inode_getsecid(struct inode *inode, u32 *secid)
+static void smack_inode_getlsmprop(struct inode *inode, struct lsm_prop *prop)
 {
-	struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_inode(inode);
-
-	*secid = skp->smk_secid;
+	prop->smack.skp = smk_of_inode(inode);
 }
 
 /*
@@ -2148,6 +2146,21 @@ static void smack_cred_getsecid(const struct cred *cred, u32 *secid)
 	rcu_read_unlock();
 }
 
+/**
+ * smack_cred_getlsmprop - get the Smack label for a creds structure
+ * @cred: the object creds
+ * @prop: where to put the data
+ *
+ * Sets the Smack part of the ref
+ */
+static void smack_cred_getlsmprop(const struct cred *cred,
+				  struct lsm_prop *prop)
+{
+	rcu_read_lock();
+	prop->smack.skp = smk_of_task(smack_cred(cred));
+	rcu_read_unlock();
+}
+
 /**
  * smack_kernel_act_as - Set the subjective context in a set of credentials
  * @new: points to the set of credentials to be modified.
@@ -2239,30 +2252,27 @@ static int smack_task_getsid(struct task_struct *p)
 }
 
 /**
- * smack_current_getsecid_subj - get the subjective secid of the current task
- * @secid: where to put the result
+ * smack_current_getlsmprop_subj - get the subjective secid of the current task
+ * @prop: where to put the result
  *
  * Sets the secid to contain a u32 version of the task's subjective smack label.
  */
-static void smack_current_getsecid_subj(u32 *secid)
+static void smack_current_getlsmprop_subj(struct lsm_prop *prop)
 {
-	struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_current();
-
-	*secid = skp->smk_secid;
+	prop->smack.skp = smk_of_current();
 }
 
 /**
- * smack_task_getsecid_obj - get the objective secid of the task
+ * smack_task_getlsmprop_obj - get the objective data of the task
  * @p: the task
- * @secid: where to put the result
+ * @prop: where to put the result
  *
  * Sets the secid to contain a u32 version of the task's objective smack label.
  */
-static void smack_task_getsecid_obj(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid)
+static void smack_task_getlsmprop_obj(struct task_struct *p,
+				      struct lsm_prop *prop)
 {
-	struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_task_struct_obj(p);
-
-	*secid = skp->smk_secid;
+	prop->smack.skp = smk_of_task_struct_obj(p);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -3435,16 +3445,15 @@ static int smack_ipc_permission(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipp, short flag)
 }
 
 /**
- * smack_ipc_getsecid - Extract smack security id
+ * smack_ipc_getlsmprop - Extract smack security data
  * @ipp: the object permissions
- * @secid: where result will be saved
+ * @prop: where result will be saved
  */
-static void smack_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipp, u32 *secid)
+static void smack_ipc_getlsmprop(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipp, struct lsm_prop *prop)
 {
-	struct smack_known **blob = smack_ipc(ipp);
-	struct smack_known *iskp = *blob;
+	struct smack_known **iskpp = smack_ipc(ipp);
 
-	*secid = iskp->smk_secid;
+	prop->smack.skp = *iskpp;
 }
 
 /**
@@ -4757,7 +4766,7 @@ static int smack_audit_rule_known(struct audit_krule *krule)
 
 /**
  * smack_audit_rule_match - Audit given object ?
- * @secid: security id for identifying the object to test
+ * @prop: security id for identifying the object to test
  * @field: audit rule flags given from user-space
  * @op: required testing operator
  * @vrule: smack internal rule presentation
@@ -4765,9 +4774,10 @@ static int smack_audit_rule_known(struct audit_krule *krule)
  * The core Audit hook. It's used to take the decision of
  * whether to audit or not to audit a given object.
  */
-static int smack_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, void *vrule)
+static int smack_audit_rule_match(struct lsm_prop *prop, u32 field, u32 op,
+				  void *vrule)
 {
-	struct smack_known *skp;
+	struct smack_known *skp = prop->smack.skp;
 	char *rule = vrule;
 
 	if (unlikely(!rule)) {
@@ -4778,8 +4788,6 @@ static int smack_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, void *vrule)
 	if (field != AUDIT_SUBJ_USER && field != AUDIT_OBJ_USER)
 		return 0;
 
-	skp = smack_from_secid(secid);
-
 	/*
 	 * No need to do string comparisons. If a match occurs,
 	 * both pointers will point to the same smack_known
@@ -4809,7 +4817,6 @@ static int smack_ismaclabel(const char *name)
 	return (strcmp(name, XATTR_SMACK_SUFFIX) == 0);
 }
 
-
 /**
  * smack_secid_to_secctx - return the smack label for a secid
  * @secid: incoming integer
@@ -4828,6 +4835,25 @@ static int smack_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
 	return 0;
 }
 
+/**
+ * smack_lsmprop_to_secctx - return the smack label
+ * @prop: includes incoming Smack data
+ * @secdata: destination
+ * @seclen: how long it is
+ *
+ * Exists for audit code.
+ */
+static int smack_lsmprop_to_secctx(struct lsm_prop *prop, char **secdata,
+				   u32 *seclen)
+{
+	struct smack_known *skp = prop->smack.skp;
+
+	if (secdata)
+		*secdata = skp->smk_known;
+	*seclen = strlen(skp->smk_known);
+	return 0;
+}
+
 /**
  * smack_secctx_to_secid - return the secid for a smack label
  * @secdata: smack label
@@ -5078,7 +5104,7 @@ static struct security_hook_list smack_hooks[] __ro_after_init = {
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getsecurity, smack_inode_getsecurity),
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_setsecurity, smack_inode_setsecurity),
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_listsecurity, smack_inode_listsecurity),
-	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getsecid, smack_inode_getsecid),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getlsmprop, smack_inode_getlsmprop),
 
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_alloc_security, smack_file_alloc_security),
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_ioctl, smack_file_ioctl),
@@ -5098,13 +5124,14 @@ static struct security_hook_list smack_hooks[] __ro_after_init = {
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_prepare, smack_cred_prepare),
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_transfer, smack_cred_transfer),
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_getsecid, smack_cred_getsecid),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_getlsmprop, smack_cred_getlsmprop),
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_act_as, smack_kernel_act_as),
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_create_files_as, smack_kernel_create_files_as),
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setpgid, smack_task_setpgid),
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getpgid, smack_task_getpgid),
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getsid, smack_task_getsid),
-	LSM_HOOK_INIT(current_getsecid_subj, smack_current_getsecid_subj),
-	LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getsecid_obj, smack_task_getsecid_obj),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(current_getlsmprop_subj, smack_current_getlsmprop_subj),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getlsmprop_obj, smack_task_getlsmprop_obj),
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setnice, smack_task_setnice),
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setioprio, smack_task_setioprio),
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getioprio, smack_task_getioprio),
@@ -5115,7 +5142,7 @@ static struct security_hook_list smack_hooks[] __ro_after_init = {
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_to_inode, smack_task_to_inode),
 
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(ipc_permission, smack_ipc_permission),
-	LSM_HOOK_INIT(ipc_getsecid, smack_ipc_getsecid),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(ipc_getlsmprop, smack_ipc_getlsmprop),
 
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_msg_alloc_security, smack_msg_msg_alloc_security),
 
@@ -5187,6 +5214,7 @@ static struct security_hook_list smack_hooks[] __ro_after_init = {
 
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(ismaclabel, smack_ismaclabel),
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(secid_to_secctx, smack_secid_to_secctx),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(lsmprop_to_secctx, smack_lsmprop_to_secctx),
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(secctx_to_secid, smack_secctx_to_secid),
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_notifysecctx, smack_inode_notifysecctx),
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_setsecctx, smack_inode_setsecctx),
diff --git a/security/smack/smackfs.c b/security/smack/smackfs.c
index 5dd1e164f9b1..1401412fd794 100644
--- a/security/smack/smackfs.c
+++ b/security/smack/smackfs.c
@@ -182,11 +182,9 @@ static inline void smack_catset_bit(unsigned int cat, char *catsetp)
  */
 static void smk_netlabel_audit_set(struct netlbl_audit *nap)
 {
-	struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_current();
-
 	nap->loginuid = audit_get_loginuid(current);
 	nap->sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(current);
-	nap->secid = skp->smk_secid;
+	nap->prop.smack.skp = smk_of_current();
 }
 
 /*