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crypto: rsassa-pkcs1 - Migrate to sig_alg backend

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A sig_alg backend has just been introduced with the intent of moving all
asymmetric sign/verify algorithms to it one by one.

Migrate the sign/verify operations from rsa-pkcs1pad.c to a separate
rsassa-pkcs1.c which uses the new backend.

Consequently there are now two templates which build on the "rsa"
akcipher_alg:

* The existing "pkcs1pad" template, which is instantiated as an
  akcipher_instance and retains the encrypt/decrypt operations of
  RSAES-PKCS1-v1_5 (RFC 8017 sec 7.2).

* The new "pkcs1" template, which is instantiated as a sig_instance
  and contains the sign/verify operations of RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5
  (RFC 8017 sec 8.2).

In a separate step, rsa-pkcs1pad.c could optionally be renamed to
rsaes-pkcs1.c for clarity.  Additional "oaep" and "pss" templates
could be added for RSAES-OAEP and RSASSA-PSS.

Note that it's currently allowed to allocate a "pkcs1pad(rsa)" transform
without specifying a hash algorithm.  That makes sense if the transform
is only used for encrypt/decrypt and continues to be supported.  But for
sign/verify, such transforms previously did not insert the Full Hash
Prefix into the padding.  The resulting message encoding was incompliant
with EMSA-PKCS1-v1_5 (RFC 8017 sec 9.2) and therefore nonsensical.

From here on in, it is no longer allowed to allocate a transform without
specifying a hash algorithm if the transform is used for sign/verify
operations.  This simplifies the code because the insertion of the Full
Hash Prefix is no longer optional, so various "if (digest_info)" clauses
can be removed.

There has been a previous attempt to forbid transform allocation without
specifying a hash algorithm, namely by commit c0d20d22e0 ("crypto:
rsa-pkcs1pad - Require hash to be present").  It had to be rolled back
with commit b3a8c8a5eb ("crypto: rsa-pkcs1pad: Allow hash to be
optional [ver #2]"), presumably because it broke allocation of a
transform which was solely used for encrypt/decrypt, not sign/verify.
Avoid such breakage by allowing transform allocation for encrypt/decrypt
with and without specifying a hash algorithm (and simply ignoring the
hash algorithm in the former case).

So again, specifying a hash algorithm is now mandatory for sign/verify,
but optional and ignored for encrypt/decrypt.

The new sig_alg API uses kernel buffers instead of sglists, which
avoids the overhead of copying signature and digest from sglists back
into kernel buffers.  rsassa-pkcs1.c is thus simplified quite a bit.

sig_alg is always synchronous, whereas the underlying "rsa" akcipher_alg
may be asynchronous.  So await the result of the akcipher_alg, similar
to crypto_akcipher_sync_{en,de}crypt().

As part of the migration, rename "rsa_digest_info" to "hash_prefix" to
adhere to the spec language in RFC 9580.  Otherwise keep the code
unmodified wherever possible to ease reviewing and bisecting.  Leave
several simplification and hardening opportunities to separate commits.

rsassa-pkcs1.c uses modern __free() syntax for allocation of buffers
which need to be freed by kfree_sensitive(), hence a DEFINE_FREE()
clause for kfree_sensitive() is introduced herein as a byproduct.

Signed-off-by: Lukas Wunner <lukas@wunner.de>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
This commit is contained in:
Lukas Wunner 2024-09-10 16:30:16 +02:00 committed by Herbert Xu
parent 7964b0d4bd
commit 1e562deace
11 changed files with 479 additions and 344 deletions
Show Stats Download Patch File Download Diff File Expand all files Collapse all files

1
crypto/Kconfig
View File

@ -250,6 +250,7 @@ config CRYPTO_RSA
tristate "RSA (Rivest-Shamir-Adleman)" tristate "RSA (Rivest-Shamir-Adleman)"
select CRYPTO_AKCIPHER select CRYPTO_AKCIPHER
select CRYPTO_MANAGER select CRYPTO_MANAGER
select CRYPTO_SIG
select MPILIB select MPILIB
select ASN1 select ASN1
help help

1
crypto/Makefile
View File

@ -48,6 +48,7 @@ rsa_generic-y += rsaprivkey.asn1.o
rsa_generic-y += rsa.o rsa_generic-y += rsa.o
rsa_generic-y += rsa_helper.o rsa_generic-y += rsa_helper.o
rsa_generic-y += rsa-pkcs1pad.o rsa_generic-y += rsa-pkcs1pad.o
rsa_generic-y += rsassa-pkcs1.o
obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_RSA) += rsa_generic.o obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_RSA) += rsa_generic.o
$(obj)/ecdsasignature.asn1.o: $(obj)/ecdsasignature.asn1.c $(obj)/ecdsasignature.asn1.h $(obj)/ecdsasignature.asn1.o: $(obj)/ecdsasignature.asn1.c $(obj)/ecdsasignature.asn1.h

10
crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c
View File

@ -83,13 +83,19 @@ software_key_determine_akcipher(const struct public_key *pkey,
if (strcmp(encoding, "pkcs1") == 0) { if (strcmp(encoding, "pkcs1") == 0) {
*sig = op == kernel_pkey_sign || *sig = op == kernel_pkey_sign ||
op == kernel_pkey_verify; op == kernel_pkey_verify;
if (!hash_algo) { if (!*sig) {
/*
* For encrypt/decrypt, hash_algo is not used
* but allowed to be set for historic reasons.
*/
n = snprintf(alg_name, CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME, n = snprintf(alg_name, CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME,
"pkcs1pad(%s)", "pkcs1pad(%s)",
pkey->pkey_algo); pkey->pkey_algo);
} else { } else {
if (!hash_algo)
return -EINVAL;
n = snprintf(alg_name, CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME, n = snprintf(alg_name, CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME,
"pkcs1pad(%s,%s)", "pkcs1(%s,%s)",
pkey->pkey_algo, hash_algo); pkey->pkey_algo, hash_algo);
} }
return n >= CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME ? -EINVAL : 0; return n >= CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME ? -EINVAL : 0;

339
crypto/rsa-pkcs1pad.c
View File

@ -16,101 +16,6 @@
#include <linux/random.h> #include <linux/random.h>
#include <linux/scatterlist.h> #include <linux/scatterlist.h>
/*
* Hash algorithm OIDs plus ASN.1 DER wrappings [RFC4880 sec 5.2.2].
*/
static const u8 rsa_digest_info_md5[] = {
0x30, 0x20, 0x30, 0x0c, 0x06, 0x08,
0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xf7, 0x0d, 0x02, 0x05, /* OID */
0x05, 0x00, 0x04, 0x10
};
static const u8 rsa_digest_info_sha1[] = {
0x30, 0x21, 0x30, 0x09, 0x06, 0x05,
0x2b, 0x0e, 0x03, 0x02, 0x1a,
0x05, 0x00, 0x04, 0x14
};
static const u8 rsa_digest_info_rmd160[] = {
0x30, 0x21, 0x30, 0x09, 0x06, 0x05,
0x2b, 0x24, 0x03, 0x02, 0x01,
0x05, 0x00, 0x04, 0x14
};
static const u8 rsa_digest_info_sha224[] = {
0x30, 0x2d, 0x30, 0x0d, 0x06, 0x09,
0x60, 0x86, 0x48, 0x01, 0x65, 0x03, 0x04, 0x02, 0x04,
0x05, 0x00, 0x04, 0x1c
};
static const u8 rsa_digest_info_sha256[] = {
0x30, 0x31, 0x30, 0x0d, 0x06, 0x09,
0x60, 0x86, 0x48, 0x01, 0x65, 0x03, 0x04, 0x02, 0x01,
0x05, 0x00, 0x04, 0x20
};
static const u8 rsa_digest_info_sha384[] = {
0x30, 0x41, 0x30, 0x0d, 0x06, 0x09,
0x60, 0x86, 0x48, 0x01, 0x65, 0x03, 0x04, 0x02, 0x02,
0x05, 0x00, 0x04, 0x30
};
static const u8 rsa_digest_info_sha512[] = {
0x30, 0x51, 0x30, 0x0d, 0x06, 0x09,
0x60, 0x86, 0x48, 0x01, 0x65, 0x03, 0x04, 0x02, 0x03,
0x05, 0x00, 0x04, 0x40
};
static const u8 rsa_digest_info_sha3_256[] = {
0x30, 0x31, 0x30, 0x0d, 0x06, 0x09,
0x60, 0x86, 0x48, 0x01, 0x65, 0x03, 0x04, 0x02, 0x08,
0x05, 0x00, 0x04, 0x20
};
static const u8 rsa_digest_info_sha3_384[] = {
0x30, 0x41, 0x30, 0x0d, 0x06, 0x09,
0x60, 0x86, 0x48, 0x01, 0x65, 0x03, 0x04, 0x02, 0x09,
0x05, 0x00, 0x04, 0x30
};
static const u8 rsa_digest_info_sha3_512[] = {
0x30, 0x51, 0x30, 0x0d, 0x06, 0x09,
0x60, 0x86, 0x48, 0x01, 0x65, 0x03, 0x04, 0x02, 0x0A,
0x05, 0x00, 0x04, 0x40
};
static const struct rsa_asn1_template {
const char *name;
const u8 *data;
size_t size;
} rsa_asn1_templates[] = {
#define _(X) { #X, rsa_digest_info_##X, sizeof(rsa_digest_info_##X) }
_(md5),
_(sha1),
_(rmd160),
_(sha256),
_(sha384),
_(sha512),
_(sha224),
#undef _
#define _(X) { "sha3-" #X, rsa_digest_info_sha3_##X, sizeof(rsa_digest_info_sha3_##X) }
_(256),
_(384),
_(512),
#undef _
{ NULL }
};
static const struct rsa_asn1_template *rsa_lookup_asn1(const char *name)
{
const struct rsa_asn1_template *p;
for (p = rsa_asn1_templates; p->name; p++)
if (strcmp(name, p->name) == 0)
return p;
return NULL;
}
struct pkcs1pad_ctx { struct pkcs1pad_ctx {
struct crypto_akcipher *child; struct crypto_akcipher *child;
unsigned int key_size; unsigned int key_size;
@ -118,7 +23,6 @@ struct pkcs1pad_ctx {
struct pkcs1pad_inst_ctx { struct pkcs1pad_inst_ctx {
struct crypto_akcipher_spawn spawn; struct crypto_akcipher_spawn spawn;
const struct rsa_asn1_template *digest_info;
}; };
struct pkcs1pad_request { struct pkcs1pad_request {
@ -148,9 +52,9 @@ static unsigned int pkcs1pad_get_max_size(struct crypto_akcipher *tfm)
struct pkcs1pad_ctx *ctx = akcipher_tfm_ctx(tfm); struct pkcs1pad_ctx *ctx = akcipher_tfm_ctx(tfm);
/* /*
* The maximum destination buffer size for the encrypt/sign operations * The maximum destination buffer size for the encrypt operation
* will be the same as for RSA, even though it's smaller for * will be the same as for RSA, even though it's smaller for
* decrypt/verify. * decrypt.
*/ */
return ctx->key_size; return ctx->key_size;
@ -168,7 +72,7 @@ static void pkcs1pad_sg_set_buf(struct scatterlist *sg, void *buf, size_t len,
sg_chain(sg, nsegs, next); sg_chain(sg, nsegs, next);
} }
static int pkcs1pad_encrypt_sign_complete(struct akcipher_request *req, int err) static int pkcs1pad_encrypt_complete(struct akcipher_request *req, int err)
{ {
struct crypto_akcipher *tfm = crypto_akcipher_reqtfm(req); struct crypto_akcipher *tfm = crypto_akcipher_reqtfm(req);
struct pkcs1pad_ctx *ctx = akcipher_tfm_ctx(tfm); struct pkcs1pad_ctx *ctx = akcipher_tfm_ctx(tfm);
@ -207,14 +111,14 @@ static int pkcs1pad_encrypt_sign_complete(struct akcipher_request *req, int err)
return err; return err;
} }
static void pkcs1pad_encrypt_sign_complete_cb(void *data, int err) static void pkcs1pad_encrypt_complete_cb(void *data, int err)
{ {
struct akcipher_request *req = data; struct akcipher_request *req = data;
if (err == -EINPROGRESS) if (err == -EINPROGRESS)
goto out; goto out;
err = pkcs1pad_encrypt_sign_complete(req, err); err = pkcs1pad_encrypt_complete(req, err);
out: out:
akcipher_request_complete(req, err); akcipher_request_complete(req, err);
@ -255,7 +159,7 @@ static int pkcs1pad_encrypt(struct akcipher_request *req)
akcipher_request_set_tfm(&req_ctx->child_req, ctx->child); akcipher_request_set_tfm(&req_ctx->child_req, ctx->child);
akcipher_request_set_callback(&req_ctx->child_req, req->base.flags, akcipher_request_set_callback(&req_ctx->child_req, req->base.flags,
pkcs1pad_encrypt_sign_complete_cb, req); pkcs1pad_encrypt_complete_cb, req);
/* Reuse output buffer */ /* Reuse output buffer */
akcipher_request_set_crypt(&req_ctx->child_req, req_ctx->in_sg, akcipher_request_set_crypt(&req_ctx->child_req, req_ctx->in_sg,
@ -263,7 +167,7 @@ static int pkcs1pad_encrypt(struct akcipher_request *req)
err = crypto_akcipher_encrypt(&req_ctx->child_req); err = crypto_akcipher_encrypt(&req_ctx->child_req);
if (err != -EINPROGRESS && err != -EBUSY) if (err != -EINPROGRESS && err != -EBUSY)
return pkcs1pad_encrypt_sign_complete(req, err); return pkcs1pad_encrypt_complete(req, err);
return err; return err;
} }
@ -368,195 +272,6 @@ static int pkcs1pad_decrypt(struct akcipher_request *req)
return err; return err;
} }
static int pkcs1pad_sign(struct akcipher_request *req)
{
struct crypto_akcipher *tfm = crypto_akcipher_reqtfm(req);
struct pkcs1pad_ctx *ctx = akcipher_tfm_ctx(tfm);
struct pkcs1pad_request *req_ctx = akcipher_request_ctx(req);
struct akcipher_instance *inst = akcipher_alg_instance(tfm);
struct pkcs1pad_inst_ctx *ictx = akcipher_instance_ctx(inst);
const struct rsa_asn1_template *digest_info = ictx->digest_info;
int err;
unsigned int ps_end, digest_info_size = 0;
if (!ctx->key_size)
return -EINVAL;
if (digest_info)
digest_info_size = digest_info->size;
if (req->src_len + digest_info_size > ctx->key_size - 11)
return -EOVERFLOW;
if (req->dst_len < ctx->key_size) {
req->dst_len = ctx->key_size;
return -EOVERFLOW;
}
req_ctx->in_buf = kmalloc(ctx->key_size - 1 - req->src_len,
GFP_KERNEL);
if (!req_ctx->in_buf)
return -ENOMEM;
ps_end = ctx->key_size - digest_info_size - req->src_len - 2;
req_ctx->in_buf[0] = 0x01;
memset(req_ctx->in_buf + 1, 0xff, ps_end - 1);
req_ctx->in_buf[ps_end] = 0x00;
if (digest_info)
memcpy(req_ctx->in_buf + ps_end + 1, digest_info->data,
digest_info->size);
pkcs1pad_sg_set_buf(req_ctx->in_sg, req_ctx->in_buf,
ctx->key_size - 1 - req->src_len, req->src);
akcipher_request_set_tfm(&req_ctx->child_req, ctx->child);
akcipher_request_set_callback(&req_ctx->child_req, req->base.flags,
pkcs1pad_encrypt_sign_complete_cb, req);
/* Reuse output buffer */
akcipher_request_set_crypt(&req_ctx->child_req, req_ctx->in_sg,
req->dst, ctx->key_size - 1, req->dst_len);
err = crypto_akcipher_decrypt(&req_ctx->child_req);
if (err != -EINPROGRESS && err != -EBUSY)
return pkcs1pad_encrypt_sign_complete(req, err);
return err;
}
static int pkcs1pad_verify_complete(struct akcipher_request *req, int err)
{
struct crypto_akcipher *tfm = crypto_akcipher_reqtfm(req);
struct pkcs1pad_ctx *ctx = akcipher_tfm_ctx(tfm);
struct pkcs1pad_request *req_ctx = akcipher_request_ctx(req);
struct akcipher_instance *inst = akcipher_alg_instance(tfm);
struct pkcs1pad_inst_ctx *ictx = akcipher_instance_ctx(inst);
const struct rsa_asn1_template *digest_info = ictx->digest_info;
const unsigned int sig_size = req->src_len;
const unsigned int digest_size = req->dst_len;
unsigned int dst_len;
unsigned int pos;
u8 *out_buf;
if (err)
goto done;
err = -EINVAL;
dst_len = req_ctx->child_req.dst_len;
if (dst_len < ctx->key_size - 1)
goto done;
out_buf = req_ctx->out_buf;
if (dst_len == ctx->key_size) {
if (out_buf[0] != 0x00)
/* Decrypted value had no leading 0 byte */
goto done;
dst_len--;
out_buf++;
}
err = -EBADMSG;
if (out_buf[0] != 0x01)
goto done;
for (pos = 1; pos < dst_len; pos++)
if (out_buf[pos] != 0xff)
break;
if (pos < 9 || pos == dst_len || out_buf[pos] != 0x00)
goto done;
pos++;
if (digest_info) {
if (digest_info->size > dst_len - pos)
goto done;
if (crypto_memneq(out_buf + pos, digest_info->data,
digest_info->size))
goto done;
pos += digest_info->size;
}
err = 0;
if (digest_size != dst_len - pos) {
err = -EKEYREJECTED;
req->dst_len = dst_len - pos;
goto done;
}
/* Extract appended digest. */
sg_pcopy_to_buffer(req->src,
sg_nents_for_len(req->src, sig_size + digest_size),
req_ctx->out_buf + ctx->key_size,
digest_size, sig_size);
/* Do the actual verification step. */
if (memcmp(req_ctx->out_buf + ctx->key_size, out_buf + pos,
digest_size) != 0)
err = -EKEYREJECTED;
done:
kfree_sensitive(req_ctx->out_buf);
return err;
}
static void pkcs1pad_verify_complete_cb(void *data, int err)
{
struct akcipher_request *req = data;
if (err == -EINPROGRESS)
goto out;
err = pkcs1pad_verify_complete(req, err);
out:
akcipher_request_complete(req, err);
}
/*
* The verify operation is here for completeness similar to the verification
* defined in RFC2313 section 10.2 except that block type 0 is not accepted,
* as in RFC2437. RFC2437 section 9.2 doesn't define any operation to
* retrieve the DigestInfo from a signature, instead the user is expected
* to call the sign operation to generate the expected signature and compare
* signatures instead of the message-digests.
*/
static int pkcs1pad_verify(struct akcipher_request *req)
{
struct crypto_akcipher *tfm = crypto_akcipher_reqtfm(req);
struct pkcs1pad_ctx *ctx = akcipher_tfm_ctx(tfm);
struct pkcs1pad_request *req_ctx = akcipher_request_ctx(req);
const unsigned int sig_size = req->src_len;
const unsigned int digest_size = req->dst_len;
int err;
if (WARN_ON(req->dst) || WARN_ON(!digest_size) ||
!ctx->key_size || sig_size != ctx->key_size)
return -EINVAL;
req_ctx->out_buf = kmalloc(ctx->key_size + digest_size, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!req_ctx->out_buf)
return -ENOMEM;
pkcs1pad_sg_set_buf(req_ctx->out_sg, req_ctx->out_buf,
ctx->key_size, NULL);
akcipher_request_set_tfm(&req_ctx->child_req, ctx->child);
akcipher_request_set_callback(&req_ctx->child_req, req->base.flags,
pkcs1pad_verify_complete_cb, req);
/* Reuse input buffer, output to a new buffer */
akcipher_request_set_crypt(&req_ctx->child_req, req->src,
req_ctx->out_sg, sig_size, ctx->key_size);
err = crypto_akcipher_encrypt(&req_ctx->child_req);
if (err != -EINPROGRESS && err != -EBUSY)
return pkcs1pad_verify_complete(req, err);
return err;
}
static int pkcs1pad_init_tfm(struct crypto_akcipher *tfm) static int pkcs1pad_init_tfm(struct crypto_akcipher *tfm)
{ {
struct akcipher_instance *inst = akcipher_alg_instance(tfm); struct akcipher_instance *inst = akcipher_alg_instance(tfm);
@ -598,7 +313,6 @@ static int pkcs1pad_create(struct crypto_template *tmpl, struct rtattr **tb)
struct akcipher_instance *inst; struct akcipher_instance *inst;
struct pkcs1pad_inst_ctx *ctx; struct pkcs1pad_inst_ctx *ctx;
struct akcipher_alg *rsa_alg; struct akcipher_alg *rsa_alg;
const char *hash_name;
int err; int err;
err = crypto_check_attr_type(tb, CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_AKCIPHER, &mask); err = crypto_check_attr_type(tb, CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_AKCIPHER, &mask);
@ -624,36 +338,15 @@ static int pkcs1pad_create(struct crypto_template *tmpl, struct rtattr **tb)
} }
err = -ENAMETOOLONG; err = -ENAMETOOLONG;
hash_name = crypto_attr_alg_name(tb[2]); if (snprintf(inst->alg.base.cra_name,
if (IS_ERR(hash_name)) { CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME, "pkcs1pad(%s)",
if (snprintf(inst->alg.base.cra_name, rsa_alg->base.cra_name) >= CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME)
CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME, "pkcs1pad(%s)", goto err_free_inst;
rsa_alg->base.cra_name) >= CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME)
goto err_free_inst;
if (snprintf(inst->alg.base.cra_driver_name, if (snprintf(inst->alg.base.cra_driver_name,
CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME, "pkcs1pad(%s)", CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME, "pkcs1pad(%s)",
rsa_alg->base.cra_driver_name) >= rsa_alg->base.cra_driver_name) >= CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME)
CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME) goto err_free_inst;
goto err_free_inst;
} else {
ctx->digest_info = rsa_lookup_asn1(hash_name);
if (!ctx->digest_info) {
err = -EINVAL;
goto err_free_inst;
}
if (snprintf(inst->alg.base.cra_name, CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME,
"pkcs1pad(%s,%s)", rsa_alg->base.cra_name,
hash_name) >= CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME)
goto err_free_inst;
if (snprintf(inst->alg.base.cra_driver_name,
CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME, "pkcs1pad(%s,%s)",
rsa_alg->base.cra_driver_name,
hash_name) >= CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME)
goto err_free_inst;
}
inst->alg.base.cra_priority = rsa_alg->base.cra_priority; inst->alg.base.cra_priority = rsa_alg->base.cra_priority;
inst->alg.base.cra_ctxsize = sizeof(struct pkcs1pad_ctx); inst->alg.base.cra_ctxsize = sizeof(struct pkcs1pad_ctx);
@ -663,8 +356,6 @@ static int pkcs1pad_create(struct crypto_template *tmpl, struct rtattr **tb)
inst->alg.encrypt = pkcs1pad_encrypt; inst->alg.encrypt = pkcs1pad_encrypt;
inst->alg.decrypt = pkcs1pad_decrypt; inst->alg.decrypt = pkcs1pad_decrypt;
inst->alg.sign = pkcs1pad_sign;
inst->alg.verify = pkcs1pad_verify;
inst->alg.set_pub_key = pkcs1pad_set_pub_key; inst->alg.set_pub_key = pkcs1pad_set_pub_key;
inst->alg.set_priv_key = pkcs1pad_set_priv_key; inst->alg.set_priv_key = pkcs1pad_set_priv_key;
inst->alg.max_size = pkcs1pad_get_max_size; inst->alg.max_size = pkcs1pad_get_max_size;

17
crypto/rsa.c
View File

@ -407,16 +407,25 @@ static int __init rsa_init(void)
return err; return err;
err = crypto_register_template(&rsa_pkcs1pad_tmpl); err = crypto_register_template(&rsa_pkcs1pad_tmpl);
if (err) { if (err)
crypto_unregister_akcipher(&rsa); goto err_unregister_rsa;
return err;
} err = crypto_register_template(&rsassa_pkcs1_tmpl);
if (err)
goto err_unregister_rsa_pkcs1pad;
return 0; return 0;
err_unregister_rsa_pkcs1pad:
crypto_unregister_template(&rsa_pkcs1pad_tmpl);
err_unregister_rsa:
crypto_unregister_akcipher(&rsa);
return err;
} }
static void __exit rsa_exit(void) static void __exit rsa_exit(void)
{ {
crypto_unregister_template(&rsassa_pkcs1_tmpl);
crypto_unregister_template(&rsa_pkcs1pad_tmpl); crypto_unregister_template(&rsa_pkcs1pad_tmpl);
crypto_unregister_akcipher(&rsa); crypto_unregister_akcipher(&rsa);
} }

422
crypto/rsassa-pkcs1.c Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,422 @@
// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later
/*
* RSA Signature Scheme with Appendix - PKCS #1 v1.5 (RFC 8017 sec 8.2)
*
* https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8017#section-8.2
*
* Copyright (c) 2015 - 2024 Intel Corporation
*/
#include <linux/module.h>
#include <linux/scatterlist.h>
#include <crypto/akcipher.h>
#include <crypto/algapi.h>
#include <crypto/sig.h>
#include <crypto/internal/akcipher.h>
#include <crypto/internal/rsa.h>
#include <crypto/internal/sig.h>
/*
* Full Hash Prefix for EMSA-PKCS1-v1_5 encoding method (RFC 9580 table 24)
*
* RSA keys are usually much larger than the hash of the message to be signed.
* The hash is therefore prepended by the Full Hash Prefix and a 0xff padding.
* The Full Hash Prefix is an ASN.1 SEQUENCE containing the hash algorithm OID.
*
* https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9580#table-24
*/
static const u8 hash_prefix_md5[] = {
0x30, 0x20, 0x30, 0x0c, 0x06, 0x08, /* SEQUENCE (SEQUENCE (OID */
0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xf7, 0x0d, 0x02, 0x05, /* <algorithm>, */
0x05, 0x00, 0x04, 0x10 /* NULL), OCTET STRING <hash>) */
};
static const u8 hash_prefix_sha1[] = {
0x30, 0x21, 0x30, 0x09, 0x06, 0x05,
0x2b, 0x0e, 0x03, 0x02, 0x1a,
0x05, 0x00, 0x04, 0x14
};
static const u8 hash_prefix_rmd160[] = {
0x30, 0x21, 0x30, 0x09, 0x06, 0x05,
0x2b, 0x24, 0x03, 0x02, 0x01,
0x05, 0x00, 0x04, 0x14
};
static const u8 hash_prefix_sha224[] = {
0x30, 0x2d, 0x30, 0x0d, 0x06, 0x09,
0x60, 0x86, 0x48, 0x01, 0x65, 0x03, 0x04, 0x02, 0x04,
0x05, 0x00, 0x04, 0x1c
};
static const u8 hash_prefix_sha256[] = {
0x30, 0x31, 0x30, 0x0d, 0x06, 0x09,
0x60, 0x86, 0x48, 0x01, 0x65, 0x03, 0x04, 0x02, 0x01,
0x05, 0x00, 0x04, 0x20
};
static const u8 hash_prefix_sha384[] = {
0x30, 0x41, 0x30, 0x0d, 0x06, 0x09,
0x60, 0x86, 0x48, 0x01, 0x65, 0x03, 0x04, 0x02, 0x02,
0x05, 0x00, 0x04, 0x30
};
static const u8 hash_prefix_sha512[] = {
0x30, 0x51, 0x30, 0x0d, 0x06, 0x09,
0x60, 0x86, 0x48, 0x01, 0x65, 0x03, 0x04, 0x02, 0x03,
0x05, 0x00, 0x04, 0x40
};
static const u8 hash_prefix_sha3_256[] = {
0x30, 0x31, 0x30, 0x0d, 0x06, 0x09,
0x60, 0x86, 0x48, 0x01, 0x65, 0x03, 0x04, 0x02, 0x08,
0x05, 0x00, 0x04, 0x20
};
static const u8 hash_prefix_sha3_384[] = {
0x30, 0x41, 0x30, 0x0d, 0x06, 0x09,
0x60, 0x86, 0x48, 0x01, 0x65, 0x03, 0x04, 0x02, 0x09,
0x05, 0x00, 0x04, 0x30
};
static const u8 hash_prefix_sha3_512[] = {
0x30, 0x51, 0x30, 0x0d, 0x06, 0x09,
0x60, 0x86, 0x48, 0x01, 0x65, 0x03, 0x04, 0x02, 0x0a,
0x05, 0x00, 0x04, 0x40
};
static const struct hash_prefix {
const char *name;
const u8 *data;
size_t size;
} hash_prefixes[] = {
#define _(X) { #X, hash_prefix_##X, sizeof(hash_prefix_##X) }
_(md5),
_(sha1),
_(rmd160),
_(sha256),
_(sha384),
_(sha512),
_(sha224),
#undef _
#define _(X) { "sha3-" #X, hash_prefix_sha3_##X, sizeof(hash_prefix_sha3_##X) }
_(256),
_(384),
_(512),
#undef _
{ NULL }
};
static const struct hash_prefix *rsassa_pkcs1_find_hash_prefix(const char *name)
{
const struct hash_prefix *p;
for (p = hash_prefixes; p->name; p++)
if (strcmp(name, p->name) == 0)
return p;
return NULL;
}
struct rsassa_pkcs1_ctx {
struct crypto_akcipher *child;
unsigned int key_size;
};
struct rsassa_pkcs1_inst_ctx {
struct crypto_akcipher_spawn spawn;
const struct hash_prefix *hash_prefix;
};
static int rsassa_pkcs1_sign(struct crypto_sig *tfm,
const void *src, unsigned int slen,
void *dst, unsigned int dlen)
{
struct sig_instance *inst = sig_alg_instance(tfm);
struct rsassa_pkcs1_inst_ctx *ictx = sig_instance_ctx(inst);
const struct hash_prefix *hash_prefix = ictx->hash_prefix;
struct rsassa_pkcs1_ctx *ctx = crypto_sig_ctx(tfm);
unsigned int child_reqsize = crypto_akcipher_reqsize(ctx->child);
struct akcipher_request *child_req __free(kfree_sensitive) = NULL;
struct scatterlist in_sg[2], out_sg;
struct crypto_wait cwait;
unsigned int pad_len;
unsigned int ps_end;
unsigned int len;
u8 *in_buf;
int err;
if (!ctx->key_size)
return -EINVAL;
if (dlen < ctx->key_size)
return -EOVERFLOW;
if (slen + hash_prefix->size > ctx->key_size - 11)
return -EOVERFLOW;
child_req = kmalloc(sizeof(*child_req) + child_reqsize +
ctx->key_size - 1 - slen, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!child_req)
return -ENOMEM;
/* RFC 8017 sec 8.2.1 step 1 - EMSA-PKCS1-v1_5 encoding generation */
in_buf = (u8 *)(child_req + 1) + child_reqsize;
ps_end = ctx->key_size - hash_prefix->size - slen - 2;
in_buf[0] = 0x01;
memset(in_buf + 1, 0xff, ps_end - 1);
in_buf[ps_end] = 0x00;
memcpy(in_buf + ps_end + 1, hash_prefix->data, hash_prefix->size);
/* RFC 8017 sec 8.2.1 step 2 - RSA signature */
crypto_init_wait(&cwait);
sg_init_table(in_sg, 2);
sg_set_buf(&in_sg[0], in_buf, ctx->key_size - 1 - slen);
sg_set_buf(&in_sg[1], src, slen);
sg_init_one(&out_sg, dst, dlen);
akcipher_request_set_tfm(child_req, ctx->child);
akcipher_request_set_crypt(child_req, in_sg, &out_sg,
ctx->key_size - 1, dlen);
akcipher_request_set_callback(child_req, CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP,
crypto_req_done, &cwait);
err = crypto_akcipher_decrypt(child_req);
err = crypto_wait_req(err, &cwait);
if (err)
return err;
len = child_req->dst_len;
pad_len = ctx->key_size - len;
/* Four billion to one */
if (unlikely(pad_len)) {
memmove(dst + pad_len, dst, len);
memset(dst, 0, pad_len);
}
return 0;
}
static int rsassa_pkcs1_verify(struct crypto_sig *tfm,
const void *src, unsigned int slen,
const void *digest, unsigned int dlen)
{
struct sig_instance *inst = sig_alg_instance(tfm);
struct rsassa_pkcs1_inst_ctx *ictx = sig_instance_ctx(inst);
const struct hash_prefix *hash_prefix = ictx->hash_prefix;
struct rsassa_pkcs1_ctx *ctx = crypto_sig_ctx(tfm);
unsigned int child_reqsize = crypto_akcipher_reqsize(ctx->child);
struct akcipher_request *child_req __free(kfree_sensitive) = NULL;
struct scatterlist in_sg, out_sg;
struct crypto_wait cwait;
unsigned int dst_len;
unsigned int pos;
u8 *out_buf;
int err;
/* RFC 8017 sec 8.2.2 step 1 - length checking */
if (!ctx->key_size ||
slen != ctx->key_size ||
!dlen)
return -EINVAL;
/* RFC 8017 sec 8.2.2 step 2 - RSA verification */
child_req = kmalloc(sizeof(*child_req) + child_reqsize + ctx->key_size,
GFP_KERNEL);
if (!child_req)
return -ENOMEM;
out_buf = (u8 *)(child_req + 1) + child_reqsize;
crypto_init_wait(&cwait);
sg_init_one(&in_sg, src, slen);
sg_init_one(&out_sg, out_buf, ctx->key_size);
akcipher_request_set_tfm(child_req, ctx->child);
akcipher_request_set_crypt(child_req, &in_sg, &out_sg,
slen, ctx->key_size);
akcipher_request_set_callback(child_req, CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP,
crypto_req_done, &cwait);
err = crypto_akcipher_encrypt(child_req);
err = crypto_wait_req(err, &cwait);
if (err)
return err;
/* RFC 8017 sec 8.2.2 step 3 - EMSA-PKCS1-v1_5 encoding verification */
dst_len = child_req->dst_len;
if (dst_len < ctx->key_size - 1)
return -EINVAL;
if (dst_len == ctx->key_size) {
if (out_buf[0] != 0x00)
/* Encrypted value had no leading 0 byte */
return -EINVAL;
dst_len--;
out_buf++;
}
if (out_buf[0] != 0x01)
return -EBADMSG;
for (pos = 1; pos < dst_len; pos++)
if (out_buf[pos] != 0xff)
break;
if (pos < 9 || pos == dst_len || out_buf[pos] != 0x00)
return -EBADMSG;
pos++;
if (hash_prefix->size > dst_len - pos)
return -EBADMSG;
if (crypto_memneq(out_buf + pos, hash_prefix->data, hash_prefix->size))
return -EBADMSG;
pos += hash_prefix->size;
/* RFC 8017 sec 8.2.2 step 4 - comparison of digest with out_buf */
if (dlen != dst_len - pos)
return -EKEYREJECTED;
if (memcmp(digest, out_buf + pos, dlen) != 0)
return -EKEYREJECTED;
return 0;
}
static unsigned int rsassa_pkcs1_max_size(struct crypto_sig *tfm)
{
struct rsassa_pkcs1_ctx *ctx = crypto_sig_ctx(tfm);
return ctx->key_size;
}
static int rsassa_pkcs1_set_pub_key(struct crypto_sig *tfm,
const void *key, unsigned int keylen)
{
struct rsassa_pkcs1_ctx *ctx = crypto_sig_ctx(tfm);
return rsa_set_key(ctx->child, &ctx->key_size, RSA_PUB, key, keylen);
}
static int rsassa_pkcs1_set_priv_key(struct crypto_sig *tfm,
const void *key, unsigned int keylen)
{
struct rsassa_pkcs1_ctx *ctx = crypto_sig_ctx(tfm);
return rsa_set_key(ctx->child, &ctx->key_size, RSA_PRIV, key, keylen);
}
static int rsassa_pkcs1_init_tfm(struct crypto_sig *tfm)
{
struct sig_instance *inst = sig_alg_instance(tfm);
struct rsassa_pkcs1_inst_ctx *ictx = sig_instance_ctx(inst);
struct rsassa_pkcs1_ctx *ctx = crypto_sig_ctx(tfm);
struct crypto_akcipher *child_tfm;
child_tfm = crypto_spawn_akcipher(&ictx->spawn);
if (IS_ERR(child_tfm))
return PTR_ERR(child_tfm);
ctx->child = child_tfm;
return 0;
}
static void rsassa_pkcs1_exit_tfm(struct crypto_sig *tfm)
{
struct rsassa_pkcs1_ctx *ctx = crypto_sig_ctx(tfm);
crypto_free_akcipher(ctx->child);
}
static void rsassa_pkcs1_free(struct sig_instance *inst)
{
struct rsassa_pkcs1_inst_ctx *ctx = sig_instance_ctx(inst);
struct crypto_akcipher_spawn *spawn = &ctx->spawn;
crypto_drop_akcipher(spawn);
kfree(inst);
}
static int rsassa_pkcs1_create(struct crypto_template *tmpl, struct rtattr **tb)
{
struct rsassa_pkcs1_inst_ctx *ctx;
struct akcipher_alg *rsa_alg;
struct sig_instance *inst;
const char *hash_name;
u32 mask;
int err;
err = crypto_check_attr_type(tb, CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_SIG, &mask);
if (err)
return err;
inst = kzalloc(sizeof(*inst) + sizeof(*ctx), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!inst)
return -ENOMEM;
ctx = sig_instance_ctx(inst);
err = crypto_grab_akcipher(&ctx->spawn, sig_crypto_instance(inst),
crypto_attr_alg_name(tb[1]), 0, mask);
if (err)
goto err_free_inst;
rsa_alg = crypto_spawn_akcipher_alg(&ctx->spawn);
if (strcmp(rsa_alg->base.cra_name, "rsa") != 0) {
err = -EINVAL;
goto err_free_inst;
}
hash_name = crypto_attr_alg_name(tb[2]);
if (IS_ERR(hash_name)) {
err = PTR_ERR(hash_name);
goto err_free_inst;
}
ctx->hash_prefix = rsassa_pkcs1_find_hash_prefix(hash_name);
if (!ctx->hash_prefix) {
err = -EINVAL;
goto err_free_inst;
}
err = -ENAMETOOLONG;
if (snprintf(inst->alg.base.cra_name, CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME,
"pkcs1(%s,%s)", rsa_alg->base.cra_name,
hash_name) >= CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME)
goto err_free_inst;
if (snprintf(inst->alg.base.cra_driver_name, CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME,
"pkcs1(%s,%s)", rsa_alg->base.cra_driver_name,
hash_name) >= CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME)
goto err_free_inst;
inst->alg.base.cra_priority = rsa_alg->base.cra_priority;
inst->alg.base.cra_ctxsize = sizeof(struct rsassa_pkcs1_ctx);
inst->alg.init = rsassa_pkcs1_init_tfm;
inst->alg.exit = rsassa_pkcs1_exit_tfm;
inst->alg.sign = rsassa_pkcs1_sign;
inst->alg.verify = rsassa_pkcs1_verify;
inst->alg.max_size = rsassa_pkcs1_max_size;
inst->alg.set_pub_key = rsassa_pkcs1_set_pub_key;
inst->alg.set_priv_key = rsassa_pkcs1_set_priv_key;
inst->free = rsassa_pkcs1_free;
err = sig_register_instance(tmpl, inst);
if (err) {
err_free_inst:
rsassa_pkcs1_free(inst);
}
return err;
}
struct crypto_template rsassa_pkcs1_tmpl = {
.name = "pkcs1",
.create = rsassa_pkcs1_create,
.module = THIS_MODULE,
};
MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("pkcs1");

22
crypto/testmgr.c
View File

@ -5569,34 +5569,38 @@ static const struct alg_test_desc alg_test_descs[] = {
.cipher = __VECS(fcrypt_pcbc_tv_template) .cipher = __VECS(fcrypt_pcbc_tv_template)
} }
}, { }, {
.alg = "pkcs1pad(rsa,sha224)", .alg = "pkcs1(rsa,sha224)",
.test = alg_test_null, .test = alg_test_null,
.fips_allowed = 1, .fips_allowed = 1,
}, { }, {
.alg = "pkcs1pad(rsa,sha256)", .alg = "pkcs1(rsa,sha256)",
.test = alg_test_akcipher, .test = alg_test_sig,
.fips_allowed = 1, .fips_allowed = 1,
.suite = { .suite = {
.akcipher = __VECS(pkcs1pad_rsa_tv_template) .sig = __VECS(pkcs1_rsa_tv_template)
} }
}, { }, {
.alg = "pkcs1pad(rsa,sha3-256)", .alg = "pkcs1(rsa,sha3-256)",
.test = alg_test_null, .test = alg_test_null,
.fips_allowed = 1, .fips_allowed = 1,
}, { }, {
.alg = "pkcs1pad(rsa,sha3-384)", .alg = "pkcs1(rsa,sha3-384)",
.test = alg_test_null, .test = alg_test_null,
.fips_allowed = 1, .fips_allowed = 1,
}, { }, {
.alg = "pkcs1pad(rsa,sha3-512)", .alg = "pkcs1(rsa,sha3-512)",
.test = alg_test_null, .test = alg_test_null,
.fips_allowed = 1, .fips_allowed = 1,
}, { }, {
.alg = "pkcs1pad(rsa,sha384)", .alg = "pkcs1(rsa,sha384)",
.test = alg_test_null, .test = alg_test_null,
.fips_allowed = 1, .fips_allowed = 1,
}, { }, {
.alg = "pkcs1pad(rsa,sha512)", .alg = "pkcs1(rsa,sha512)",
.test = alg_test_null,
.fips_allowed = 1,
}, {
.alg = "pkcs1pad(rsa)",
.test = alg_test_null, .test = alg_test_null,
.fips_allowed = 1, .fips_allowed = 1,
}, { }, {

3
crypto/testmgr.h
View File

@ -1268,7 +1268,7 @@ static const struct sig_testvec ecrdsa_tv_template[] = {
/* /*
* PKCS#1 RSA test vectors. Obtained from CAVS testing. * PKCS#1 RSA test vectors. Obtained from CAVS testing.
*/ */
static const struct akcipher_testvec pkcs1pad_rsa_tv_template[] = { static const struct sig_testvec pkcs1_rsa_tv_template[] = {
{ {
.key = .key =
"\x30\x82\x04\xa5\x02\x01\x00\x02\x82\x01\x01\x00\xd7\x1e\x77\x82" "\x30\x82\x04\xa5\x02\x01\x00\x02\x82\x01\x01\x00\xd7\x1e\x77\x82"
@ -1380,7 +1380,6 @@ static const struct akcipher_testvec pkcs1pad_rsa_tv_template[] = {
"\xda\x62\x8d\xe1\x2a\x71\x91\x43\x40\x61\x3c\x5a\xbe\x86\xfc\x5b" "\xda\x62\x8d\xe1\x2a\x71\x91\x43\x40\x61\x3c\x5a\xbe\x86\xfc\x5b"
"\xe6\xf9\xa9\x16\x31\x1f\xaf\x25\x6d\xc2\x4a\x23\x6e\x63\x02\xa2", "\xe6\xf9\xa9\x16\x31\x1f\xaf\x25\x6d\xc2\x4a\x23\x6e\x63\x02\xa2",
.c_size = 256, .c_size = 256,
.siggen_sigver_test = true,
} }
}; };

1
include/crypto/internal/rsa.h
View File

@ -82,4 +82,5 @@ static inline int rsa_set_key(struct crypto_akcipher *child,
} }
extern struct crypto_template rsa_pkcs1pad_tmpl; extern struct crypto_template rsa_pkcs1pad_tmpl;
extern struct crypto_template rsassa_pkcs1_tmpl;
#endif #endif

1
include/linux/slab.h
View File

@ -448,6 +448,7 @@ void kfree_sensitive(const void *objp);
size_t __ksize(const void *objp); size_t __ksize(const void *objp);
DEFINE_FREE(kfree, void *, if (!IS_ERR_OR_NULL(_T)) kfree(_T)) DEFINE_FREE(kfree, void *, if (!IS_ERR_OR_NULL(_T)) kfree(_T))
DEFINE_FREE(kfree_sensitive, void *, if (_T) kfree_sensitive(_T))
/** /**
* ksize - Report actual allocation size of associated object * ksize - Report actual allocation size of associated object

6
security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
View File

@ -1114,7 +1114,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(ima_measure_critical_data);
#ifdef CONFIG_INTEGRITY_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS #ifdef CONFIG_INTEGRITY_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS
/** /**
* ima_kernel_module_request - Prevent crypto-pkcs1pad(rsa,*) requests * ima_kernel_module_request - Prevent crypto-pkcs1(rsa,*) requests
* @kmod_name: kernel module name * @kmod_name: kernel module name
* *
* Avoid a verification loop where verifying the signature of the modprobe * Avoid a verification loop where verifying the signature of the modprobe
@ -1128,7 +1128,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(ima_measure_critical_data);
* algorithm on the fly, but crypto_larval_lookup() will try to use alg_name * algorithm on the fly, but crypto_larval_lookup() will try to use alg_name
* in order to load a kernel module with same name. * in order to load a kernel module with same name.
* *
* Since we don't have any real "crypto-pkcs1pad(rsa,*)" kernel modules, * Since we don't have any real "crypto-pkcs1(rsa,*)" kernel modules,
* we are safe to fail such module request from crypto_larval_lookup(), and * we are safe to fail such module request from crypto_larval_lookup(), and
* avoid the verification loop. * avoid the verification loop.
* *
@ -1136,7 +1136,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(ima_measure_critical_data);
*/ */
static int ima_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name) static int ima_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name)
{ {
if (strncmp(kmod_name, "crypto-pkcs1pad(rsa,", 20) == 0) if (strncmp(kmod_name, "crypto-pkcs1(rsa,", 17) == 0)
return -EINVAL; return -EINVAL;
return 0; return 0;